It is settled law that a denial of summary judgment is ordinarily not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. An exception exists, however, when government officials seek summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, and the court denies the motion as a matter of law.See Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 501-02 (2d Cir. 2004);Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2004); Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2003). Such an order is collateral to the merits of the underlying action and is, therefore, considered final for appellate purposes.
This Court must first determine whether a constitutional right has been violated, and then determine whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2006); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004). In conducting this analysis, this Court will assume without deciding that Greene was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations and that Freedman qualifies as a state actor.
However, reliability as used in the Second Circuit looks to the trustworthiness of evidence, particularly the testimony of a confidential informant or victim, or hearsay evidence. See Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring independent inquiry by hearing officer into reliability of confidential informant before accepting testimony); Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148, 1152 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring independent inquiry by hearing officer into reliability of victim before accepting testimony); Sira, 380 F.3d at 78 (requiring totality of the circumstances inquiry before accepting hearsay evidence). The standard for sufficiency of the evidence continues to be the "some evidence" standard set forth in Hill.
Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). To pass muster under the Fourteenth Amendment, a hearing officer's disciplinary determination must also garner the support of at least "some evidence."
For such discipline to be constitutionally imposed, an inmate must be afforded "advance written notice of the charges; a fair and impartial hearing officer; a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; and a written statement of the disposition, including supporting facts and reasons for action taken." Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)). To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official's act or omission caused "a deprivation that is 'objectively, sufficiently serious' that he was denied 'the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities'"; and (2) that the official acted (or failed to act) with a '"sufficiently culpable state of mind' . . . such as deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety."
[1] advanced written notice of the charges; [2] written notice of the charges; a fair and impartial hearing officer; [3] a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; and [4] a written statement of the disposition, including supporting facts and reasons for the action taken.Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999)). In this case, Petitioner asserts only that he was denied an impartial hearing officer and that the hearing officer's decision itself violates due process.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the following procedural protections are required in disciplinary hearings when the length or conditions of confinement trigger due process protections: "advance written notice of the charges; a fair and impartial hearing officer; a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; and a written statement of the disposition, including supporting facts and reasons for the action taken." Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999));accord McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1983); Higgins v. Coombe, 2002 WL 362776, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2002); Silva v. Sanford, 1998 WL 205326, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1998). The importance of providing inmates with a detailed written disposition is well established.
In addition, due process requires that the findings of a prison disciplinary hearing officer be based on some "reliable evidence of the inmate's guilt." Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to defendants because Shabazz has not put forward sufficient evidence of bias at either the April 17 or May 2 hearings and because both decisions were based on reliable evidence.
In applying this standard, the Second Circuit "has not construed the phrase 'any evidence' literally," but has instead "looked to see whether there was 'reliable evidence' of the inmate's guilt." Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004).
In considering the impartiality of a hearing officer, the Supreme Court has held “that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the [hearing officer] . . . .” Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487-88 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).