Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. PC20050702, PC20060229
ROBIE, J.
In December 2005, plaintiffs Luke Anthony Paul Lumina (then known as Anthony P. Umina) and Michael P. Umina filed a petition for an accounting from defendant Leonard J. Umina as cotrustee of a trust known as the LMMK Trust (case No. PC20050702). (The other trustee of the trust was identified as Michael.) Leonard objected to the petition and filed his own petition for an accounting from Michael in March 2006.
Three other individuals -- Julia M. Umina, Mary F. Umina, and Kathryn E. Gauthier -- were also identified as petitioners. In a later amended petition, however, these three were dropped as petitioners.
In May 2006, Luke filed a complaint against Leonard for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith, breach of trust, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief relating to the LMMK Trust (case No. PC20060229). In response, Leonard filed a cross-complaint against Luke for breach of contract, fraud, and conversion.
Sometime thereafter not identified in the record, the court consolidated the two cases, presumably for all purposes. Also sometime not identified in the record, the parties stipulated to a bifurcated court trial on the issue of the validity of the LMMK Trust. That issue was apparently relevant both to the petitions for accountings and to the various causes of action asserted in the complaint and cross-complaint.
The trial was held in September 2007. In December 2007, the court found that the LMMK Trust “is not now nor ever was in effect; i.e., was never a valid trust” because the required signatures of all the donors identified in the trust document were never secured and there was “no credible evidence of the existence of a trust res.” The court’s findings were embodied in a document (apparently prepared by the court itself) entitled, “Judgment After Bifurcated Court Trial. Validity Of LMMK Trust.”
Leonard filed a timely notice of appeal from the “Judgment.”
In his opening brief, Leonard asserts the “Judgment” is appealable under subdivision (a)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which provides that an appeal may be taken from “a judgment, except... an interlocutory judgment.” It is well-established that under this statute, “an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, but not an interlocutory judgment. [Citations.] ‘The rule was designed to prevent piecemeal dispositions and costly multiple appeals which burden the court and impede the judicial process.’” (Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 132, italics added). Generally, “There can be only one final judgment in a single action, and only such a judgment is appealable.... ‘[A]n appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all... causes of action between the parties....’” (C3 Entertainment, Inc. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1025.)
When an issue is bifurcated for trial before the other issues in the case (see Code Civ. Proc., § 598), there is no “final judgment” until all of the remaining issues are resolved. (See Plaza Tulare v. Tradewell Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 523-524; Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 956-957.)
Here, the only issue resolved by the “Judgment” the trial court issued in December 2007 was whether the LMMK Trust was a valid trust. All the other issues in these consolidated cases remained to be resolved.
We take judicial notice of the record in another appeal taken in these consolidated cases in August 2008 (case No. C059939), which demonstrates that further trial court proceedings have continued in these cases while this appeal has been pending.
Under these circumstances, there appears no valid basis to characterize the “Judgment After Bifurcated Court Trial. Validity Of LMMK Trust” as a final judgment appealable under subdivision (a)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. Rather, it is an interlocutory judgment that is not appealable under that statute. As Leonard has failed to identify any other possible basis on which that “Judgment” could be deemed appealable, we are left with the conclusion that it is not.
It appears the trial court should not have entered a “judgment” on the bifurcated issue of the trust’s validity, but instead should have rendered a statement of decision. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1591.) Had the trial court followed this rule, this appeal probably never would have been taken, and the corresponding expense to the parties and the courts could have been avoided.
Of course, the issues Leonard seeks to raise in this premature appeal may be raised on appeal from the final judgment in these consolidated cases, whenever that judgment is finally entered. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 906.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., SIMS, J.
To avoid confusion, we will refer to the parties by their first names.