Luczak Brothers v. Generes

14 Citing cases

  1. Weather-Tite v. University of St. Francis

    383 Ill. App. 3d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 4 times

    The trial court entered an order granting the university's motion for summary judgment and denied Excel's cross-motion for summary judgment. In its order, the trial court relied on Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286, 451 N.E.2d 1267 (1983), which "seemed factually similar to this case." The trial court summarized that case as follows: "[T]he subcontractor was entitled to a lien only in the amount shown to become due on the last statement for which payment was made and the subcontractor must look to the contractor for payment" (emphasis in original), citing Luczak, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 303, 451 N.E.2d at 1281.

  2. Cordeck Sales v. Construction Systems

    382 Ill. App. 3d 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 68 times
    Finding that an overstatement in a mechanic's lien claim did not constitute constructive fraud because aside from the lien claim itself there was no other evidence from which fraudulent intent could be inferred

    As a general rule, "a clear, unambiguous waiver of lien rights bars an action under the Mechanics' Lien Act." Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286, 298 (1983). This rule, however, is only applicable when an innocent party relies on the waiver in making payments.

  3. Weather-Tite v. Univ. of St. Francis

    233 Ill. 2d 385 (Ill. 2009)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that an unpaid subcontractor listed in a contractor's affidavit could enforce a lien in the unpaid amount against the owner's property even though that amount was included in what the owner paid the contractor

    See also Keeley Brewing Co. v. Neubauer Decorating Co., 194 Ill. 580, 592 (1902) ("a notice by the sub-contractor is not necessary where the sworn statement of the contractor, made under section 5, gives to the owner true notice of the amount due, and to whom due"). The University submits that Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Halsey Bros. Co., 262 Ill. 241 (1914), and Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1983), support its argument that the owner is entitled to rely on the contractor's sworn statement and is required to make full payment to the contractor of all amounts due subcontractors under section 5 of the Act. The University misreads these cases.

  4. Bricks, Inc. v. C F Developers, Inc.

    361 Ill. App. 3d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 14 times

    However, in addition to protecting the rights of those furnishing labor and materials, the Act also seeks to protect owners from the potential claims of subcontractors. Many cases have found that a secondary subcontractor seeking to enforce his mechanics' lien, even if in compliance with the notice requirements of section 24 of the Act, is limited to recovering only that amount which is owed to his immediate contractor at the time the notice of his lien is given. See Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A. Borenstein Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 648, 656 (1995); Contractors' Ready-Mix, Inc. v. Earl Given Construction Co., 242 Ill. App. 3d 448, 455-57 (1993); Decatur Housing Authority v. Christy-Foltz, Inc., 177 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081 (1983); Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286, 302-03 (1983); Koenig v. McCarthy Construction Co., 344 Ill. App. 93, 104 (1951). Moreover, section 5 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

  5. Fisher v. Harris Bank Trust Co.

    506 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 3 times
    In Fisher v. Harris Bank Trust Co., 154 Ill.App.3d 79, 106 Ill.Dec. 711, 506 N.E.2d 418 (1987), the court stated that, "This rule is only applicable where an innocent party has relied upon the waiver in making payments to the general contractor."

    Further, in the case before us, the contractor's affidavit is a separate document, and its terms would be extrinsic evidence which may not be considered where the terms of the waiver are unambiguous. Nor may we consider the terms of the construction contract between the owners and Fisher for the same reasons. • 3 However, while a clear unambiguous waiver of mechanic's lien rights bars an action under the Mechanics' Liens Act, this rule is only applicable where an innocent party has relied upon that waiver in making payments to the general contractor. ( Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 286, 298.) It is a question of fact as to whether the owners here relied upon the waiver when they made their payments to the general contractor, Fisher. See Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 286, 298.

  6. Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. La Salle National Bank

    132 Ill. App. 3d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 55 times
    Recognizing existence of cause of action for breach of unilateral contract

    • 2, 3 Generally, where the terms of a waiver of lien are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence which varies from or contradicts such terms cannot be considered in order to determine the intent of the parties; this rule applies, however, only when the party against whose property a lien is sought has relied upon the waiver of lien in innocence and good faith. ( Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 286, 298, 451 N.E.2d 1267; see also Country Service Supply Co. v. Harris Trust Savings Bank (1981), 103 Ill. App.3d 161, 165-66, 430 N.E.2d 631.) Whether there has been such innocent, good-faith reliance is a question of fact. ( Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 286, 298, 451 N.E.2d 1267; see also Contract Builders Service Corp. v. Eland (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 366, 372-73, 428 N.E.2d 178.) In addition, questions of customary practice between the parties and trade usage in the industry are also appropriately raised in the context of the effect of a subcontractor's lien waiver. Chicago Bridge Iron Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co. (1970), 46 Ill.2d 522, 530-32, 264 N.E.2d 134.

  7. In re Germansen Decorating, Inc.

    149 B.R. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)   Cited 12 times

    Lien waivers bar rights under the Mechanic's Lien Act, even if there is inadequate consideration for the waivers. Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App.3d 286, 71 Ill.Dec. 900, 910, 451 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (1 Dist. 1983). Consequently, assuming the Trustee's allegations to be true, as the court must in the context of the instant motion, Petersen-Lund's mechanic's lien claims with respect to the waiver counts are unperfected and fall to the Trustee's § 544(a) strong arm power. Thus, the Trustee has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to the waiver counts.

  8. Baldwin Enters. v. Articon Hotel Servs.

    2021 IL App (5th) 200150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    ¶ 15 To ascertain the intention of the parties as to this provision, we first look to the language of this provision, giving the words used therein their ordinary, natural meaning. See Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286, 295 (1983). "Any doubts or ambiguities raised by that language will be resolved against the drafter [citation] and against a finding of waiver [citation], since 'it should be presumed, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, that one has not disabled himself from the use of so valuable a privilege as that given by statute for the enforcement of builder's rights.' "

  9. Recchia v. Yong

    2019 Ill. App. 2d 180844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    ¶ 32 The appellate court will not disturb a trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill. App. 3d 286, 301 (1983). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.

  10. Gerdau Ameristeel United States, Inc. v. Broeren Russo Constr., Inc.

    2013 Ill. App. 4th 120547 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 6 times

    ¶ 63 As in Bricks, because Campus could rely on Broeren Russo's sworn statements, Ahal's and Blager's recovery is limited to the unpaid amount due to their immediate contractor as of the date they served notice of their liens. See Decatur Housing Authority v. Christy–Foltz, Inc., 117 Ill.App.3d 1077, 1081, 73 Ill.Dec. 519, 454 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1983) (stating subcontractors are limited “to the amounts due their immediate contractors at the time the notice of their liens is given”); Luczak Brothers, Inc. v. Generes, 116 Ill.App.3d 286, 303, 71 Ill.Dec. 900, 451 N.E.2d 1267, 1281 (1983). As such, Ahal and Blager are entitled to recovery of their pro rata shares of the funds remaining due to JMC on the subcontract between Broeren Russo and JMC, less any pro rata portion paid to Gerdau.