Opinion
Launa Adolph, Matthew John Matern, Matern Law Group, PC, Manhattan Beach, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Remy J. Kessler, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND RULE 30(b)(6) TESTIMONY (DKT. NO. 62)
SUZANNE H. SEGAL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Uriel Luna, Carrie Gartin, Shaun Gartin and Gregoria Ruiz (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed the operative "corrected" Sixth Amended Complaint ("6AC") on January 28, 2014 on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals employed by Defendant Universal City Studios LLC d/b/a Universal Parks and Resorts ("Defendant"). The Sixth Amended Complaint followed several motions to dismiss and an order by the District Judge issued on August 27, 2013, granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In that August 27, 2013 order, the District Judge specifically denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' class allegations and noted that Plaintiffs should be permitted to take discovery. (See Order dated 8/27/13, Dkt. No. 35 at 14).
Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of Defendant's current and former non-exempt employees in the state of California from August 21, 2008 to the present who were represented by either the Amusement Areas Employees Union Local B-192 or the Unitehere Local 11 Union. (6AC at 2-3). Plaintiffs allege that they and the other members of the putative class (1) were not provided the requisite number of meal periods and rest breaks; (2) were required to work "off the clock" for the time spent changing in and out of their uniforms and turning in equipment, tools and uniforms; (3) were not paid all wages owed at the time of discharge; and (4) were not provided wage statements containing all of the information required by the California Labor Code. (Joint Stipulation, "Jt. Stip.," Dkt. No. 62 at 3).
On January 7, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel ("Motion" or "MTC") seeking further responses to several requests for production ("RFP") and requests for admission ("RFA") and requiring Defendant to produce qualified Rule 30(b)(6) deponents on certain topics. The Parties filed a Joint Stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, including the declaration of Matthew J. Matern ("Matern Decl.") in support of the Motion and the declaration of Ian A. Wright ("Wright Decl. I") in opposition to the Motion. (Id.). On January 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum ("P. Memo."), including the declaration of Aubry Wand ("Wand Decl."). (Dkt. No. 65). On January 20, 2015, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum ("D. Memo."), including a second declaration of Ian A. Wright. ("Wright Decl. II"). (Dkt. No. 66). On that same day, Defendant also filed objections to Ms. Wand's declaration ("Obj."). (Dkt. No. 67).
Although Plaintiffs state that they seek an order compelling "Defendant to supplement its responses to several documents requests, requests for admission and interrogatories," no interrogatories were specifically identified in the Motion. (Jt. Stip. at 5).
In its Objections, Defendant challenges Ms. Wand's attempt to authenticate and explain the contents of exemplars of Plaintiffs' earnings statements and time records on the grounds that Ms. Wand lacks personal knowledge and a foundation to do so and the documents are "impermissible hearsay." (Obj. at 2-3). It is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Defendant's Objections because the documents and testimony to which the Objections are directed did not affect the outcome of the Court's decision. See, e.g., PacifiCorp v. Northwest Pipeline GP, 879 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1194 n.7 & 1214 (D. Or. 2012) (declining to address evidentiary objections where the court would reach the same conclusions whether or not it considered the challenged materials).
On February 3, 2015, after a hearing on the motion, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the disputed discovery requests that the Court had not orally granted or denied in their entirety. The Court also ordered the Parties to file a joint status report indicating, by discovery request or Rule 30(b)(6) topic, any agreement reached or, if the Parties were unable to resolve their differences, the Parties' last respective positions, if any. (Dkt. No. 68). The Parties filed a Status Report on February 4, 2015 memorializing their agreements regarding the discovery issues. The parties requested that the Court adopt their agreements as part of the ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion. (Dkt. No. 69). The Parties' request for an order approving the discovery agreements addressed in their Status Report is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' specific discovery requests will be addressed seriatim in Part III below.
II.
STANDARDS
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit favors a broad scope of discovery. "[W]ide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for truth." Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 54 F.3d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
While federal policy broadly favors a party's right to discovery, special considerations may apply to discovery during the pre-certification stage of a putative class action. Courts are not required to authorize pre-certification discovery in all circumstances. See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) ("District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery will be permitted ... lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.' "); see also Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1309 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he parties' pleadings alone are often not sufficient to establish whether class certification is proper, and the district court will need to go beyond the pleadings and permit some discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a class may be certified.").
"In determining whether to grant discovery the court must consider its need, the time required, and the probability of discovery resolving any factual issue necessary for the [class certification] determination." Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Kamm v. California City Development Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975)). A district court has broad discretion to determine and order discover deemed relevant to the certification of a class. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).
"[W]here discovery is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses," the denial of discovery may be an abuse of discretion. Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313; see also Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611, 615 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("Although pre-certification discovery is discretionary, courts generally permit such discovery if it would substantiate the class allegations or if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied."). Indeed, courts generally authorize pre-certification discovery in recognition of the fact that "the necessary antecedent to the presentation of evidence [in support of class certification] is ... enough discovery to obtain the material, especially when the information is within the sole possession of the defendant." Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313.
However, "[w]here the necessary factual issues may be resolved without discovery, [pre-certification discovery] is not required." Id. The Ninth Circuit has upheld district court decisions refusing to allow pre-certification discovery where plaintiffs failed either to show a prima facie case for class relief or to establish that discovery was likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. See id. ("[W]here the plaintiffs fail to make even a prima facie showing of Rule 23's prerequisites ... the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating the class action allegations."); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Although in some cases a district court should allow discovery to aid the determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 are satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion."); Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942 (rejecting contention that it is procedurally improper for a trial court to rule on a defense motion to deny class certification before plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification while acknowledging that Ninth Circuit precedent "stand[s] for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and some discovery will be warranted").
Accordingly, while courts in the Ninth Circuit are not required to condition pre-certification discovery on a prima facie showing that class certification is appropriate, courts may require such a showing, or, in the alternative, a showing that discovery is likely to substantiate class allegations. As one court explained:
Doninger and Mantolete stand for the proposition that a court does not abuse its discretion if it decides to require a prima facie showing that class treatment is appropriate before allowing discovery on issues pertaining to class certification.... It is true that there is nothing in Doninger and Mantolete that suggests that a prima facie showing is mandatory in all cases, and it very well may be the case that courts routinely do not require such a showing. However, it is clear that a court has discretion to decide whether to require the prima facie showing that was approved of in Doninger and Mantolete before allowing discovery of the kind Plaintiff seeks here.
Kaminske v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2010 WL 5782995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010). Here, the District Judge concluded that Defendants' motion to dismiss the class allegations should be denied and that Plaintiffs should be permitted discovery. Accordingly, it is appropriate at this time to permit relevant pre-certification discovery to proceed.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. "Covered Employees" For Purposes Of Class Certification Discovery Shall Be Limited To Current And Former Parking Lot Attendants, Dishwashers, and Food Stand Attendants During The Covered Period
A fundamental dispute underlying Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is whether pre-certification discovery should encompass information relating to (1) the four named Plaintiffs only; (2) the four named Plaintiffs and employees with the same job titles as the named Plaintiffs (i.e., parking lot attendant, dishwasher, and food stall attendant); or (3) all non-exempt employees regardless of job title. The Parties' post-hearing agreements resolved this dispute with respect to the specific requests addressed in the Status Report. The Court finds that it is appropriate for all of Plaintiff's discovery requests at issue in the instant Motion to apply the same limitation on the scope of "covered employees" to the four named Plaintiffs and employees with the same job titles.
While it is not uncommon for courts to phase discovery in class actions, the distinction between "certification" and "merits" discovery is rarely clear-cut. Many courts have recognized that "discovery can certainly be relevant both to class certification issues and to the merits." Ho v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2007 WL 1394007, *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2007). These courts recognize that because certification issues often "cannot be meaningfully developed without inquiry into basic issues of the litigation," class certification discovery "is closely enmeshed with merits discovery." Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Nonetheless, the Rules advisory committee recommends that merits discovery in class action lawsuits, while often necessary even in the early stages of the litigation to establish the existence of a class, be "controlled" prior to certification to focus on issues relevant to the certification decision:
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense, it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the "merits," limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 advisory committee's notes to 2003 amendments, Paragraph (1).
Here, Plaintiffs require some discovery beyond that relating uniquely to the four named Plaintiffs to establish the typicality of the named Plaintiffs' claims and other certification requirements. At the same time, discovery involving all non-exempt employees regardless of job title would be overbroad at this stage of the litigation. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' discovery requests and deposition topics concerning "COVERED EMPLOYEES" are appropriately limited to requests for information relating or relevant to the named Plaintiffs and current and former non-exempt employees with the same job titles as the named Plaintiffs, i.e., parking lot attendant, dishwasher, and food stand attendant, for the covered period.
B. Production of Time Records, Edits To Time Records, Payroll Records and Bonus Payment Information (RFP Nos. 4, 10 & 12)
RFP No. 4 seeks the production, in electronic format, of "the time records of COVERED EMPLOYEES, any edits made to those time records, and the corresponding payroll records." (Jt. Stip. at 10). RFP No. 10 seeks data "reflecting edits or alterations made to the time records and payroll records," which Plaintiffs acknowledge may be subsumed in the response to RFP No. 4. (Id. at 11). RFP No. 12 seeks documents that "evidence or reflect bonuses (including, without limitation, longevity bonuses, spot bonuses, incentive bonuses, and referral bonuses)," which may also be subsumed in the response to RFP No. 4. (Id. at 40).
Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, Defendant will supplement its responses to RFP Nos. 4, 10 and 12 by producing "Timekeeper" system records and corresponding payroll records "for two pay periods per year of the putative class period" from August 21, 2008 to the present "for half of all putative class members who held the same job positions as the named Plaintiffs." (Status Report at 2). "The two pay periods will be the first pay period in July and the last pay period in October. The sample of half the putative class members will be randomly selected by choosing employees with the last names beginning with the letters ‘A' to ‘M' during one year, and selecting employees with the names beginning with the letters ‘N' to ‘Z' for the next year, alternating in this method for each year of the putative class period, from the list of putative class members who have held the same job positions as the named Plaintiffs." (Id.). The production shall adhere to the parameters in the chart below:
Records responsive to these requests "shall be produced in their native and/or electronic format to the extent feasible and subject to Plaintiffs' counsel addressing Defendant's security concerns for the electronic transfer and storage of private employee information, as addressed at the Parties' meet and confer after the February 3, 2015 hearing." (Status Report at 2).
| Pay Period | Sample (by employee last name) |
| October 2008 (last pay period) | A-M |
| July 2009 (first pay period) | N-Z |
| October 2009 (last pay period) | N-Z |
| July 2010 (first pay period) | A-M |
| October 2010 (last pay period) | A-M |
| July 2011 (first pay period) | N-Z |
| October 2011 (last pay period) | N-Z |
| July 2012 (first pay period) | A-M |
| October 2012 (last pay period) | A-M |
| July 2013 (first pay period) | N-Z |
| October 2013 (last pay period) | N-Z |
| July 2014 (first pay period) | A-M |
| October 2014 (last pay period) | A-M |
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP Nos. 4, 10 and 12 is GRANTED, as modified by the Parties' agreement.
C. Production Of Documents Reflecting Policies And Procedures Re The Provision Of Wage Statements And The Editing Of Time And Payroll Records (RFP Nos. 7 & 9)
RFP No. 7 seeks documents setting forth Defendant's "policies or practices regarding the provision of wage statements," including the information included on such wage statements. (Jt. Stip. at 34). RFP No. 9 seeks documents setting forth policies and practices "regarding the alteration or editing of time records and payroll records." (Id. at 35).
As the Court ruled at the hearing, RFP Nos. 7 and 9 are DENIED to the extent that the documents responsive to the requests have already been produced. Defendant shall conduct a reasonable search to confirm its representation at the hearing that it has produced all responsive documents. If no additional responsive documents are found, Defendant shall serve a supplemental written response to these RFPs to reflect that following a reasonable search, all documents responsive to the requests in Defendant's possession, custody or control have been produced. However, in the event that Defendant locates any responsive documents during the search, the documents must be produced. To that extent, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to RFP Nos. 7 and 9 is conditionally GRANTED IN PART.
D. Production Of Documents Reflecting The Calculation Of Regular Pay Rates (RFP No. 13)
As described in the Parties' Status Report, RFP No. 13 seeks documents "relating to how Defendant calculated the regular rate of pay for putative class members in the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 (Universal Studios Hollywood) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 bargaining units during the putative class period." (Status Report at 4). Pursuant the Parties' agreement, Defendant "will search for documents responsive to RFP No. 13 and will produce them to the extent that they exist." (See id.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to RFP No. 13 is GRANTED, as modified by the Parties' agreement.
E. Requests For Admission Regarding The Calculation Of The Regular Rate Of Pay (RFA Nos. 34-35)
RFA No. 34 seeks an admission that Defendant "did not include meal period penalty payments in calculating the regular rate of COVERED EMPLOYEES for the purposes of overtime payments during the COVERED PERIOD." (Jt. Stip. at 41). RFA No. 35 seeks an admission that Defendant "did not include rest period penalty payments in calculating the regular rate of COVERED EMPLOYEES for the purposes of overtime payments during the COVERED PERIOD." (Id.).
Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, Defendant will provide an answer to RFA Nos. 34 and 35, with qualification if necessary. (Status Report at 4). Accordingly, subject to Defendant's right to qualify its answers, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to RFA Nos. 34 and 35 is GRANTED.
F. Requests For Admission Regarding Bonus Payments (RFA Nos. 36-37)
RFP No. 36 seeks an admission that Defendant paid referral bonuses to covered employees during the covered period. (Jt. Stip. at 42). RFP No. 37 seeks an admission that Defendant did not include referral bonuses in the calculation of the employees' regular rate of pay. (Id.).
Defense counsel agreed at the hearing to provide an answer, with qualification if necessary, to the requests for admission concerning referral bonuses. Accordingly, subject to Defendant's right to qualify its answers, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to RFA Nos. 36 and 37 is GRANTED.
G. Rule 30(b)(6) Testimony Topics
Plaintiffs seek to compel testimony pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) on a wide range of topics. As a preliminary matter, however, the Court reminds the Parties of their respective obligations regarding the preparation of witnesses and legitimate scope of questioning for 30(b)(6) depositions.
The Court expects both Plaintiffs and Defendant to apply a rule of reasonableness to the degree of information that a witness may be expected to address at a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. A party who notices a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition should limit the scope of the matters that the witness is required to testify about to fair and reasonable parameters. For "Rule [30(b)(6) ] to effectively function, the requesting party must take care to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute." Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000). "Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses must be prepared and knowledgeable, but they need not be subjected to a ‘memory contest.'" Alexander v. F.B.I., 486 F.R.D. 137, 143 (D. D.C. 1998). While a corporation must make a good faith effort to prepare a 30(b)(6) witness to "fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter ... that task becomes less realistic and increasingly impossible as the number and breadth of noticed subject areas expand." Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000) ("An overbroad Rule 30(b)(6) notice subjects the noticed party to an impossible task.").
At the same time, a party responding to discovery has "an obligation to construe ... discovery requests in a reasonable manner." Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 618-19 (D. Colo. 2007); see also King-Hardy v. Bloomfield Board of Education, 2002 WL 32506294, *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2002) (responding party must give discovery requests a reasonable construction, rather than strain to find ambiguity); McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000) ("A party responding to discovery requests should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized....") (internal quotation marks omitted); Adolph Coors Co. v. American Insurance Co., 164 F.R.D. 507, 518 (D. Colo. 1993) (in responding to discovery requests, a responding party is "obligated ... to put the collective heads of its lawyers and agents together ... to give those requests a reasonable construction"). Therefore, a 30(b)(6) topic is not objectionable to the extent that it may be reasonably construed to seek relevant information capable of being addressed in a deposition.
1. Organizational Structure, Internal Audits And Staffing Requirements (Topic Nos. 5, 9, 11 & 40)
As modified by Plaintiffs prior to the filing of their Motion, Topic No. 5 seeks testimony "about the managerial and supervisorial hierarchy of the company, i.e., what are the job titles of the direct supervisors of Plaintiffs and prospective class members, who do those supervisors report to, and so on up the chain of command. Plaintiffs are not seeking to question the witness regarding the identity of every single supervisor, but expect the witness to be able to name the individuals who are responsible for creating and implementing Defendant's wage and hour policies, and the general supervisorial reporting structure in place." (Jt. Stip. at 50-51).
Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, Defendant has agreed to produce a witness for Topic No. 5 "to testify generally on this topic as to putative class members who were part of the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 (Universal Studios Hollywood employees) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 during the putative class period, and as limited by Plaintiffs in the Joint Stipulation." (Status Report at 4-5). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Topic No. 5, as modified by the Parties' agreement.
Topic No. 9 seeks testimony about any audits Defendant may have conducted to assess its "compliance with the California wage and hour laws alleged to have been violated in the operative complaint in this action." (Jt. Stip. at 52). Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, "Defendant will produce a witness to testify on this topic as to putative class members in the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 (Universal Studios Hollywood employees) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 bargaining units during the putative class period. However, Defendant maintains its concerns regarding the disclosure of information which may violate the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product and reserves its rights to raise these objections during the deposition." (Status Report at 4). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Topic No. 9, as modified by the Parties' agreement and subject to Defendant's reservation of its right to object to particular questions at the deposition on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.
Topic No. 11 seeks testimony about Defendant's staffing requirements. (Jt. Stip. at 54). Topic No. 40 "is related to Topic No. 11 but pertains more specifically as to how Defendant monitors and controls sales and labor costs." (Status Report at 5). Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, "Defendant has agreed to produce a witness to testify generally on these two topics as to putative class members in the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 (Universal Studios Hollywood employees) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 bargaining units during the putative class period. However, Defendant raises concerns about protecting confidential, proprietary and/or trade secret information regarding these topics. Defendant reserves the right to object during the deposition if it believes a response will reveal such information." Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Topic Nos. 11 and 40, as modified by the Parties' agreements and subject to Defendant's reservation of its right to object to particular questions on the grounds that the information sought is confidential, proprietary or a trade secret.
The Court advises the Parties, however, that it is unlikely to sustain such objections where the information requested is relevant to the class certification decision and the confidentiality of the information may be protected from improper dissemination pursuant to a protective order. It does not appear from the Court's review of the docket that a protective order has been entered in this matter. The Court's website contains guidance regarding protective orders and a sample protective order. This information is available in Judge Segal's section of the link marked "Judges' Procedures & Schedules." (See http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/JudgeReq.nsf/FAQs+about+Judges% 27+Procedures+and+Schedules?OpenView). The Parties are strongly advised to lodge a stipulated protective order for the Court's approval as soon as possible if they believe that discovery will require the exchange of confidential or protected personal information and that a court order is necessary to prevent the improper dissemination of that information.
2. Policies And Procedures Re The Tracking Of Hours Worked, Including Off The Clock Activities, Break Time, And Rounding (Topic Nos. 23, 28, 33, 34, & 38)
Topic No. 23 seeks testimony regarding Defendant's policies and procedures regarding "the creation, storage, and maintenance" of electronic time and payroll records. (Jt. Stip. at 56). As the Court ruled at the hearing, Plaintiffs' request for testimony regarding Topic No. 23 is GRANTED. Litigants often request, and are entitled to, information about a responding party's computerized document and data systems that will enable the requesting party to make sense of electronic data produced.
Topic No. 28 seeks testimony regarding Defendant's policies and procedures regarding the maintenance and provision of itemized wage statements to putative class members. (Status Report at 5). Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, "Defendant will produce a witness to testify on this topic as to putative class members in the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 (Universal Studios Hollywood) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 bargaining units during the putative class period." (Id. at 5-6). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Topic No. 28, as modified by the Parties' agreement.
Topic No. 33 seeks testimony about Defendant's policies and procedures relating to off the clock activities, including time spent at the theme park walking to and from a punch clock and time spent waiting for and changing into a uniform. (Jt. Stip. at 59). Pursuant to defense counsel's agreement at the hearing to produce a witness on this topic, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to Topic No. 33 is GRANTED.
Topic No. 34 seeks testimony about Defendant's policies and procedures regarding the provision of break rooms, including their location. (Jt. Stip. at 60). As the Court ruled at the hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to Topic No. 34 is GRANTED. Information about Defendant's break rooms is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims regarding the alleged coercion of employees into foregoing meal periods or the alleged requirement that meals be taken where employees could be approached by park patrons, such that employees effectively worked during ostensible meal periods.
Topic No. 38 seeks testimony regarding Defendant's policies and procedures relating to the rounding of putative class members' time records. (Jt. Stip. at 62). Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, "Defendant will produce a witness to testify on this topic as to putative class members who were part of the Unitehere, Local 11 (Commissary employees), Unitehere, Local 11 Universal Studios (Hollywood employees) and Amusement Areas Employees Union, Local B-192 bargaining units during the putative class period." (Status Report at 6). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to Topic No. 38 is GRANTED, as modified by the Parties' agreement.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant shall serve further responses to written discovery as required within fourteen days of the date of this Order. Defendant shall supplement its production of documents within fourteen days of the date of this Order. Defendant shall also be prepared to present Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses to testify about the 30(b)(6) Topics, as limited and required by this Order, within fourteen days of the date of this Order. The Parties are encouraged to lodge a stipulated protective order for the Court's review as soon as possible to govern procedures for the discovery of personal and/or proprietary information.
Expedited response and production deadlines are warranted because fact discovery closes on March 10, 2015. (Dkt. No. 53). Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, which the discovery sought by the instant Motion is intended to support, is due by March 30, 2015. (Dkt. No. 61).