Opinion
November 17, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Miller, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the motion is granted.
CPLR 2104 states that to be enforceable, a stipulation, unless reduced to the form of an order and entered, must be in writing and signed by a party or his attorney. In the alternative, an oral stipulation will be binding if it is spread upon the record in open court ( see, Margolis v. New York City Tr. Auth., 233 A.D.2d 483; Gage v. Jay Bee Photographers, 222 A.D.2d 648; Public Adm'r of County of N.Y. v. Bankers Trust Co., 182 A.D.2d 592). Here, there was no open-court stipulation and the written stipulation executed by the attorneys expressly provided that it was "subject to" the agreement of the parties. Thus, by its very terms, the stipulation was not enforceable unless and until the parties executed a further stipulation ( see, Margolis v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 483; Batties v. Solis, 171 A.D.2d 529; Rivera v. Triple M. Roofing Corp., 116 A.D.2d 561; Graffeo v. Brenes, 85 A.D.2d 656). Inasmuch as the parties were not able to reach a formal agreement, there was clearly no settlement. The court thus erred in denying the appellant's motion on the basis that the action had been settled, and the husband's counterclaim should have been restored to the trial calendar ( see, Margolis v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 483; Phillips v. Pamper Decorating Serv., 228 A.D.2d 425; Venuti v. Booth Mem. Med. Ctr., 204 A.D.2d 715; Rivera v. Triple M. Roofing Corp., supra, at 561).
The wife's contention that the husband's counterclaim was subject to automatic dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3404 is without merit. The husband's counterclaim was expressly severed at the time the wife discontinued her divorce action.
Miller, J. P., Ritter, Altman and Krausman, JJ., concur.