Luna v. Luna

31 Citing cases

  1. Allen v. Allen

    No. W2000-01844-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 11, 2001)   Cited 1 times

    each case. While the alimony analysis is factually driven, the court must also balance several statutory factors including those enumerated in section 36-5-101(d)(1) of the Tennessee Code. Although all statutory factors listed in section 36-5-101(d)(1) are important and are considered by the trial court, need and the ability to pay are the critical factors in setting the amount of an alimony award. See Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Long v. Long, 957 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). Section 36-5-101(d)(1) provides:

  2. Daniel v. Daniel

    No. M2006-01579-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007)   Cited 6 times
    Finding transmutation where "[t]he mortgage, insurance, and taxes on the property were paid with the rental proceeds that had been deposited into a joint bank account held by the parties"

    A trial court has the authority to make an additional award to an innocent spouse to defray the legal expenses resulting from the divorce. Smith Beaty v. Beaty, No. 03A01-9209-CH-00364, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 234 (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 25, 1993) (quoting Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.App. 1986)). The allowance of attorney's fees is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not interfere except upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Smith v.Smith, 984 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997).

  3. Morrow v. Morrow

    No. M2003-02448-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 14, 2005)   Cited 6 times

    When assessing the needs and resources of the parties, the court may consider not only the relative values of each party's property post-divorce, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G) and (H), but also whether or not a party has been left with sufficient liquid assets to pay an attorney. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d at 25; Gilliam v. Gilliam, 776 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). In the present case, the property division left Ms. Morrow with a valuable piece of property, but little or no liquid assets.

  4. Hunter v. Hunter

    No. M2002-02560-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2005)   Cited 6 times

    When assessing the needs and resources of the parties, the court may consider not only the relative values of each party's property post-divorce, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(G) and (H), but also whether or not a party has been left with sufficient liquid assets to pay an attorney. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d at 25; Gilliam v. Gilliam, 776 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). In the present case, Wife was awarded only $5,600 in liquid assets, and almost half of that amount (the $2,700 withdrawn from the First Farmers and Merchants Bank account) had been depleted by the time of the divorce hearing.

  5. Reed v. Reed

    No. M2003-02428-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004)   Cited 4 times
    In Reed, the court addressed a similar dispute regarding a prenuptial agreement and the classification of separate property.

    As with decisions involving alimony, decisions involving attorneys' fees are within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent evidence preponderating to the contrary. Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986) (citing Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983); Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983)).

  6. Perry v. Perry

    No. W2001-01350-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002)   Cited 3 times
    In Perry, the trial court awarded Ms. Perry rehabilitative alimony for a period of two years, and ordered the parties to return to court before the end of that time for a review of the award.

    The trial court's decision is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. See id. (citing Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986)); Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to alter a trial court's award of alimony "unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policy embodied in the applicable statutes."

  7. Gore v. Gore

    No. M2000-02412-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001)   Cited 2 times

    See id. (citing Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986)); Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to alter a trial court's award of alimony "unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policy embodied in the applicable statutes."

  8. Scarbrough v. Scarbrough

    No. W2000-01807-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2001)   Cited 2 times

    We review a trial court's decision according to the familiar standard per Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we will uphold the trial court's decision unless it is based on an improper application of the law or is against the preponderance of the evidence. See Cranford, 772 S.W.2d at 50; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). Upon review of the record in this case, we find no error in the trial court's decision to terminate Husband's obligation to pay rehabilitative alimony.

  9. Hanselman v. Hanselman

    No. M1998-00919-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2001)   Cited 14 times
    In Hanselman v. Hanselman, No. M1998-00919-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 252792, (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2001), the court explained that the Guidelines "provide the approach for dealing with fluctuating income," although they "do not prescribe how variable income should be averaged."

    We review a trial court's decision according to the familiar Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d) standard, and we will uphold the trial court's decision unless it is based on an improper application of the law or is against the preponderance of the evidence. Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d at 50; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986). We have not been provided the record of the original divorce proceeding, and the parties have not otherwise explained the basis for the trial court's original spousal support decision.

  10. Fontenot v. Fontenot

    No. M1999-02322-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2000)

    An award of attorney's fees is appropriate in cases where the final decree does not provide the obligee with funds out of which counsel may be paid or where payment of those expenses would require depletion of other assets. Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1980); see also Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 170 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) ; Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986) (holding that an award of attorney fees may be justified in order to avoid requiring the spouse to deplete her source of income). We note that the appellant has incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $18,221.34.