Thus, Reid’s claim that the court’s ruling was based solely on "[b]road, conclusory statements" is entirely without merit. See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607, 610-611 (2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) ; cf. Rainey v. Lange , 261 Ga. App. 491, 492 (1), 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003) (The trial court’s grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: "Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child’s best interests and will promote the child’s well-being and avoid harm to the child’s welfare, by way of providing a system of checks and balances." In vacating the order and remanding the case to the trial court, this Court held that "[t]his broad conclusory statement fails to set forth specific findings of fact supporting the trial court’s grant of grandparent visitation which would enable this Court to conduct an intelligent review of the merits of this case.") (

Sheppard's request for grandparent visitation is governed by OCGA § 19–7–3, commonly referred to as “The Grandparent Visitation Statute.” See Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga.App. 607, 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006). In accordance with the statute, a grandparent may file an original action for visitation rights to a minor child when the parents are separated and the child is not living with both of the parents.

OCGA § 19-7-3, the Grandparent Visitation Statute, "was enacted to provide a mechanism for courts to grant a grandparent visitation rights with his or her minor grandchild, where, as here, a child's parent objects." Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607, 611 (3), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006). The statute "codifies a standard for the trial courts to utilize in balancing the interests of the child, the rights of the parents, and the wishes of an alienated grandparent."

On appeal from an order granting grandparent visitation, we "defer to the trial court's factfinding and affirm unless the evidence fails to satisfy the appellate standard of review." Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga. App. 607, 610 (1) ( 634 SE2d 439) (2006). The record shows that Cates and his wife, Shelley, had two minor children as a result of their marriage.

(Footnote omitted.) Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607, 611 (3), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006). "Where a petitioning grandparent meets this standard, a trial court may grant visitation — notwithstanding evidence or circumstances that weigh against a grant of visitation."

We find that they do. In reaching this conclusion, we note that although clear and convincing evidence represents a heightened standard of proof, it did not require the grandparents to come forward with unequivocal or undisputed evidence that custody with the mother would result in physical harm to L. G. M. See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607, 611 (3), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) (applying OCGA § 19-7-3, the Grandparent Visitation Statute). See also Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U. S. 745, 756 (II), 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard).

Id. at 536–537(2), 768 S.E.2d 278 (noting the order expressly recognized the mother's judgment as to the best interest of the child regarding visitation shall be given deference but is not conclusive). See also Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga.App. 607, 608–609, 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) (affirming trial court's grant of regularly scheduled grandparent visitation where record showed mother had previously agreed the grandparent could spend “some time” with her children). Here, the trial court utilized the correct clear and convincing standard of proof in finding that A.C.'s welfare would be harmed unless reasonable visitation with Callahan was granted and that it is in the best interest of A.C. that such visitation be granted.

We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but defer to the trial court's factfinding and affirm unless the evidence fails to satisfy the appellate standard of review.Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga.App. 607, 609–610(1), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) (citations omitted). So viewed, the evidence shows that A.B. was born on December 11, 2001.

(Citations omitted.) Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607, 609-610 (1), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006).So viewed, the record shows that Ryan Elmore ("Ryan") and his daughter E. E. lived with E. E.’s grandparents off and on during the child’s early life. E. E.’s grandmother, Leslie Clay ("Leslie"), played a large part in helping to raise E. E. during this time and she provided child care as well as financial support for E. E. In the past, Leslie was a maternal figure for E. E. In 2013, however, Ryan wed Kelly and E. E. moved out of her grandparent’s home, thereby discontinuing Leslie’s quasi-motherly role and the grandparents’ financial support of E. E.

Cates v. Jamison, 301 Ga.App. at 442, 687 S.E.2d 675;Rainey v. Lange, 261 Ga.App. at 492(1), 583 S.E.2d 163. Cf. Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga.App. 607, 611(2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) (The visitation award stated that it was based on the trial court's finding that “the strong, emotional bond between [the grandfather] and the said minor children is so well established that the emotional welfare and well being of the children would actually suffer unless visitation with [the grandfather] is granted.” The order also contained a statement showing that the trial court employed the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.