the plea of privilege has been filed in due season, that it shall be sustained by the trial court unless contested, and the defendant is required by law to take no further notice of the plea of privilege unless the same is contested and notice of the contest is served on the defendant for ten days; and in this cause the plea of privilege was filed in due season, properly entered on the motion docket, and no contest was filed and the defendant had the right to presume that the court had transferred the case to Van Zandt County for trial; and after the filing of the plea of privilege, when it was not contested, the court had no jurisdiction to render any judgment by default against the defendant, and the only judgment he did have jurisdiction to render was a judgment sending the case from Tarrant County to Van Zandt County for trial. Bennett v. Rose Mfg. Co., 226 S.W. 143; Brooks v. Wichita Mill Elevator Co., 211 S.W. 288; Ray v. Kimball, 207 S.W. 351; Murphy v. Dabney, 208 S.W. 981; Lucid v. McDowell, 206 S.W. 203; Merchants v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 S.W. 1098; Browne v. Walker, 206 S.W. 859; Art. 1832 of Vernon's Complete Statutes of Texas, 1920; Camp v. Gourley, 201 S.W. 671; Hinkle v. Thompson, 195 S.W. 311; Hickman v. Swain, 167 S.W. 209; Rev. Stats., Arts. 2118, 2120-2121. R.H. Smith, for defendant in error.

It is not for this court, in an attempted supervisory capacity, to tell him how to proceed with the trial of his docket of cases. See Lucid v. McDowell, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 203; Pollard v. Speer, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 620. We are unable to hold that Judge Lindsey's actions amount to a refusal to try the plea of privilege case, so as to bring the matter within the purview of Article 1824, supra.

The venue of a suit between divorced parties for the custody and control of their child, whether brought in the form of habeas corpus or otherwise, is, in the absence of some special statutory ground, in the county of the defendant's residence. Black v. Black (Tex.Civ.App.) 2 S.W.2d 331, 332, par. 5; Keith v. Keith (Tex.Civ.App.) 286 S.W. 534, 536, par. 5; Lucid v. McDowell, Dist. Judge (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 203, 205, par. 3; Finney v. Walker (Tex.Civ.App.) 144 S.W. 679, 681, par. 3. Such a suit invokes consideration of the rights of the respective parties and the welfare of the child, regardless of whether an issue of trespass is involved or not.

The next contention by appellant is that the court was without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, for the reason that the child, Arch Land, was not actually produced before the court on the hearing of the case, and that therefore the court was without authority to enter any order or judgment affecting his possession and custody. We think there is nothing in this contention, and this court has heretofore held that the actual presence in court of a child whose custody and possession was involved in the suit was not required so as to authorize the court to determine the question of the child's custody and possession. Lucid v. McDowell (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 203. The contention is overruled. The next contention is that the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that appellant had disclaimed in this suit any right to the possession and custody of the child, Arch Land. The court did find that appellant had disclaimed any right to the custody and possession of the child, and this was based upon appellant's evidence to the effect that he had given the child to his mother Mrs. C. G. Land. Whether the conclusion be one of law or fact, it is entirely immaterial, though we think that the court was justified in concluding that appellant had abandoned the child; such conclusion being based upon his positive testimony that he had made a verbal gift of the child to its grandmother.

We believe the following cases will support the view above expressed. Ray v. Kimball, 207 S.W. 351; Murphy v. Dabney, 208 S.W. 981; Lucid v. McDowell, 206 S.W. 203. The caption of the act, amending article 1903, also suggests, we think, that it was the purpose to change the practice or procedure as formerly established.

It seems to us this formality is now dispensed with, and the decisions to that effect under article 1910 are not applicable. We believe the following cases will support the view above expressed: Ray v. Kimball, 207 S.W. 351; Murphy v. Dabney, 208 S.W. 981; Lucid v. McDowell, 206 S.W. 203. The caption of the act, amending article 1903, also suggests, we think, that it was the purpose to change the practice or procedure as formerly established.