Thus it is apparent the motion presented no question for the trial court's consideration nor for review by this court. Owens v. State, 32 Ga. App. 417, 418 (2) ( 123 S.E. 919); Bryant v. State, 44 Ga. App. 781 (2) ( 163 S.E. 219); Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank Trust Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 223 (5) ( 110 S.E.2d 782); Whitehead v. State, 101 Ga. App. 732 ( 115 S.E.2d 429). 5. The fourth special ground of the motion alleges that during the progress of the trial the assistant solicitor made the remark: "Mr. Howard ought to anticipate anything as much money as he is getting out of this case."
" The statutory right to seek attorney fees accrued directly to the Bank as the result of Canal's refusal to pay the claim made by the Bank itself in its capacities as assignee thereof and as loss payee under the policy. See Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217 ( 110 S.E.2d 782) (1959). "In reviewing a judgment against an insurer under OCGA § 33-4-6 for bad faith penalties and attorney fees for refusing to pay a claim, `[t]he proper rule is that the judgment should be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it unless it can be said as a matter of law that there was a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer.' [Cits.
The above evidence shows clearly that the jury was authorized to make an award of bad faith and attorney fees. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 217 Ga. 206 (2) ( 121 S.E.2d 649); U.S. F. G. Co. v. Evans, 223 Ga. 789 ( 158 S.E.2d 243); Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Grehan, 74 Ga. 642, 657; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lathan, 77 Ga. App. 6, 9 ( 47 S.E.2d 596); Jackson v.Motors Ins. Corp., 97 Ga. App. 658 ( 104 S.E.2d 253); North British c. Ins. Co. v. Mercer, 90 Ga. App. 143, 145 ( 82 S.E.2d 41); Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 228 ( 110 S.E.2d 782). Judgment affirmed. Marshall and Smith, JJ., concur.
" and the witness answered, "Yes, it is." Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 222 ( 110 S.E.2d 782); Rabun v. Wynn, 209 Ga. 80 (7) ( 70 S.E.2d 745). 3. Counsel for the appellant contends that it was error to allow a witness for the plaintiff to read from a letter regarding certain laboratory tests.
The admission of this evidence, if error, does not require the grant of a new trial because the defendant elicited testimony substantially to the same effect on cross examination of the same witnesses and did not object to testimony comparable in import by another witness. Chatham Amusement Co. v. Perry, 216 Ga. 445, 449 ( 117 S.E.2d 320); Rabun v. Wynn, 209 Ga. 80, 83 ( 70 S.E.2d 745); Fluker v. State, 184 Ga. 809 ( 193 S.E. 749); Simmons v. State, 34 Ga. App. 163, 164 ( 128 S.E. 690); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Hancock, 71 Ga. App. 471, 472 ( 31 S.E.2d 59); Kell v. Hunter, 84 Ga. App. 792, 795 ( 67 S.E.2d 597); King v. Sharpe, 96 Ga. App. 71, 79 ( 99 S.E.2d 283); Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 222 ( 110 S.E.2d 782); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Ga. App. 260, 262 ( 119 S.E.2d 38); Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. McDonald, 103 Ga. App. 328, 340 ( 119 S.E.2d 356); Chandler v. Alabama Power Co., 104 Ga. App. 521, 525 ( 122 S.E.2d 317), reversed on other grounds, 217 Ga. 550 ( 123 S.E.2d 767); Williams Bros. Grocery Co. v. Blanton, 105 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 124 S.E.2d 479); American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 109 Ga. App. 122, 124 ( 135 S.E.2d 442); General Gas Corp. v. Whitner, 110 Ga. App. 878, 879 ( 140 S.E.2d 227). 2.
The contentions of counsel as shown by this ground as to why a motion for a mistrial should have been granted do not appear to have been urged before the trial court. This ground of the motion for new trial is too defective and incomplete to present any question for decision, and the trial judge did not err in overruling it. Owens v. State, 32 Ga. App. 417, 418 (2) ( 123 S.E. 919); Lumbermens Underwriting Alliance v. First National Bank Trust Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 223 (5) ( 110 S.E.2d 782)." Whitehead v. State, 101 Ga. App. 732 ( 115 S.E.2d 429).
The final two special grounds assign error on portions of the charge of the court on the ground that such portions were confusing and contrary to law and harmful and prejudicial to the defendant and misleading to the jury. These assignments of error are entirely too vague and general to present any question for decision. They fail to point out how or in what way the portions of the charge were confusing and misleading and prejudicial to the defendant, and they fail to point out what law movant contends the instructions were contrary to. Betts Co. v. Mims, 14 Ga. App. 786, 788 ( 82 S.E. 474); Hill Bros. v. Render, 33 Ga. App. 13, 14 (7) ( 125 S.E. 79); Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 226 (10) ( 110 S.E.2d 782). 5. The only assignments of error contained in the bill of exceptions filed by the plaintiff are to the ruling of the trial court on May 10, 1962, sustaining ground 8 of the defendant's special demurrers to the petition and to the judgment of the court awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $82.89, rather than in the amount of $682.89, rendered as a part of the judgment on the verdict on April 24, 1963. Plaintiff waited until the trial court overruled the defendant's motion for new trial and then tendered his bill of exceptions on November 19, 1963. While this bill of exceptions is not denominated specifically as a cross bill of exceptions, under the foregoing facts it contains no timely assignment of error on a final judgment and is thus deficient as a direct or main bill of exceptions.
There is no merit in special grounds 5,6, and 8 of the amended motion for new trial, for even if the trial court erred in the comments and colloquy with counsel during the trial as set forth in these grounds, which we do not decide, a proper objection or motion for mistrial should have been made at the time of the occurrence to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any possible prejudicial effect of his remarks by appropriate instructions to the jury or other action. In the absence of this objection, and none is disclosed by the record, error assigned on the judge's remarks for the first time in the motion for new trial will not be considered. Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270, 275 ( 106 S.E. 274); Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 833, 850 ( 174 S.E. 597); Shepherd v. State, 203 Ga. 635 ( 47 S.E.2d 860); Davis v. Peek, 43 Ga. App. 199 ( 158 S.E. 348); Cline v. State, 49 Ga. App. 16 ( 174 S.E. 194); Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliancev. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 223 ( 110 S.E.2d 782); Darby v. McNelley, 103 Ga. App. 570 ( 120 S.E.2d 153); Flanigan v. Reville, 107 Ga. App. 382, 384 ( 130 S.E.2d 258). 3. There is no merit in ground 12 of the amended motion for new trial. It is never error to refuse to direct a verdict.
Our courts have held that a party claiming he has been prejudiced by a trial judge's expression of opinion during the course of the trial, concerning what has been proved or the weight of the evidence, cannot raise this ground for the first time in a motion for new trial, but must make a motion for mistrial and give the trial judge an opportunity to correct any possible prejudicial effect of his remarks by appropriate instructions to the jury or other action. Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270, 275 ( 106 S.E. 274); Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 833, 850 ( 174 S.E. 597); Shepherd v. State, 203 Ga. 635 ( 47 S.E.2d 860); Davis v. Peek, 43 Ga. App. 199 ( 158 S.E. 348); Cline v. State, 49 Ga. App. 16 ( 174 S.E. 194); Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. First Nat. Bank c. Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 223 ( 110 S.E.2d 782). The case of Potter v. State, 117 Ga. 693 ( 45 S.E. 37), and other cases relied on by the plaintiff were overruled in Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 783, 791 ( 28 S.E.2d 139). The plaintiff having made no motion for mistrial, these grounds are without merit.
The contentions of counsel as shown by this ground as to why a motion for a mistrial should have been granted do not appear to have been urged before the trial court. This ground of the motion for a new trial is too defective and incomplete to present any question for decision, and the trial judge did not err in overruling it. Owens v. State, 32 Ga. App. 417, 418 (2) ( 123 S.E. 919); Lumbermens Underwriting Alliance v. First National Bank Trust Co., 100 Ga. App. 217, 223 (5) ( 110 S.E.2d 782). Judgment affirmed. Gardner, P. J., Townsend and Frankum, JJ., concur.