" Oller v. State, 187 Ga. App. 818, 820 (2) ( 371 S.E.2d 455) (1988). See also Landers v. State, 194 Ga. App. 329, 330 (2) ( 390 S.E.2d 302) (1990) (physical precedent); Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga. App. 532, 536 (5) ( 374 S.E.2d 92) (1988); Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262, 263 (3) ( 363 S.E.2d 791) (1987); Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 740, 742 (1) ( 356 S.E.2d 723) (1987); Cox v. State, 173 Ga. App. 422 (1) ( 326 S.E.2d 796) (1985). The independent acts demonstrated a continuing, in fact almost annual, pattern of conduct.

Consequently, this enumeration presents no ground for reversal. See Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262, 263 (2) ( 363 S.E.2d 791) (1987). 4. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing a DFCS worker to testify concerning the child abuse accommodation syndrome because she was not properly qualified as an expert witness.

Even if any error did occur, it was harmless because appellant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the victim about her out-of-court statements, and the social worker's testimony was cumulative of the other evidence adduced during the trial. See Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262 (2) ( 363 S.E.2d 791) (1987). Dr. Hodgson was qualified as an expert in pediatrics and the record reflects she had some expertise in child abuse. Dr. Hodgson's testimony regarding the reluctance of children to disclose sexual abuse was offered on direct examination to explain how she arrived at the diagnosis of sexual abuse. "[I]t is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit expert opinion to aid the jury in understanding other testimony whenever the court finds it to be helpful or necessary. [Cit.] ... It matters not whether such facts are sought on direct or cross-examination. [Cit.

In addition, a five-month lapse of time does not render the evidence inadmissible. See Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262 (3) ( 363 S.E.2d 791) (1987). "The trial court is granted a wide discretion in the admission of evidence and an appellate court should not reverse his finding unless he has abused that discretion. [Cit.

Compare Wimberly v. State, 180 Ga. App. 148, 149 ( 348 S.E.2d 692). See Kickery v. State, 185 Ga. App. 274, 276 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 805); Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262, 263 (3) ( 363 S.E.2d 791); and Bernyk v. State, 182 Ga. App. 329, 330 (2), 331 ( 355 S.E.2d 753). Judgment affirmed. Carley, C. J., Deen, P. J., Banke, P. J., Birdsong, Sognier, Pope and Benham, JJ., concur.

However, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Luckey v. State, 185 Ga. App. 262 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 791) (1987). 2. During the redirect examination of the pediatrician, he described, over appellant's objection, the "syndrome of delayed disclosure."