Lundt v. Hodges

8 Citing cases

  1. Whaley v. Commonwealth

    CIVIL 4:22-CV-00987 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2022)

    Such criminal offense provisions do not create a private cause of action.”) (citing Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F.Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Iowa 1985)); Rockefellerv.U.S. Court of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 (“However, the plaintiff is precluded from asserting any claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C §§ 242 and 371 because, as criminal statutes, they do not convey a private right of action.”), Whaley cannot bring a private action under any of the criminal statutes he cites because no such private action exists.

  2. Brown v. Express Scripts

    CASE NO. 4:17CV866 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2018)   Cited 17 times
    Dismissing plaintiff's claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242 because plaintiff had no private right of action

    These claims will be dismissed as plaintiffs have no private right of action under these statutes, regulations or guidebooks. See Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F.Supp. 373, 375 (N.D.Iowa 1985) (no private rights of action under criminal statutes); Abou-Hussein v. Gates, 657 F.Supp.2d 77, 81 (D.D.C.2009) (same); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1387, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015) (federal statutes phrased as directives to federal agencies lack rights-creating language needed to imply a private right of action); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc., 773 F.3d 58, 63 (8th Cir.2014) (private right of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress and evidenced by an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)); Radford v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 3d 784, 789-90 (E.D. Mo. 2016). Plaintiff also attempts to raise claims for "black listing," and "gang stalking."

  3. Ausler v. Bradford

    CASE NO. 3:17-CV-03036 (W.D. Ark. Jun. 19, 2017)

    "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (immunity applies to cases under §§ 1985 & 1986 and other civil rights legislation). Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is nonjudicial; and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.

  4. Radford v. United States

    178 F. Supp. 3d 784 (E.D. Mo. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    These claims will be dismissed as plaintiffs have no private right of action under these statutes, regulations or guidebooks. See Lundt v. Hodges , 627 F.Supp. 373, 375 (N.D.Iowa 1985) (no private rights of action under criminal statutes); Abou–Hussein v. Gates , 657 F.Supp.2d 77, 81 (D.D.C.2009) (same); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1387, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015) (federal statutes phrased as directives to federal agencies lack rights-creating language needed to imply a private right of action); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc. , 773 F.3d 58, 63 (8th Cir.2014) (private right of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress and evidenced by an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275, 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) ).Whistleblower Protection Program, 29 U.S.C. § 218c

  5. Garcia v. Mortgage Sense Inc.

    EDCV 13-1678-CAS (DTBx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013)   Cited 3 times

    . To the extent that plaintiff is asserting this claim based on the aforementioned criminal statutes, the claim fails because these statutes do not give rise to a private right of action. See Lundt v. Hodges , 627 F.Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241); Wagner v. United States , 377 F.Supp.2d 505, 510-11 (D.S.C. 2005) (same regarding 18 U.S.C. § 242); Williams v. McCausland , 791 F.Supp. 992, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank , 167 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1999) (same regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1621); Roemer v. Crow , 993 F.Supp. 834, 836 (D. Kan. 1998) (same regarding 18 U.S.C. § 1621).

  6. Salley v. Rodriguez

    Civil No. 07-4914 (SRC) (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2008)   Cited 7 times

    toff without notice or hearing against deposit funds of depositors who owe indebtedness arising from use of bank credit cards); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973) (seizure by bank of plaintiff's funds and collateral in form of accounts receivable without foreclosure or notice is not act under color of state law cognizable under § 1983, since the state was not so significantly involved itself in procedures followed by bank as to constitute act under color of state law); Roemer v. Security Bancshares, 978 F. Supp. 988 (D. Kan. 1997) (a mortgagor's § 1983 complaint against bank and bank officials was dismissed where the mortgagor alleged that the foreclosure action against him was attempt to perpetuate apparently illegal lending practices of bank in violation of his constitutional rights, because complaint included no allegations of involvement of any state actors or any facts showing that defendants acted "under color of state law"); Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (Section 1983 plaintiff failed to state cause of action against auctioneers, implement dealers and a banker, where the plaintiff alleged no facts showing that such defendants were acting under color of state law); Nesglo, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 506 F. Supp. 254 (D.P.R. 1980) (allegations in complaint fail to state action under color of law where they merely recite that national banking association and its officers are members of regulated entities that invoked local court process resulting in attachment of plaintiff's goods in satisfaction of defaulted note or previous unpaid extensions of credit granted by bank). Since it is well established that an action taken by a private entity constitutes state action only when "there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself," Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Ja

  7. Kelley v. Watts

    4:07CV00945-WRW (E.D. Ark. Oct. 31, 2007)   Cited 2 times

    See Powell v. Kopman, 511 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Iowa 1985); United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.1 (1st Cir. 1989) (only a United States prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. § 242)).IV.

  8. Risley v. Hawk

    918 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1996)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that the district court may dismiss an action where the complaint duplicates the allegations of other pending or previously filed litigation, even where the previously filed actions were filed in different districts

    Such criminal offense provisions do not create a private cause of action. See Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D.Iowa 1985). Furthermore, §§ 4241-44 and § 4246 of the same title concern the determination of an individual's competency to stand trial, the determination of the existence of insanity at the time of the offense, and the hospitalization of such individuals, none of which are implicated by the defendant's Complaint.