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Lull v. Cnty. of Placer

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Oct 18, 2022
No. 21-16735 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022)

Opinion

21-16735

10-18-2022

CHRISTOPHER LULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF PLACER; STEVEN SOLOMON; BRIAN HARRIS; DAVID FRANK; MICHAEL PROFANT; RYAN ZENDER; JIM HOLMES; KIRK UHLER; JENNIFER MONTGOMERY; ROBERT WEYGANT; JACK DURAN; DAN BLAIR; TIMOTHY WEGNER, Defendants-Appellees.


NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Submitted October 12, 2022 [**]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California D.C. No. 2:19-cv-02444-KJM-AC Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM [*]

Christopher Lull appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of a fine and assessment related to his real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim); Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal on the basis of res judicata). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Lull's claims against the County of Placer, and Lull's official capacity claims, other than his unreasonable seizure claim, against the individual defendants, because Lull's claims were raised or could have been raised in his prior federal action between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (elements of res judicata under federal law); see also Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2017) (res judicata bars claims that accrue prior to the filing of the operative complaint in the prior federal action).

The district court properly dismissed Lull's procedural due process claim because Lull failed to allege facts sufficient to show he was denied any specific, meaningful protections in connection with the nuisance abatement or assessment hearings. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (conclusory allegations are not entitled to be assumed true); Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 379 (9th Cir. 1983) (procedural due process requires an opportunity "to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner").

The district court properly dismissed Lull's substantive due process claim because Lull failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the imposition of the fine or assessment was done in a manner that was arbitrary or shocks the conscience. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998) (substantive due process claim requires conduct that is arbitrary or shocks the conscience); Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (not every state law violation gives rise to a due process claim).

The district court properly dismissed Lull's equal protection claim because Lull failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was treated differently from other, similarly situated individuals. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (to state a class-of-one equal protection claim the plaintiff must show that he or she "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment").

The district court properly dismissed Lull's unreasonable seizure claim because Lull failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that he was arrested, or that defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him briefly and issue him a citation for driving with a suspended license. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (a stop may become an arrest it if "would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she will not be free to leave after brief questioning"); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that reasonable suspicion allows law enforcement to conduct brief investigatory stops).

The district court properly dismissed Lull's retaliation claim because Lull failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his criticisms of defendants' job performance and earlier-filed lawsuit were a substantial or motivating factor in Lull being required to pay a fine and assessment or being cited for driving with a suspended license. See Mendocino Env't Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (First Amendment retaliation claim requires plaintiff to establish that defendant chilled or deterred speech and "such deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor" in defendants' conduct (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).


Summaries of

Lull v. Cnty. of Placer

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Oct 18, 2022
No. 21-16735 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022)
Case details for

Lull v. Cnty. of Placer

Case Details

Full title:CHRISTOPHER LULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF PLACER; STEVEN…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Oct 18, 2022

Citations

No. 21-16735 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2022)