It is, in many cases, a substitute for a bill in equity and is governed by equitable principles." Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich App 539, 545; 463 NW2d 152 (1990). After the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition on Count I, plaintiff filed a renewed motion for partial summary disposition on Counts II and III. Counts II and III of the complaint alleged claims for assumpsit and unjust enrichment based on the alleged violation of MCL 141.91.
According to appellants, because they were not involved in these proceedings at the time the initial award of benefits was granted, consideration of the issue was barred by MCL 418.852(1), as well as the doctrine of laches. Laches is an equitable doctrine. While the WCAC has no equitable jurisdiction, it is well established that the WCAC may apply equitable principles in appropriate instances to further the purposes of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich App 539, 544-545; 463 NW2d 152 (1990). MCL 418.852(1) states: "The liability of a carrier or fund regarding a claim under this act shall be determined by the hearing referee or worker's compensation magistrate, as applicable, at the time of the award of benefits.
Thus, it was necessary for the circuit court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction to decide this dispute between the two insurers. In Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich. App. 539, 545; 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990), this Court held that the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board had exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for reimbursement against an employee for the double payment of disability and workers' compensation benefits. However, the situation in Lulgjuraj is distinguishable from the present case.
An employer pays supplemental benefits to an injured employee but is reimbursed for those payments from general funds either by the compensation supplement fund or through tax credits. MCL 418.352(8); MSA 17.237(352)(8), MCL 418.391(7); MSA 17.237(391)(7); Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich. App. 539, 542; 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990). The employer cannot have a double recovery by withholding the overpayments from supplemental benefits it owes the employee and also by being reimbursed by the state, directly or indirectly.
Supplemental benefits are an obligation of the state. Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich. App. 539, 542; 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990). As explained in Lulgjuraj, an employer or carrier is merely a disbursement agent for the state.
D In Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich. App. 539; 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990), while the plaintiff litigated his workers' compensation claim, he received S A benefits and EDB payments from Aetna, the employer's group insurer. When the board awarded the plaintiff workers' compensation benefits, the employer paid, but the plaintiff refused to reimburse Aetna pursuant to alleged assignment agreements.
Id. More recently, in Lulgjuraj v Chrysler Corp, 185 Mich. App. 539; 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990), this Court held that, even in the absence of any reimbursement agreement between the insurance company and the employee, the Appeal Board erred in denying the insurance company reimbursement where the employee had received sickness and accident benefits provided on behalf of the employer. The Court based its decision on equitable principles.
Nevertheless, some confusion may have resulted from this Court's observation that "[w]hile the [MCAC] has no equitable jurisdiction , it is well established that it may apply equitable principles in appropriate instances to further the purposes of the [WDCA]." Lulgjuraj v. Chrysler Corp. , 185 Mich. App. 539, 544-545, 463 N.W.2d 152 (1990) (emphasis added). To the extent Lulgjuraj can be understood to suggest that the MCAC may exercise equitable powers, such as the power to reform a contract, Lulgjuraj unambiguously conflicts with well-established and thoroughly settled caselaw from our Supreme Court to the contrary.