Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing San Diego County Super. Ct. No. EJ3192, Ronald F. Frazier, Judge.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Lucia O. and Ricardo E. seek review of juvenile court orders setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Lucia and Ricardo contend the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided is not supported by substantial evidence. They also assert the juvenile court erred when it did not state the factual basis for its findings under section 366.21, subdivision (f). We deny the petition.
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUAL BACKGROUND
Lucia and Ricardo are the parents of Z.E., who was born in November 2008. In October 2009 Ricardo was arrested for hitting Lucia in the face. Z.E. was present during the physical altercation. Lucia's lower lip was swollen and bruised. A witness reported that Lucia had been crying and screaming for help. When the witness tried to intervene, Ricardo became angry and tried to hit the witness, resulting in a fistfight between the two men. Lucia did not want police officers to arrest Ricardo. She claimed she had bit and injured her lip a week earlier.
Ricardo had an extensive criminal history dating from 1990, including a felony conviction for transport and sale of narcotics. He was arrested in 1992 for inflicting injury on a child.
In November 2009 Ricardo was arrested for violating a criminal protective order. He said Lucia had invited him to her home.
After the parents violated the protective order, the matter was referred to the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency). The Agency offered voluntary services to Lucia. In December 2009 Lucia signed a safety plan agreeing not to have contact with Ricardo, and to participate in individual therapy, in-home support services and a domestic violence prevention group. Less than a week later, Ricardo was arrested for violating the protective order when he was found in Lucia's home.
In February 2010 the social worker made an unannounced visit to Lucia's home and found Ricardo hiding in a bathroom shower. Lucia said she allowed him in the home. The Agency then initiated dependency proceedings and detained Z.E. with her maternal grandparents. The social worker offered counseling services and in-home services to Lucia, and gave her a list of approved domestic violence prevention programs.
Lucia entered a residential program for women. She participated in parenting classes and a five-week "Healthy Relationship Module" program consisting of five one-hour classes, including one class on domestic violence awareness and another on safety planning and self-defense strategies. Ricardo entered a men's program with the same provider.
In March the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the section 300 petition and removed Z.E. from parental custody. The Agency continued Z.E.'s placement with her grandparents. The social worker described Z.E. as a cheerful one-year-old, with no developmental concerns. She was emotionally healthy and attached to her grandparents. The social worker said Lucia was bonded with Z.E. and did a good job providing for her basic needs.
Lucia completed the residential program in June and entered a transitional program. She started therapy in August. With the concurrence of minor's counsel, Lucia started having unsupervised visits with Z.E.
Ricardo was discharged from his program in August for drinking. He did not maintain contact with the social worker or participate in services. He was prohibited from visiting Z.E. by the terms of the protective order.
In September Lucia and Ricardo went to court together to lift the protective order. The Agency reinstated supervised visitation. The social worker noted Lucia's focus was on her relationship with Ricardo instead of protecting Z.E. from domestic violence.
At the 12-month status review hearing in March 2011, the Agency recommended that the juvenile court terminate family reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for Z.E. The juvenile court admitted the social worker's report in evidence. The social worker reported that Lucia was seven months pregnant with Ricardo's child. Although Lucia's interactions with Z.E. were loving and attentive, the social worker was concerned Lucia would allow Ricardo to have access to Z.E. Z.E. was afraid of Ricardo. The maternal grandfather described an earlier incident in which he observed Ricardo holding a pillow over Z.E.'s face. The previous social worker had referred Lucia to a 32-week domestic violence prevention program, which Lucia did not attend. Lucia was not able to demonstrate a parental role with Z.E. and did not place Z.E.'s needs before her own needs.
The parents and minor did not cross-examine the social worker and did not present any affirmative evidence. The juvenile court found that returning Z.E. to parental custody would be detrimental to her and there was not a substantial probability Z.E. would be returned to parental custody within the next six months. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Lucia and Ricardo petition for review of the court's orders under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, and request a stay of the section 366.26 hearing pending this court's decision. This court issued an order to show cause, the Agency responded, and the parties waived oral argument.
Ricardo joins in the petition filed by Lucia. He filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition but did not file a separate petition.
DISCUSSION
A
Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that the Agency Offered or Provided Reasonable Services to the Family
Lucia and Ricardo contend the court erred when it found that reasonable services were provided. The parents assert there is no evidence to show that services other than visitation and therapy were offered to Lucia during the six months preceding the 12-month status review hearing. They argue the social worker did not inform Lucia that she was required to complete a 32-week domestic violence prevention program after Lucia completed the five-week course at the residential program. The parents do not dispute the finding that the Agency offered or provided reasonable services to Ricardo.
Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. (§ 361.5; In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563; In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458; see 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7).) If reasonable services were not provided or offered to the parent, the court is required to continue the case for the period of time permitted by statute. (See § 366.21, subds. (e) & (g)(1).) The "adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.)
Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family. (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793, citing In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) "The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, "the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult...." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
We review the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.)
The record shows that the social worker identified domestic violence as the main problem leading to the parents' loss of custody of Z.E. Lucia insisted on maintaining a relationship with Ricardo, who had a history of violent criminal behavior, did not engage in services and was prevented by a protective order from contacting Z.E. Lucia's case plan required her to complete a domestic violence treatment program and parenting classes, undergo a substance abuse evaluation and participate in any recommended treatment, and participate in individual counseling. The record shows that Lucia's case plan was clearly described in court reports and the Agency offered or provided those services to her throughout the dependency proceedings.
Contrary to the parents' claim, the circumstances here are not comparable to those in Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, in which the reviewing court reversed the finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parents. (Id. at p. 1345.) In that case, the social worker incorrectly informed the parent that she had enrolled in all required court-ordered programs. Then, at the 12-month review hearing, the social worker told the parent she was not enrolled in all of the required programs, and used the lack of proper enrollment as a basis to recommend that the juvenile court terminate reunification services. (Id. at p. 1347.)
In contrast, here, the social worker referred Lucia to a county certified 32-week domestic violence treatment program and gave her a list of approved programs at the start of the dependency proceedings. In the report prepared for the six-month review hearing, the social worker reported that Lucia attended some domestic violence prevention classes. The social worker did not represent that Lucia was properly enrolled in required services or indicate that Lucia had completed the domestic violence treatment component of her case plan. Thus, at the time of the six-month status review hearing, Lucia had notice she had yet to complete the court-ordered domestic violence treatment program.
The record shows that the Agency referred Lucia to a 32-week domestic violence treatment program. Rather than participating in a lengthy program, Lucia completed a five-week program focusing on healthy relationships. The record permits the reasonable inference that Lucia did not choose to enroll in the longer program. As Lucia acknowledges, the Agency provided counseling and visitation services to her during the second six-month review period. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were offered or provided. (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.).
B
The Record Supports the Necessary Findings Required By Section 366.21 , Subdivision (f)
Lucia and Ricardo complain that the juvenile court did not set forth a factual basis for its findings that it would be detrimental to return Z.E. to Lucia's care and that there was no substantial probability of return within the next six months. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The parents do not explicitly contend the juvenile court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
At the 12-month status review hearing, regardless of whether the child is returned to his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to specify the factual basis for its decision. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) If the child is not returned to a parent, the juvenile court shall specify the factual basis for its conclusion that returning the child to the parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. (Ibid.)
The juvenile court should make its factual findings on the record. However, the reviewing court may imply the necessary finding if the juvenile court considered the correct code provision and the evidence clearly supports the finding. (In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973; In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825, citing In re Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 554-555, In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 83-84.) Here, the juvenile court erred when it did not set forth the factual basis for its findings under section 366.21, subdivision (f). However, we can imply the necessary findings on review. The record leaves no doubt the juvenile court considered the correct code provision. (In re V.F., supra, at pp. 972-973.) Further, the record clearly shows that returning Z.E. to parental custody would be detrimental to her well-being and there is no substantial probability of return to Lucia within the next six months. (§ 366.21, subd. (f); In re Marquis D., supra, at p.1825.)
There is ample evidence to show that Lucia insisted on maintaining her relationship with Ricardo despite his history of domestic assault and the substantial risks it posed to Z.E.'s safety and physical and emotional well-being. The record shows that Lucia wanted to maintain a relationship with Ricardo at the expense of Z.E.'s safety. She did not enroll in a court-ordered domestic violence prevention program. Lucia violated the terms of a criminal protective order before and during the dependency proceedings. She sought to have the protective order lifted soon after Ricardo was discharged from his program for drinking. Thus, there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that Lucia made little to no progress in her case plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (f) [failure of the parent to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental to the child].) A parent's past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior. (In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.) The record does not support the findings that Lucia would be able or willing to protect Z.E. from Ricardo within the next six months and thus be able to safely care for her two-year-old daughter. The juvenile court's findings are amply supported by the record.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., IRION, J.