Opinion
A21-1714
08-28-2023
Goodhue County District Court File No. 25-CV-20-1325
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
MICHELLE A. LARKIN, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. This dispute over the interests of appellant-landowners Ross R. Lundstrom, et al., and respondent Township of Florence, in the portions of unopened, platted streets abutting landowners' lots (the disputed streets), is before this court for a second time. On remand from the supreme court, we now review, with the benefit of intervening caselaw, the district court's summary judgment granting relief to the township on landowners' claims and denying the township's request for costs and disbursements.
2. In the underlying action, landowners sought a declaration that they are the fee owners of the disputed streets, free of any interest in the township, by operation of the Minnesota Marketable Title Act (MTA), Minn. Stat. § 541.023 (2022). The disputed streets are dedicated to public use by the Plat of Westervelt, which was recorded in 1857 and renamed the Plat of Frontenac in 1859.
3. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the township's summary-judgment motion in part and dismissed landowners' claims, implicitly determining that the MTA applied to the disputed streets, but concluding that the MTA's requirements were not satisfied. The district court denied the township's summary-judgment motion to the extent it requested costs and disbursements. Landowners appealed the dismissal of their claims, and the township cross-appealed the denial of its request for costs and disbursements.
4. In the first appeal, we relied on this court's then-recent holding in In re Application of Moratzka, 974 N.W.2d 266 (Minn.App. 2022) (Moratzka I), rev'd, 988 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2023), and upheld the district court's implicit determination that the MTA applies to streets dedicated to public use by plat. Lundstrom v. Township of Florence, 980 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn.App. 2022) (Lundstrom), vacated mem., (Minn. Apr. 26, 2023). Analyzing the MTA's requirements, we reversed the district court's determination that landowners lacked a source of title to the disputed streets. Id. at 192. In view of that reversal, we affirmed the district court's denial of the township's request for costs and disbursements. Id.
5. The supreme court then reversed Moratzka I, holding that "the [MTA] does not apply to land dedicated to public use by plat." In re Application of Moratzka, 988 N.W.2d 42, 42 (Minn. 2023) (syllabus by court) (Moratzka II). Shortly thereafter, the supreme court filed an order vacating our Lundstrom decision and remanding to this court for reconsideration in light of Moratzka II. Lundstrom v. Township of Florence, No. A21-1714 (Minn. Apr. 26, 2023) (order). We reinstated this appeal and allowed the parties an opportunity to brief the application of Moratzka II to the issues raised in the appeal and cross-appeal. The parties filed memoranda. We now reconsider the matter in light of Moratzka II.
6. On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts review de novo whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Sampair v. Village of Birchwood, 784 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2010). A summary judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any ground. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).
7. Applying the holding of Moratzka II, the MTA does not operate to extinguish the township's interest in the disputed streets. Moratzka II, 988 N.W.2d at 51. Because the MTA does not apply to the disputed streets, the district court properly granted partial summary judgment for the township on landowners' claims, and the judgment is affirmed in that respect. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 163.
8. Landowners do not dispute that Moratzka II resolves the merits of this appeal, but ask this court to remand the matter to the district court "for the purpose of the District Court receiving testimony and evidence as to a feasible time-table with respect to" removal of their property from the disputed streets. They do not explain why a new court-imposed deadline is necessary or an evidentiary hearing would be helpful to set it, pointing only to expiration of the original deadline. The township opposes the remand request.
9. Even while an appeal is pending, the district court retains jurisdiction as to matters independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the judgment. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. Collateral matters include enforcement of the judgment. David N. Volkmann Constr., Inc. v. Isaacs, 428 N.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Minn.App. 1988) (citing Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 1984)). If any party believes court supervision of the removal process is necessary, nothing prevents that party from seeking guidance in the district court.
10. Having concluded that the district court properly ruled in favor of the township on the merits, we turn to the district court's denial of the township's request for costs and disbursements.
11. Under Minnesota law, "the prevailing party . . . shall be allowed reasonable disbursements paid or incurred," Minn. Stat. § 549.04, subd. 1 (2022), and "costs shall be allowed" to a defendant "when judgment is rendered in the defendant's favor on the merits," Minn. Stat. § 549.02, subd. 1 (2022). "The plain language of the statute therefore creates a mandatory duty for a district court to award a 'reasonable' amount of costs and disbursements to the prevailing party." Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 155 (Minn. 2014).
12. But "the district court retains discretion to determine which party, if any, qualifies as a prevailing party," Benigni v. County of St. Louis, 585 N.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Minn. 1998), and to ensure the reasonableness of the amounts requested, Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 155.
In determining who qualifies as the prevailing party in an action, the general result should be considered, and inquiry made as to who has, in the view of the law, succeeded in the action. The prevailing party in any action is one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered.Borchert v. Maloney, 581 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. 1998) (footnotes omitted) (quotation omitted). A prevailing-party determination "depends on a careful weighing of the relative success of the parties to a lawsuit, a process that invests a certain amount of discretion in the district court." Posey v. Fossen, 707 N.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Minn.App. 2006).
13. The district court entered judgment in favor of the township on landowners' claims, and we affirm the judgment in that respect. There is no "relative success" to balance against the township's judgment. See Posey, 707 N.W.2d at 715. Under the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion by implicitly determining that the township was not the prevailing party and denying costs and disbursements on that basis. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of the township's request for costs and disbursements.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.