Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago

8 Citing cases

  1. Roe v. Jewish Children's Bureau

    339 Ill. App. 3d 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 61 times
    Finding that determination of when plaintiffs were on notice of misrepresentation should be determined by finder of fact

    Plaintiffs argue that they did not discover that they had been injured as the result of fraud until they learned that the statements made to them regarding the health of Larry's biological mother were false. Defendant responds that plaintiffs should have known of their injury in 1976 when they discovered Larry's impairment. We believe that this issue is resolved by this court's recent opinion in Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169 (2002). Defendant cites this code section in its arguments regarding the statute of limitations.

  2. Kremers v. Coca-Cola Company

    712 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Ill. 2010)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that the injuries caused by defendant's trade practices, if any, is one that plaintiff could have easily avoided by simply drinking a different soft drink or beverage

    Further, where the undisputed facts clearly show that a plaintiff's cause of action is untimely, it is for the court to decide as a matter of law that the statute of limitations has run. See Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 765 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("Ordinarily, the trier of fact must decide the point at which a plaintiff reasonably should have known that a wrongful act caused his injury. . . . But the court properly decides the issue without trial if all reasonable persons would draw the same conclusion from the undisputed facts."); Betts v. Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("The application of the discovery rule to determine when a party knows or reasonably should have known the injury occurred and it was wrongfully caused such that the statute of limitation begins to run is a question of fact, unless the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn from them, . . . in which case summary judgment will be an appropriate disposition."); Aspegren v. Howmedica, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("Although an injured person is not held to a standard of knowing the inherently unknowable, he may not slumber on his rights once it appears that the injury was wr

  3. Joyce v. Morgan Stanley Co. Incorporated

    No. 06 C 4754 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2007)

    When the cause of the "injury could develop naturally, without any wrongful cause, knowledge of the injury does not immediately put the plaintiff on inquiry concerning a potential wrongful cause." Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 765 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002) (citing McIntyre v. Christ Hosp., 536 N.E.2d 882 (1989)). As such, "[t]he limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff becomes aware that the cause of his problem stems from another's negligence and not from natural causes."

  4. Jagiello v. Beverly Glen Homeowners' Ass'n

    2019 Ill. App. 2d 180621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    A cause of action accrues under the statute when the plaintiff " 'knew or reasonably should have known that it was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.' " Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 172 (2002) (quoting Superior Bank FSB v. Golding, 152 Ill. 2d 480, 488 (1992)). A plaintiff reasonably should know that an injury is wrongfully caused when he has enough information about the injury to alert a reasonable person about the need for additional inquiry to determine if the cause of the injury is legally actionable.

  5. Warner v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc.

    2015 Ill. App. 142248 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    "A cause of action accrues, within the meaning of the statute, when the plaintiff 'knew or reasonably should have known that it was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.' " Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171-72 (2002) (quoting Superior Bank FSB v. Golding, 152 Ill. 2d 480, 488 (1992)). In the second amended complaint, Warner and Driscoll alleged that "since September 2005, United has 'modified' the Silver Wings Plus Program to the extent that 'lifetime' members receive no discernible benefit beyond the receipt of their membership card."

  6. Hassebrock v. Ceja Corp.

    2015 Ill. App. 5th 140037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that breach of contract does not constitute a tort under Illinois law

    A cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes "when the plaintiff 'knew or reasonably should have known that it was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.' " Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171-72 (2002) (quoting Superior Bank FSB v. Golding, 152 Ill. 2d 480, 488 (1992)).¶ 29 The plaintiff's cause of action in the present case stems from his assertions that the defendant breached the venture agreement. It is undisputed, however, that the alleged

  7. Hassebrock v. Ceja Corp.

    2015 Ill. App. 5th 140037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    A cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes "when the plaintiff 'knew or reasonably should have known that it was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused.' " Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau of Chicago, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 172 (2002) (quoting Superior Bank FSB v. Golding, 152 Ill. 2d 480, 488 (1992)).¶ 30 The plaintiff's cause of action in the present case stems from his assertions that the

  8. Village of Glendale Heights v. Glen Ayre Enterprises, Inc.

    404 Ill. App. 3d 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that section 7–1–46 can bar a counterclaim, despite the provision in section 13–207 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13–207 (West 2004)) that “ defendant may plead * * * counterclaim barred by the statute of limitation”

    The legislative preference for finality in annexation proceedings is so strong that, again unlike typical statutes of limitations, the annexation limitations statute is not tempered by any discovery rule pausing the start of the limitations period until the claimant knew of or should have discovered the cause of action. See, e.g., Lubin v. Jewish Children's Bureau, 328 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171-72 (2002) (explaining the normal discovery rule). These two observations compel the conclusion that section 7-1-46 represents a legislative policy, in favor of limiting annexation challenges, that is unusually strong among limitations statutes.