Indeed, New York courts ordinarily require defendants to “present an affidavit stating that a diligent inquiry has been made to determine the names of such parties” when commencing an action with a named John Doe defendant. Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. P'ship, 229 A.D.2d 249, 253, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (4th Dep't 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, only when a plaintiff proves unable, despite his or her exercise of due diligence, to identify the defendant may he or she commence an action and name John Doe defendants pursuant to Section 1024.

The filing of a "John Doe" complaint can toll the applicable statute of limitations, provided the plaintiff "show[s] that he made genuine efforts to ascertain the defendants' identities prior to the running of the [s]tatute of [l]imitations." Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. P'Ship, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div. 1997) (internal quotations omitted);accord Mabry v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Corr., No. 05 Civ. 8133, 2008 WL 619003, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2008); Murphy v. West, 533 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); Wilson, 2006 WL 2528468, at *3. "The plaintiff must show that the persons named as unknown were actually unknown."

The applicability of CPLR 1024 was raised by Alleman in her motion to dismiss because she "anticipated" that the plaintiff would rely upon it. "Under New York's commencement-by-filing system, ‘a claim asserted against unknown parties pursuant to CPLR 1024 is deemed to be interposed for Statute of Limitations purposes when the "John Doe" summons with notice is filed with the clerk of the court’ " ( Moran v. County of Suffolk, 189 A.D.3d 1219, 1220, 138 N.Y.S.3d 92, quoting Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 A.D.2d 249, 254, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543 ; seeBumpus v. New York City Tr. Auth., 66 A.D.3d 26, 30–31, 883 N.Y.S.2d 99 ). Here, even assuming that the plaintiff was required to demonstrate due diligence, contrary to Alleman's contention, the plaintiff demonstrated that, prior to the commencement of the action and therefore prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, he exercised due diligence to discover Alleman's full name through online searches (seeRogers v. Dunkirk Aviation Sales & Serv., Inc., 31 A.D.3d at 1120, 818 N.Y.S.2d 717 ; Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 A.D.2d at 253, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543 ).

"Under CPLR 1024, the description of the unknown party must be sufficiently complete to fairly apprise that entity that it is the intended defendant" (Olmsted v Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 28 A.D.3d 855, 856 [3d Dept 2006]; see Thas v Dayrich Trading, Inc., 78 A.D.3d 1163, 1165 [2d Dept 2010]; Carmer v Odd Fellows, 66 A.D.3d 1435, 1436 [4th Dept 2009]). In addition, the plaintiff "must show that [they] made 'timely efforts to identify the correct party before the statute of limitations expired'" (Justin v Orshan, 14 A.D.3d 492, 492-493 [2d Dept 2005]; see Walker v Hormann Flexon, LLC, 153 A.D.3d 997, 998 [3d Dept 2017]; Luckern v Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 A.D.2d 249, 253 [4th Dept 1997]).

( Olmsted v. Pizza Hut of Am. , Inc. , 28 A.D.3d 855, 856, 813 N.Y.S.2d 241 [3d Dept. 2006] ; seeThas v. Dayrich Trading , Inc. , 78 A.D.3d 1163, 1165, 913 N.Y.S.2d 269 [2d Dept. 2010] ; Carmer v. Odd Fellows , 66 A.D.3d 1435, 1436, 885 N.Y.S.2d 852 [4th Dept. 2009] ). In addition, the plaintiff "must show that [they] made ‘timely efforts to identify the correct party before the statute of limitations expired’ " ( Justin v. Orshan , 14 A.D.3d 492, 492-493, 788 N.Y.S.2d 407 [2d Dept. 2005] ; seeWalker v. Hormann Flexon , LLC , 153 A.D.3d 997, 998, 59 N.Y.S.3d 614 [3d Dept. 2017] ; Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership , 229 A.D.2d 249, 253, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543 [4th Dept. 1997] ). We conclude that the complaint adequately described Berkshire such that, from that description, it would have known that it was an intended defendant (seeRogers v. Dunkirk Aviation Sales & Serv. , Inc. , 31 A.D.3d 1119, 1120, 818 N.Y.S.2d 717 [4th Dept. 2006] ; see generallyCarmer , 66 A.D.3d at 1436, 885 N.Y.S.2d 852 ).

Here, plaintiff failed to seek leave to extend the time for service prior to expiration of the statutory limitations period. Further, a party seeking to apply the relation-back doctrine under CPLR 1024 carries the burden "of establishing that diligent efforts were made to ascertain the unknown party's identity prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations" ( Holmes v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 952, 954, 18 N.Y.S.3d 676 [2015] ; see Goldberg v. Boatmax://, Inc., 41 A.D.3d 255, 256, 840 N.Y.S.2d 570 [2007] ; Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 A.D.2d 249, 253, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543 [1997] ). Plaintiff's third amended complaint was filed nearly 10 months after the statute of limitations expired, with the delay essentially unexplained but for a statement that Rytec's identity could not be ascertained until the door was inspected in May 2015.

"In order to employ the procedural mechanism made available by CPLR 1024, the plaintiff must show that he made 'genuine effort[s] to ascertain the defendants' identities prior to the running of the Statute of Limitations'." (Luckern v Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 AD2d 249, 253 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 1997 NY App Div LEXIS 6454 [4" Dept]; Porter v Kinesbrook OB/GYN Assocs., 209 AD2d 497 [2nd Dept 19941, appeal dismissed 86 NY2d 871.)

However, to take advantage of § 1024, a plaintiff "must show that the persons named as unknown were actually unknown." Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. P'ship, 229 A.D.2d 249, 253 (4th Dep't 1997); accord Brook v. Peconic Bay Med. Ctr., 172 A.D.3d 468, 469 (1st Dep't 2019)

First, the party must “exercise due diligence, prior to the running of the statute of limitations, to identify the defendant by name.” Bumpus, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 104;see also Harris v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp. at Syosset, 16 A.D.3d 549, 792 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (2d Dep't 2005); Justin, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 408;Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd., 229 A.D.2d 249, 654 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545–46 (4th Dep't 1997). Second, the party must describe the John Doe party “in such form as will fairly apprise the party that [he] is the intended defendant.”

However, to take advantage of Section 1024, a “plaintiff must show that the persons named as unknown were actually unknown.” Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. P'ship, 229 A.D.2d 249, 253 (4th Dep't 1997).