However, a plaintiff may recover damages only for those injuries which are "causally linked" to the nuisance. See Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 709 (1980) (Awarding emotional distress damages because the nuisance would offend a reasonable person and "[a]ny anguish plaintiffs suffered is causally linked to their concern over the affects of the defendants' trespass and the resulting nuisance."). Here, Williams contends that Defendants' operation of the Willow Creek Wind Facility have interfered with the use and enjoyment of his property because the audible noise, vibration, light, and infrasound emitted by the wind turbines causes him stress, anxiety, and loss of sleep.

It points to the general rule that an owner may always testify about the value of property without demonstrating special knowledge, skill, or training, even if the owner has little knowledge of the value of the property. See Edwards v. Uncle Don's Mobile City, 273 Or. 746, 751, 543 P.2d 4 (1975); Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 709-10, 613 P.2d 63 (1980). Even assuming that a partner of a partnership that owns the condemned land comes within this rule, but see Assembly of God, 230 Or at 177 (testimony of president of corporation does not qualify as testimony of owner of condemned land), the trial court did not err.

"the general rule that an owner may always testify about the value of property without demonstrating special knowledge, skill, or training, even if the owner has little knowledge of the value of the property. See Edwards v. Uncle Don's Mobile City, 273 Or 746, 751, 543 P2d 4 (1975); Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 709-10, 613 P2d 63 (1980). * * *

"[']Intentional['] is used in this context to mean that the acts setting in motion the invasion were done with knowledge that a trespass would result and not that the acts were done for the specific purpose of causing a trespass or injury." United States v. W. Radio Servs. Co., 2012 WL 3776474, *6 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (quoting Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 705, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (1980)). "Any physical intrusion by a person onto another's land necessarily interferes with the possessor's right to exclusive use of the land."

Compliance with the zoning ordinance may be a factor in determining whether defendants' conduct was a nuisance, but it is not determinative. See Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo.Ct.App. 1984); Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 67 (Or.Ct.App. 1980); Klein v. Shadyside Health, Educ. Research Corp., 643 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1994); Bowers v. Westvaco Corp., 419 S.E.2d 661, 666 (Va. 1992). ¶ 15.

We view the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, who prevailed below. Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or.App. 701, 703, 613 P.2d 63 (1980) (“[In] an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, private landowners, granting damages and injunctive relief in an action for trespass * * * [t]he evidence [is] viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs[.]”). The access lot, Lot 16, is a 15–foot–wide strip of land running west to east along the northern border of defendant's lot, Lot 10, from a neighborhood street to the Willamette River. Lot 16 is jointly owned by plaintiff and all of the homeowners owning property in the River Park subdivision of West Linn, and the lot provides them with access to the river and an adjoining stretch of beach.

We view the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, who prevailed below. Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 703, 613 P2d 63 (1980) ("[In] an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, private landowners, granting damages and injunctive relief in an action for trespass * * * [t]he evidence [is] viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs[.]"). The access lot, Lot 16, is a 15-foot-wide strip of land running west to east along the northern border of defendant's lot, Lot 10, from a neighborhood street to the Willamette River. Lot 16 is jointly owned by plaintiff and all of the homeowners owning property in the River Park subdivision of West Linn, and the lot provides them with access to the river and an adjoining stretch of beach.

In Whitesell, however, the defendants knew or should have known that their tree would cause damage to the plaintiffs' property, which in Oregon would support a finding that they intended to cause that harm. See Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 705, 613 P2d 63 (1980). In Abbinett, the trial court found that the defendants were negligent, a finding that the appellate court affirmed.

The instruction here was not erroneous. Defendants rely on our statement in Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 613 P.2d 63 (1980): "A trespass may arise from an intrusion upon plaintiffs' land which is either intentional, negligent or the result of ultrahazardous conduct.

Evidence of a property's value after a tortious injury can be established several ways, including through the property owner's opinion as to the fair market value of the property and the diminution of that value caused by the defendant's injury to it. Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or.App. 701, 710 (1980) (explaining that an “owner of property is competent to give an opinion regarding its fair market value and diminution in value”).