Without any evidence that an interpreter exceeded his or her role by improperly participating in jury deliberations, a presumption of regularity exists with respect to an interpreter's compliance with the oath to correctly translate testimony. See Marcham, 770 P.2d at 359; see also Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 ("Bedrock principles of appellate law dictate that matters not of record present no issue for review, that there is a presumption of regularity in the proceedings below, and that error must be clearly demonstrated.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, we decline to find prejudice unless there is a showing that an interpreter acted improperly.

After the hearing on Mother's emergency motion to stay the enforcement of judgment, the district court's amended final decree acknowledged Mother's objections but did not adequately establish its reasoned basis for denying the objections, because the amended final decree's only addition was to state that it complied with the requirements of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), without sufficiently demonstrating that the district court had performed the necessary judicial function of reviewing the objections, the record, and making an independent determination. See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan , 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (expressing "grave concern if ... district judges are presented with stick noted orders that they automatically sign" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Buffington , 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31, 136 N.M. 226, 96 P.3d 787 (emphasizing that a district court exercises its core judicial function by considering a party's objections to a hearing officer's recommendations and establishing the basis for its decision before signing an order based on those recommendations).

Given these distinctions, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in reaching a different conclusion here. See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 ("The fact that a decision is upheld as not an abuse of discretion does not mean that a different, although comparable, decision under different facts is erroneous."). {17} The State has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in this ruling, and for all of these reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court to exclude the DNA testimony in this case.

Under such circumstances, there was no basis for review. See generally Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 ("Bedrock principles of appellate law dictate that matters not of record present no issue for review[.]"). {4} In their memorandum in opposition Defendants continue to seek to present additional arguments on the merits to this Court.

We therefore presume the regularity of the proceedings in the lower courts. See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 ("Bedrock principles of appellate law dictate that matters not of record present no issue for review, that there is a presumption of regularity in the proceedings below, and that error must be clearly demonstrated."). {5} For these reasons, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the appeal.

{12} "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the decision below." See Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067. "We resolve all conflicts and, importantly, indulge in all inferences to support that decision."

[MIO 1-2] To the extent Defendant is claiming that Plaintiff acted illegally by attaching a lien on Defendant's home, [MIO 1-2] we decline to consider her contentions because there is nothing in the record concerning the alleged lien. See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (recognizing that "[b]edrock principles of appellate law dictate that matters not of record present no issue for review"). Finally, our review of Defendant's memorandum in opposition indicates that she is again seeking to challenge the propriety of the underlying money judgment in addition to the garnishment order.

Practitioners dealing with domestic violence know of these contradictions, and our own cases recognize the problem. SeeLujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (recognizing that the motivation for a domestic abuse case can be to further the parent's interest); State v. Buck, 33 N.M. 334, 338, 266 P. 917, 919 (1927) (recognizing, in a domestic violence case, that the admission of a spontaneous declaration is often sought where the declarant has died. "In such cases great caution is to be exercised.

{7} Hotel sets forth the following proper standard of review based on Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Diamond D Construction Co., 2001-NMCA-082, ¶ 16, 131 N.M. 100, 33 P.3d 651: "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the decision below[, and we] resolve all conflicts and, importantly, indulge in all inferences to support that decision." Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 15, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (citation omitted). Hotel, however, goes on to raise the legal question of whether our cases require direct evidence to support the required elements before a lien may be foreclosed.

See, e.g., id. (stating that after hearing on objections to the specials master's report, district court may adopt the report, modify it, reject it in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit with instructions). As in Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067 (N.M.Ct.App. 2003), which involved a hearing before a special commissioner, we do not hold that "only a transcription of the hearing before the [hearing officer] will [e]nsure that the district judge plays his or her appropriate role." The nature of the hearing and review to be conducted by the district court will depend upon the nature of the objections being considered.