Opinion
Case No. 20010845-CA.
Filed September 18, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Fred D. Howard.
Holli Lundahl, Orem, Appellant Pro Se.
Stephen J. Trayner and Steven T. Densley, Salt Lake City, for Appellee CNA Insurance aka Continental Loss Adjusting.
Kevin D. Swenson and H. Scott Jacobson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees Hotsy Corporation and Adele Castro.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Davis.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Appellant Holli Lundahl appeals rulings dismissing her case against CNA Insurance aka Continental Loss Adjusting (CNA), Adele Castro (Castro), and Hotsy Corporation (Hotsy).
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that based upon Lundahl's extensive experience with the Utah courts, "she shall be charged with full knowledge and understanding of all relevant statutes, rules, and case law," despite her pro se status. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ¶ 5, 67 P.3d 1000. Accordingly, we conclude that Lundahl's brief is deficient under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition to requiring concise presentation of the issues and argument, including citations to the record, rule 24(j) states, in part, that "[a]ll briefs . . . must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." Lundahl's brief is confusing and disjointed, contains material unrelated to the case on appeal, and does not narrowly focus on the grounds for the district court decision. To the extent the claims can be deciphered, Lundahl claims that (1) the judgments relied upon for the application of res judicata are void; (2) those same judgments are interlocutory; (3) the parties to this case lack privity with parties in the prior actions; and (4) the claims are not time-barred.
The district court correctly dismissed the claims against Castro for insufficiency of process. Lundahl failed to accomplish personal service upon Castro, and she did not obtain an order from the district court allowing any alternative form of service. Accordingly, her unilateral attempt at service by mailing to Castro's last known address in California and to the California Department of Motor Vehicles was both unauthorized and ineffective to confer personal jurisdiction over Castro. Furthermore, the district court correctly dismissed the case against Castro for lack of personal jurisdiction. Lundahl alleged that Utah had personal jurisdiction under its long-arm statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (2002). She claimed that Castro "committed tortious injury" in Utah; however, Castro's alleged actions all related to a 1993 motor vehicle accident that occurred in California. The district court correctly concluded that there is no basis for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Castro also persuasively argues that she lacks the requisite minimum contacts with Utah, but our determination makes it unnecessary to consider that argument.
The district court also correctly ruled that claims against Hotsy are barred by res judicata. The initial California state court action resulted in dismissal of the claims against Hotsy pertaining to the 1993 accident as barred by the statute of limitations. The California case was dismissed in 1995, which was then affirmed in 1998 by the California Court of Appeals. Finally, at the time that this case was filed, the claims asserted against Hotsy (and Castro) were time-barred under California law. Lundahl argues, without adequate analysis or development of argument, that because she moved to Utah at some point after the 1993 accident, she is entitled to sue Hotsy and Castro in Utah as a Utah resident under Utah's borrowing statute. Lundahl was not a citizen of Utah when her cause of action arose in California. Her argument is neither persuasive nor adequately briefed, and it lacks merit.
The claims against CNA and various real or imagined CNA-related entities have been incorporated in numerous lawsuits filed in California and Utah, including the Utah federal court case and a 1999 case filed in Fourth District Court and assigned to Judge Ray Harding Jr. While that case was pending, Lundahl filed a largely duplicative complaint in this case, which was assigned to Judge Fred D. Howard, roughly two months after filing her initial complaint in Fourth District Court. Both complaints are based on the same operative facts. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims against CNA in this case based upon res judicata. Lundahl's blanket assertion that all prior rulings in favor of CNA are void and her further assertion that those judgments are not final for res judicata purposes are simply without merit. Despite Lundahl's attempts to distinguish various CNA-related parties, it is clear that the operative facts, the intended parties, and the claims are not distinguishable. The claim preclusion branch of res judicata precludes all claims actually asserted against a party or its privies, as well as all claims that were available in the earlier cases.See Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 13, 44 P.3d 642. A person or entity in privity "is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the issue preclusion branch of res judicata precludes subsequent litigation where identical issues have been previously litigated. See Culbertson, 2001 UT 108 at ¶ 25; Wild v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981). Despite Lundahl's attempts to frequently recharacterize her claims, redesignate parties, or adopt purported new theories, it is increasingly clear that the issues concerning CNA have been repeatedly resolved.
The judgments of dismissal are affirmed.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, Russell W. Bench, Judge, and James Z. Davis, Judge, concur.