Opinion
EP-21-CV-00302-FM
12-05-2022
JAIRO LUIS LUJAN, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN BEARD, in his individual capacity; and THE COUNTY OF EL PASO, TEXAS, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
FRANK MONTALVO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the court are Defendant Jonathan Beard's “First Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Claim Against Jonathan Beard” (“Motion”), ECF No. 15, filed Mar. 10, 2022 and Plaintiff Jairo Luis Lujan's “Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant Jonathan Beard's First Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (“Response”), ECF No. 17, filed March 24, 2022 Defendant Beard moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Upon due consideration of the Motion, Response, and applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
“First Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Claim Against Jonathan Beard” (“Mot.”), ECF No. 15, filed Mar, 10, 2022.
“Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant Jonathan Beard's First Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (“Resp.”), ECF No. 17, filed March 24,2022. .
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This cause arises from an alleged unprovoked assault on Plaintiff by Defendant Beard and -the underlying policies and practices of the County of El Paso, Texas (“Defendant El Paso County”). Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint alleges the following:
“Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint” (“Am. CompL”) 1 ¶ 1.1, ECF No. 2, filed Jan. 6,2022.
On December 12,2019, Plaintiff was detained pre-trial in the booking area of the El Paso County Jail Annex. He was cold, so he knocked on the window of a door—behind which El Paso County Sheriffs Office employees were working—and asked for a blanket. Defendant Beard, a law enforcement officer employed by the El Paso County Sheriffs Office, opened the door and, rather than provide a blanket, led Plaintiff down a hallway to stand outside a row of cells. Plaintiff was facing the wall with his hands behind his back while Defendant Beard was facing Plaintiff.Together they walked down the short hallway leading back towards the booking area. Defendant Beard and Plaintiff walked partway down the hall until Defendant Beard stopped and pointed back towards the row of cells they had just left, indicating to Plaintiff that he should return the way they had come. Plaintiff complied with Defendant Beard's instructions and offered no resistance as he walked back towards the row of cells. Defendant Beard then grabbed Plaintiff by the back of his shirt and marched him towards the cell doors, As Defendant Beard “propelled” Plaintiff down the hall, Defendant Beard shoved Plaintiff into a concrete wall, causing Plaintiff to hit his head, Defendant Beard then held Plaintiff by the back of his shirt as Defendant Beard unlocked the door to a cell and shoved Plaintiff inside. Without provocation, Defendant Beard kicked Plaintiff's legs out from under him and pushed him to the ground. As Plaintiff fell, Defendant Beard used his left hand to strike Plaintiff in the lower back, accelerating the force with which Plaintiff hit the floor. Defendant Beard stood over Plaintiff and taunted him with profanities.Then, as Plaintiff lay on the floor, Defendant Beard exited the cell and closed the door.
Id. .
Id. at 3 ¶ 5.3.
Id. at 3 ¶ 4.2,4 ¶ 5.6.
Id. at 4 ¶ 5.7. .
Id.
Id. 4 ¶ 5.8.
Id. at 4 ¶ 5.9.
Id. at 4 ¶ 5.10.
Id. at4 ¶ 5.11.
Id. at 4 ¶ 5.12; 5 ¶ 5.16.
Id. at 5 ¶ 5.17.
Id. at5 ¶ 5.18.
Id. at 5 ¶ 5.20.
Id. at 5 ¶ 5.21.
After repeatedly requesting medical attention, Plaintiff was eventually given a pair of crutches. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was using his crutches when he experienced a low back spasm, causing him to trip over his sandals, fall, and hit his head. Roughly a month later, Plaintiff experienced another low back spasm, this time while in the shower, causing him a painful fall, from which he was unable to rise without assistance. Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with a severe back injury—specifically, a herniated disc—dramatically affecting his quality of life.Prior to the incident with Defendant Beard, Plaintiff had not experienced back spasms, nor was he aware of any lower back injury.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.30-31.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.32.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.34.
Id. at7¶5.37.
Id. at 7 ¶ 5.42; Resp. at 10.
B. Procedural Background
On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Beard and El Paso County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging use of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On March 10, 2022, Defendant Beard, pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6), filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff responded on March 24, 2022. Shortly thereafter, Defendants Beard and El Paso County filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint.
“Plaintiff's Complaint,” ECF No. 1, filed Dec. 10, 2021.
Id.
Am. Compl. at 1.
Mot.
Resp.
“Defendant Beard and the County of El Paso, Texas' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint,” ECF 22, filed April 14, 2022.
C. Parties' Arguments
Defendant Beard seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs excessive force claim, citing qualified immunity as the basis. First, Defendant Beard asserts his actions were not unreasonable as “the . use of force was limited to returning Lujan back to his cell and pushing him to the ground.”Neither did he harbor any malicious or sadistic intent. Second, Defendant Beard contends that Plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between the initial application of force and the complained-of back injury, noting the two intervening instances in which Plaintiff tripped on his sandal and slipped in the shower.
Mot. at 3-5. .
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id., Am. Compl. at 6 ¶¶ 5.32, 5.34
Plaintiff counters that Defendant Beard's conduct was objectively unreasonable for several reasons: 1) he had no legitimate reason to use force; 2) he caused Plaintiff to suffer a serious injury; 3) he made little effort to limit his use of force; 4) he was not responding to any security threat; and 5) no reasonable officer would have considered Plaintiff a threat. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Beard's invocation of a “malicious or sadistic” test is inapposite as Plaintiff is asserting an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment whereas the “malicious or sadistic” test applies only under an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Beard's actions were the proximate cause of the injuries he sustained tripping over his sandals and falling in the shower since these falls resulted from low back spasms, which in turn were caused by a back injury “directly traceable to [Defendant] Beard's excessive force.” Plaintiff notes that, prior to the incident with Defendant Beard, he “was not aware of any injury to his lower back and did not experience back spasms.” Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, at the time Defendant Beard assaulted Plaintiff, using force against a compliant, nonresisting detainee was clearly unconstitutional and therefore Defendant Beard is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Resp. at 6-8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Therefore, a complaint is not required to set out “detailed factual allegations,” but it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Although the court must accept well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, it does not afford conclusory allegations similar treatment.
Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,313 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Sales, Inc., 677 F,2d 1045,1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F,2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974)).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for plaintiffs seeking damages or injunctions against local officials in their individual capacity for constitutional violations. Suit against a local official may be appropriate when they are acting “under color of law,” exercising the authority of the state. However, the official's constitutional tort must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. .
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186(1961).
Cnty. of Los Angeles, Calif, v. Mendez, 137 S.Ct. 1539, 1548 (U.S. 2017),
Additionally, plaintiffs must defeat qualified immunity, which courts grant to law enforcement officers: These officials “are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” and should, therefore, be protected from “harassing litigation.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (holding that law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified but not absolute immunity).
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399 (2015); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
a. Proximate Cause
Law enforcement officers may only be held liable “for the foreseeable consequences of [] their constitutional torts.” According to Defendant Beard, Plaintiffs injuries from tripping over his sandals and slipping in the shower resulted from his own blunders, which were therefore “intervening” causes. As a result, Defendant Beard maintains, he did not proximately cause these injuries when he shoved Plaintiff into a cell many days prior. He is incorrect.
Mendez, 137 S.Ct. at 1548.
Mot. at 5 ¶ 23.
First, as a threshold matter, Defendant Beard's actions were the plausible but-fpr cause of Plaintiffs injuries: when Defendant Beard shoved Plaintiff to the ground, Plaintiff “felt a sharp pain and a pinching sensation in his lower back,” Days later, after repeatedly complaining about his back pain, he was given crutches. Plaintiff first fell tripping over those crutches after suffering a severe back spasm. His second fall was also caused by a back spasm. Yet, before Defendant Beard's assault, Plaintiff had never experienced back spasms and “was not aware of any injury to his lower back.” Thus, both the presence of crutches and the back spasms, which caused Plaintiffs later injuries, were directly traceable to Defendant Beard's conduct.
Am. Compl. at 5 ¶ 5.19.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.31.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.32.
Id. at 6 ¶ 5.34. .
Reap, at 10.
Second, it is perfectly foreseeable that shoving someone into a hard, jail cell floor after sweeping their legs out from under them could cause a back injury and that such an injury might necessitate crutches or result in impaired mobility. Therefore, Plaintiffs plausible allegations are sufficient to establish a proximate connection between Defendant Beard's initial constitutional violation and Plaintiffs later tripping and slipping injuries.
As an aside, Defendant Beard also maintains “there is no conclusive evidence” that kicking Plaintiff s legs out from under him and shoving him into the ground resulted in Plaintiff s herniated disc. In response, Plaintiff correctly points out he need not produce such evidence at the motion to dismiss stage.
Id.
See Resp. at 9; George v. SI Group, Inc., 36 F.4th 611,620 (5th Cir. 2022) (District courts may not “require data” or “cite the failure to produce evidence at [the] Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”).
b. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Since Defendant Beard was allegedly acting under color of law as a law enforcement officer, the court must assess whether he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
i. Constitutional Right
Plaintiff has alleged a violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force.” In this context, force is excessive when it is objectively unreasonable, which a plaintiff can establish by showing the force applied was “not rationally related to a legitimate government objective or that it [was] excessive in relation to that purpose,” Such an analysis is necessarily fact- and context-specific, but courts are instructed to consider factors such as “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiffs injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989)).
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 391-92, 398 (clarifying that a pretrial detainee need not show that an officer was “subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable”).
Id. at 397.
“We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Under this standard, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant Beard's application of force was excessive and objectively unreasonable. He claims he complied at all times with Defendant Beard's instructions “and offered no resistance” as he and Defendant Beard walked down a hallway of the El Paso County Jail Annex. He claims he was walking calmly when Defendant Beard grabbed him by the shirt and shoved him into a concrete wall. He asserts that he neither physically attacked nor verbally threatened Defendant Beard. Defendant Beard then “shoved” Plaintiff in a holding cell, kicked his “legs out from under him and pushed him to the ground,” striking him in the low back as he fell. Plaintiff was later diagnosed with a herniated disc in his low back.
Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2013).
Am. Compl. at 4 ¶ 5.9.
Id. at 4 ¶ ¶ 5.10-11.
Id. at 4 ¶ 5.14.
Id. at 5 ¶ ¶ 5.16-18. .
Id. at 7 ¶ 5.27.
Applying the Kingsley factors, Defendant Beard's application of force was excessive and objectively unreasonable: he had no need to use any force, much less proportionate force; he was not responding to any threat or security issue; and, Plaintiff was not resisting. Additionally, Plaintiffs injury appears to be severe.
There is an aspect of the plausibility of Plaintiffs version that must be addressed. According to him, he asked for a blanket; in response, Defendant Beard walked him down a hallway for some distance until, for some unannounced reason, he stopped, told Plaintiff to turn around and return the way they had come. It was during this return trip that Beard allegedly assaulted Plaintiff. As Plaintiff tells it, Beard's actions were entirely and completely unprovoked. On the other hand, Beard claims he was “compelled” to grab Plaintiff and escort him to a cell, seemingly as a result of something Plaintiff said. However, there is no indication Plaintiff said anything threatening or justifying the application of force. Even assuming that according to Beard's version, he was justified in forcefully escorting Plaintiff to a cell, he was certainly not justified in kicking Plaintiffs legs out from under him and shoving him into the ground as Plaintiff was allegedly calm and compliant. Therefore, under either party's recitation of the events Defendant Beard's conduct was excessive and objectively unreasonable.
Id. 4 ¶ ¶ 5.5-8. .
Mot.at2 ¶ 7.
Rather than apply an objective standard, Defendant Beard would have this court assess his conduct through a subjective lens. Citing Hudson v. McMillian and Whitley v. Albers , he claims the question is whether he applied force “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” or intended to “maliciously and sadistically cause harm.” But the Supreme Court in Kingsley v. Hendrickson expressly rejected this framework with respect to pretrial detainees' excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. The subjective test offered by Defendant Beard applies instead to excessive force claims by prisoners under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant Beard is therefore mistaken and the objective test applied above is the appropriate one. Under that test, Plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of his constitutional right and, as a result, has met the first prong to defeating qualified immunity at this stage.
503 U.S. 1,6-7(1992).
475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
Mot. at 4-5 ¶ 21.
Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484,491 (5th Cir. 2019).
ii. Clearly Established
The second prong requires a plaintiff to show that the right at issue was clearly established at the time of its violation. A constitutional right is clearly established when its contours are sufficiently intelligible such that “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” In essence, there must be a strong overlap between the facts in the instant case and those of other cases in which the same constitutional violation has been alleged.That said, “notable factual distinctions” are permissible “so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.” “The touchstone of the inquiry into whether an official's conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him.” In short, prior case law must have adequately put law enforcement officers on notice that conduct like Defendant Beard's is impermissible,
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (cleaned up).
Timpav. Di/W, 20 F.4,h 1020, 1034 (5th Cir. 2020).
Id.
Swindle v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 655 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up and citation omitted).
See Elder v. Halloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (“A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its ‘full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents.'”) (citation omitted).
Defendant Beard allegedly assaulted Plaintiff on December 12, 2019. By then, Fifth Circuit law had long established that applying force to a compliant, non-resistant detainee is excessive and unreasonable. In Valencia v. Wiggins, for example, an officer applied a choke hold to a “non-resisting” detainee and later struck him while he was handcuffed on his knees.The officer's conduct was upheld as excessive and unreasonable.
Am. Compl. at 1 ¶ 1.1.
See, e.g, Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts have frequently found constitutional violations in cases where a restrained or subdued person is subjected to the use of force.”). Note that, prior to Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389,. these cases often applied the subjective test described above as well as an objective one. Regardless, the results were the same: force applied against a non-resisting detainee is unreasonable and excessive.
Valencia, WA F.2d at 1442.
Id. at 1449.
Moreover, this defendant was already on notice that slamming pretrial detainees into walls or into the ground is excessive when they are compliant and non-resisting, having been sued once already by a detainee at the El Paso County Jail Annex under substantially similar circumstances.In that case, a pretrial detainee asked Defendant Beard for his medications; in response, Defendant Beard allegedly attempted to isolate the detainee in his cell. Not feeling safe, the detainee asked to speak with Defendant Beard's supervisor. Defendant Beard and another officer (Guerro) then grabbed the detainee, slammed him against a wall, handcuffed him, slammed against another wall, and then shoved him to the ground. “While [the detainee] may have initially been noncompliant with Defendant Beard and Guerro's orders, there is no indication that he resisted their use of force. However, Defendants Beard and Guerro continued to use force.” This court therefore denied Defendant Beard's motion to dismiss, finding he was not entitled to qualified immunity as it was clearly established that his use of force was excessive and unreasonable. In short, it is absurd for Defendant Beard to have mistakenly assumed “his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him.”
Ryals v. El Paso County, No. EP-13-CV-289-PRM, 2015 WL 3540951, *2 (W.D. Texas, June 3,2015).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7, 11.
Swindle, 655 F.3d at 401 (cleaned up and citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint properly alleges a claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant Beard is not entitled to qualified immunity at the stage.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the “First Amended 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Claim Against Jonathan Beard” [ECF No. 15] is DENIED.