each case. While the alimony analysis is factually driven, the court must also balance several statutory factors including those enumerated in section 36-5-101(d)(1) of the Tennessee Code. Although all statutory factors listed in section 36-5-101(d)(1) are important and are considered by the trial court, need and the ability to pay are the critical factors in setting the amount of an alimony award. See Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Long v. Long, 957 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). Section 36-5-101(d)(1) provides:
A trial court has the authority to make an additional award to an innocent spouse to defray the legal expenses resulting from the divorce. Smith Beaty v. Beaty, No. 03A01-9209-CH-00364, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 25, 1993) (quoting Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.App. 1986)). The allowance of attorney's fees is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not interfere except upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Smith v.Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997).
When assessing the needs and resources of the parties, the court may consider not only the relative values of each party's property post-divorce, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G) and (H), but also whether or not a party has been left with sufficient liquid assets to pay an attorney. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d at 25; Gilliam v. Gilliam, 776 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). In the present case, the property division left Ms. Morrow with a valuable piece of property, but little or no liquid assets.
When assessing the needs and resources of the parties, the court may consider not only the relative values of each party's property post-divorce, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G) and (H), but also whether or not a party has been left with sufficient liquid assets to pay an attorney. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d at 25; Gilliam v. Gilliam, 776 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). In the present case, Wife was awarded only $5,600 in liquid assets, and almost half of that amount (the $2,700 withdrawn from the First Farmers and Merchants Bank account) had been depleted by the time of the divorce hearing.
As with decisions involving alimony, decisions involving attorneys' fees are within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent evidence preponderating to the contrary. Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986) (citing Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983); Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983)).
The trial court's decision is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. See id. (citing Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986)); Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to alter a trial court's award of alimony "unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policy embodied in the applicable statutes."
See id. (citing Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986)); Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to alter a trial court's award of alimony "unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policy embodied in the applicable statutes."
We review a trial court's decision according to the familiar standard per Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we will uphold the trial court's decision unless it is based on an improper application of the law or is against the preponderance of the evidence. See Cranford, 772 S.W.2d at 50; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). Upon review of the record in this case, we find no error in the trial court's decision to terminate Husband's obligation to pay rehabilitative alimony.
We review a trial court's decision according to the familiar Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d) standard, and we will uphold the trial court's decision unless it is based on an improper application of the law or is against the preponderance of the evidence. Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d at 50; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). We have not been provided the record of the original divorce proceeding, and the parties have not otherwise explained the basis for the trial court's original spousal support decision.
An award of attorney's fees is appropriate in cases where the final decree does not provide the obligee with funds out of which counsel may be paid or where payment of those expenses would require depletion of other assets. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1980); see also Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 170 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) ; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986) (holding that an award of attorney fees may be justified in order to avoid requiring the spouse to deplete her source of income). We note that the appellant has incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $18,221.34.