This sua sponte screening procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that a defendant may later bring. See Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007); see also Lucas v. Jovanovich, 2016 WL 3267332, at *3 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016).
This sua sponte screening procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that a defendant may later bring. See Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007); see also Lucas v. Jovanovich, 2016 WL 3267332, at *3 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016).
Reviewing a complaint under §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court "employ[s] the same standard used to test the sufficiency of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Lucas v. Jovanovich, No. CV 15-76-H-DLC-JTJ, 2016 WL 3267332, at *2 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016) (citing, inter alia, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Accordingly, to survive dismissal at this stage, with the Court accepting all its factual allegations as true, Warner's Complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
To meet its § 1915(e) screening obligation, the Court "employ[s] the same standard used to test the sufficiency of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Lucas v. Jovanovich, No. CV 15-76-H-DLC-JTJ, 2016 WL 3267332, at *2 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016) (citing, inter alia, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Therefore, to survive dismissal at this stage, with the Court accepting all its factual allegations as true, Anderson's Amended Complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Defendant argues that the screening order has no bearing on the Court's obligation to reach the merits of the motion to dismiss. Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (providing that 1915A's "screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to bring"); Lucas v. Jovanovich, No. CV 15-76-H-DLC-JTJ, 2016 WL 3267332, at *2-3 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016) (footnote omitted). This is because a contrary view "would deprive Defendants of the basic procedural right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings."
And still others conclude that the screening order has no bearing on the Court's obligation to reach the merits of the motion to dismiss. Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (providing that 1915A's "screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to bring"); Lucas v. Jovanovich, No. CV 15-76-H-DLC- JTJ, 2016 WL 3267332, at *2-3 (D. Mont. June 10, 2016) (footnote omitted). This is because a contrary view "would deprive Defendants of the basic procedural right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings."