The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Rockhill and similar cases from other jurisdictions "emphasize the relationship between the parties as being a factor to consider" in determining whether conduct is outrageous. Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 85, 716 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Ct.App. 1985). A federal court, applying Washington state law, noted that the extreme and outrageous nature of a defendant's conduct must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that "whether a special relationship exists between the parties" is a factor in that determination. Masood v. Saleemi 2007 WL 2069853, at *6 (W.D.Wash. July 13, 2007); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[I]n Michigan, a special relationship between the parties may lower the level of conduct needed to be actionable."); Robinson v. Intercorp, 512 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1315 (N.D.Ga. 2007) ("[T]he existence of a special relationship between the actor and victim, such as that of employer to employee, may make otherwise non-egregious conduct outrageous.") (citing Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 220 Ga.App. 498, 469 S.E.2d 776 (1996)); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681, 688 (1980) ("[T]here are cases in which the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct arises

It further granted Dr. Stimmell's motion as to the infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death counts, but denied summary judgment with regard to the personal injury claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Samaritan Health Service, but affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Stimmell on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ( Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 85, 716 P.2d 1022 (1985). The Lucchesis petitioned this court for review claiming that sufficient evidence existed to create a factual question as to whether Dr. Stimmell's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.

In their reply, Knoells' contend that their "outrage" claim is synonymous with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 85, 716 P.2d 1022 (App. 1985). They no longer assert "outrage."