Opinion
24A-JT-544
11-07-2024
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.D. and S.D. (Minor Children); v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner L.R. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent and Kids' Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE-INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Frances Barrow Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE-KIDS' VOICE OF INDIANA Katherine Meger Kelsey Kids' Voice of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Katelyn A. Bacon Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Duane E. Merchant, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D09-2301-JT-446 49D09-2301-JT-447
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha R. Griffin Christopher Kunz Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE-INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE-KIDS' VOICE OF INDIANA
Katherine Meger Kelsey Kids' Voice of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Katelyn A. Bacon Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] L.R. ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to K.D. and S.D. (collectively "the Children"). Mother argues that: (1) several of the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
The Children's father is deceased.
Issue
[¶2] Mother raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous.
II. Whether the trial court clearly erred by terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children.
Facts
[¶3] Mother has four children. Child in need of services ("CHINS") cases were previously opened for Mother's two oldest children due to Mother's illegal drug use, and Mother was unsuccessful in treating her substance abuse issues during the cases. Ultimately, Mother consented to the adoption of one of the older children, and Mother's parental rights to the other child were terminated.
[¶4] This case concerns Mother's other children, twin daughters born in March 2019 ("the Children"). Mother used illegal drugs while pregnant with the Children, and the Children were born exposed to opiates. The Department of Child Services ("DCS") removed the Children shortly after their birth, filed a petition alleging the Children were CHINS, and placed the Children in foster care. The Children were adjudicated to be CHINS in September 2019. The initial permanency plan was reunification with Mother. Mother was ordered to complete a parenting assessment and a substance abuse assessment, engage in substance abuse treatment, and participate in drug screening.
[¶5] In January 2020, Mother was engaged in services, but her participation in drug screening was inconsistent. By November 2020, Mother had worked toward unsupervised visits with the Children, and by April 2021, Mother had achieved overnight visits. Mother, however, tested positive for illegal drugs in the fall of 2021, and visits were ordered to return to supervised status. Mother's visits remained supervised for the rest of the case.
[¶6] By February 2022, Mother's supervised visits with the Children were occurring three times per week at Mother's home. DCS would transport the Children to Mother's residence. Mother was "consistent" with visits during the first few weeks of this period, but her participation then became "up and down ...." Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Mother demonstrated a "lack of engagement" with the Children during visits. Id. at 48. She would have the Children watch television or play on her phone. Sometimes Mother would sit next to the Children, but other times she would walk "back and forth throughout the house or in the back of the kitchen saying she's cleaning ...." Id. Both Children have individual food allergies; however, Mother would deny that the Children had allergies and was defensive regarding DCS's suggestions.
[¶7] In the summer of 2022, Mother's engagement and consistency again improved, and DCS increased her supervised visits to four times per week. Things took a turn, however, in the fall of 2022. Mother was incarcerated in September 2022, and after she was released, her participation with services was "up and down" once more. Id. at 52. Mother was not consistently present for scheduled visits; DCS would transport the Children to Mother's residence, but Mother would not be there. Additionally, in August 2022, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and Mother told DCS that she used "opiates and some other crazy stuff" in September 2022. Id. at 180.
[¶8] DCS began requiring Mother to confirm visits the night before, and when that failed to solve the issue, DCS began requiring Mother to confirm visits on the morning of the visits. Despite confirming visits beforehand, however, Mother continued to miss approximately one visit per week. This resulted in DCS transporting the Children to Mother's house only to drive the Children back to the foster family. When Mother did attend visits, she would occasionally end visits early. Mother mostly let the Children watch television during visits, and she required coaching on preparing food for the Children that was safe given their allergies.
[¶9] Also during the fall of 2022, Mother's residence was unsafe for the Children. The door was "never locked," and there was broken glass and metal pieces around the outside of the residence. Id. at 122. The inside of the house appeared "ransacked"; there were "car parts in the middle of the living room," and, at one point, the residence smelled of gasoline. Id. at 123. Mother did not have a bedroom set up for the Children and "never wanted them to go past the living room area." Id. at 122.
[¶10] Mother had a visit scheduled for December 12, 2022, which she confirmed with DCS the night before. On the morning of the visit, however, DCS did not hear from Mother, so a DCS services provider, Kamryn Kirk, went to Mother's house at around 10:00 a.m. to check the status of the visit. Mother initially did not answer the door, and when she eventually did, she appeared "disoriented." Id. at 55. The house was "in complete disarray ...." Id. Mother told Kirk that she had a meeting with her probation officer and cancelled the scheduled visit because she would not be able to clean the residence in time. DCS, however, had no knowledge that Mother was on probation at the time.
[¶11] After speaking with Mother, Kirk backed out of the driveway and pulled over to the side of the road to inform DCS regarding the cancellation. She saw Mother take two or three trips to Mother's car and then saw Mother enter the driver's seat where she remained for five to ten minutes. Kirk then walked up to Mother's car and observed Mother to be "passed out." Id. at 58. After Kirk yelled Mother's name several times, Mother eventually responded. Kirk asked her, "Did you go to probation?" Id. at 58. Mother responded that she had gone to probation and "probation gave her medicine and so that's why she's like this right now." Id. at 59.
[¶12] During the next scheduled visit on December 14, 2022, Mother was "erratic," demonstrated little engagement with the Children, and "kept going back and forth once again" between the back and front of the residence. Id. at 60. At one point, Mother had been in the back of the residence for an unusually long time, and Kirk went to check on her. Kirk observed Mother on her knees and bending down over a white binder. A white powder was on the binder, and Mother had a red straw with one end in the powder and the other end in her nose. Kirk took a photo of Mother and confronted her; however, Mother was defensive and said, "I don't know what you think you just saw, but you didn't see what you think you just saw." Id. at 63. Mother was approximately twenty-five steps away from the Children at the time.
[¶13] Kirk immediately cancelled the visit. Mother later called Kirk, apologized, and said she was "going to go to rehab" and would miss her next scheduled visit. Id. at 64. Mother admitted to Kirk that she "relapse[d]" but claimed that the white powder was MiraLAX and "that was the way in which her doctor told her to take her medicine." Id. at 65-66. Kirk did not hear from Mother again until January 16, 2023, when Mother claimed she was "out of rehab," sober, and ready to start visits again. Id. at 66.
[¶14] On January 17, 2023, DCS petitioned for the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children, and the trial court approved a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. In February 2023, visits commenced again; however, visits were reduced from four times per week at Mother's residence to twice per month at a DCS facility. Visits were never returned to Mother's home thereafter.
[¶15] At a February 2023 child-family-team meeting, Mother told DCS that she wanted the Children's maternal grandmother to adopt the Children. This was surprising to DCS because caseworkers did not believe Mother had "much of a relationship" with maternal grandmother, and the Children had only spoken virtually with maternal grandmother on one or two occasions during visits. Id. at 134-135. Additionally, Mother told DCS that she had gone to a drug treatment facility following the December 14, 2022 incident. In March 2023, Mother relapsed.
[¶16] The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the termination of parental rights petition on June 22, July 13, October 12, and December 21, 2023. At the first hearing, Mother testified that she previously received substance abuse treatment through Gallahue and was currently receiving "medication management and psychiatry" through Journey Road. Id. at 17. At the final hearing, however, Mother claimed that she was participating in an in-patient drug treatment program at a "residential center" through Journey Road, where she had been living for a year and a half. Id. at 220. Mother claimed that she had been clean during this time. Mother further claimed that she was on track to complete the program the following week and planned to move in with maternal grandmother, whose house had space for Mother and the Children. Mother claimed that she missed visits and cancelled visits early because she was not given sufficient notice to inform Journey Road and also because of her health problems, including a cancer diagnosis and treatment.
[¶17] Mother admitted that she relapsed four times since 2019, the last of which was in March 2023. Regarding the December 14, 2022 incident with the red straw, Mother admitted that she relapsed around that time; however, she claimed that the white powder was MiraLAX and that she was "sucking it through the straw with [her] mouth." Id. at 23. A photograph of Mother using the straw with the white powder was admitted as DCS Exhibit 25.
[¶18] DCS service providers testified that Mother had submitted only one drug screen to DCS since December 2022 and that Mother had not provided a release for information regarding Mother's treatment and drug screens through Journey Road. They further testified that Mother had missed approximately half of the scheduled visits since February 2023, including five of the seven visits scheduled between the termination of parental rights fact-finding hearings. Regarding a visit Mother missed in October 2023, one caseworker testified that Mother called over an hour after the visit was scheduled to begin and claimed that she would have to miss the visit because she got pulled over by the police.
[¶19] Additionally, despite Mother's claim that she was on track to complete the drug treatment program and was planning to stay with maternal grandmother, family case manager ("FCM") Assiath Falana testified that Mother had told her several days beforehand that Mother had already completed a drug treatment program, had "been let out," and was "at her mother's looking for a home." Id. at 238.
[¶20] DCS argued that Mother was no closer to reunification than she was at the beginning of the case. DCS further argued that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests because, throughout the life of the case, Mother had been unable to address her substance abuse, and adoption would give the Children the "permanency and stability that they need." Id. at 184. The Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") testified that termination was in the Children's best interests due to concerns regarding Mother's housing and substance abuse. The GAL did not believe that, given more time, Mother would be able to maintain sobriety.
[¶21] On February 7, 2024, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court found the following:
63. [Mother's] explanation of sucking dry MiraLAX into her mouth through a straw is not credible. It is more than likely that [Mother] was using the straw to ingest illicit substances while her children were in the home.
* * * * *
79. [Mother] described her care at Journey Road to include seeing a medication doctor and a psychiatrist. In the beginning of that treatment [Mother] was seeing the medication doctor three times a month. At the time of the June 2023 trial date, [Mother] testified that she had progressed to only seeing the medication doctor once a month.
80. As of the June 2023 trial date, [Mother] has been using Subutex/suboxone for approximately 6 years or longer. During the course of this six-year use of Subutex, [Mother] has repeatedly relapsed in her use of illegal substances.
* * * * *
82. [Mother] was ordered by the CHINS court to submit to random drug screens. According to [Mother], those drug screens should normally happen three times a week. Between December 1, 2022, and the June 2023 trial date, [Mother] admitted to only submitting one drug screen during that time.
* * * * *
93. On December 21, 2023 [Mother] testified that she had been living at Journey Road treatment center for a year and a half, and had been clean that entire time. The court does not find this testimony to be credible. The picture taken of [Mother] snorting a white substance was taken in December of 2022 at her own residence. Additionally, [Mother] admitted to the team that she relapsed more than once over the last 18 months, including in March 2023.
* * * * *
109. The current plan of permanency for the children is adoption. That plan is a satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of the children as it will allow them to achieve a safe stable home free from substance abuse. [Mother] has been unable to provide that safety and stability since the children were removed from her care nearly five years ago.
110. The children cannot be returned to the care of their mother due to [Mother's] failure to remedy her long term and continued use of illicit substances. Over the course of the nearly five years the underlying CHINS case has been open; [Mother] has been unable to demonstrate continued sobriety.
111. Under the current CHINS case, [Mother] has had services available to help her achieve sobriety for nearly five years. Prior to this CHINS case opening, [Mother] also was offered substance abuse treatment through the CHINS cases for her other two children who are no longer in her care. There is no reason to believe that providing [Mother] with more time to achieve sobriety would be successful. It is not in the best interests of the children to further delay their permanency by offering [Mother] more of the same services with which she has historically been unsuccessful.
112. While [Mother] has alleged she participated in multiple drug treatment programs over the course of the CHINS case, none of those programs have allowed [Mother] to achieve the long term sobriety necessary for her to provide a safe stable home free from substance use. By [Mother's] own admission, she has repeatedly relapsed after her participation in those programs. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that further substance use treatment would allow [Mother] to achieve and maintain sobriety for long enough to transition the children to her care.
113. [Mother] has failed to consistently visit with her children during the pendency of this TPR case, and prior to its inception. Her failure to spend precious time with her children, despite the efforts of providers to fully transport [Mother] to visits, is significant evidence to support the fact that [Mother] lacks the ability to dedicate her time to caring for her children.
114. As recently as two days before the final day of trial in this matter, [Mother] still lacked an appropriate home where she could reunify with the children as evidenced by her request to FCM Falana for assistance with housing.
115. Termination of the parent child relationship between [Mother] and her children [] is in the best interests of the children. Termination of the parental relationship will allow the children to be adopted into the only home they have known for their nearly five years of life. Adoption will allow the children to find permanency in a safe, stable home free from the use of illicit substances, and that is in their best interest.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34-40. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶22] Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights to the Children. We disagree. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). "[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is 'perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].'" Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000)). We, however, recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) ("Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children-but this right is not absolute."). "When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated." Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.
[¶23] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court "shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)" when granting a petition to terminate parental rights. Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.
Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.
(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.
[¶24] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that, "if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship." Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Our General Assembly amended Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. See Ind. Legis. Serv. Pub. L. 70-2024. Because the amended statute took effect after the petition for termination of parental rights was filed in this case, we apply the previous version of the statute. Moreover, our result in this case would be the same under the amended statute.
DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).
I. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.
[¶25] Mother first challenges several of the trial court's findings. We begin with Findings Nos. 109, 110, 111, and 112, in which the trial court determined that Mother had been unable to provide the Children with a "safe and stable home free from substance abuse"; that Mother had "been unable to demonstrate continued sobriety"; and that "[t]here is no reason to believe that providing [Mother] with more time to achieve sobriety would be successful" based on Mother's previous unsuccessful attempts to address her substance abuse through treatment programs. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 39.
[¶26] These findings are not clearly erroneous. Mother argues that "DCS did not refute Mother's claim that she was currently in treatment, or that she was currently sober." Appellant's Br. p. 20. Mother was enrolled in drug treatment programs throughout the case; however, Mother admittedly relapsed at least four times during this period. In particular, in December 2022, Mother ingested illegal drugs through a straw during a supervised visit while the Children were mere steps away from her. Mother lied to DCS and the trial court by claiming that she was sucking dry MiraLAX through her mouth as recommended by her doctor. The photograph of this incident clearly shows the straw in Mother's nose.
[¶27] Mother was also dishonest regarding her claim that she had been participating in inpatient treatment at Journey Road and clean for nearly a year and a half; Mother admitted that she relapsed in March 2023, which was only nine months prior to this testimony. Furthermore, Mother submitted only one drug screen to DCS since December 2022. Although Mother claimed that she was drug screening through Journey Road during this period, she did not provide DCS with a release to obtain the results of this screening.
[¶28] Mother also challenges Finding No. 114, in which the trial court determined that, "[a]s recently as two days before the final day of trial in this matter, [Mother] still lacked an appropriate home where she could reunify with the children as evidenced by her request to FCM Falana for assistance with housing." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 39. Like the other findings, Finding No. 114 is not clearly erroneous. During the final hearing date, Mother testified that she was residing at Journey Road and planned to move in with maternal grandmother upon completion of the program. During the same hearing date, however, FCM Falana testified that Mother told her she already completed the Journey Road program, was already living with maternal grandmother, and was searching for another residence. Mother, thus, provided two different accounts regarding her living situation, and the trial court was not required to believe that Mother had stable housing. Moreover, when Mother lived at her own residence, DCS repeatedly found the residence in disarray, with parts of the residence unsafe for the Children during visits. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.
Mother also challenges Finding No. 115, in which the trial court found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. We address this finding in Part II.B. Additionally, because Mother does not challenge the remaining findings, we accept them as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (explaining that this Court will accept unchallenged trial court findings as true).
II. The trial court did not clearly err by terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children.
A. Reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will be remedied
[¶29] Mother next argues that DCS failed to prove that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the Children were unlikely to be remedied. Mother relies on Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family and Children, 841 N.E.2d 615 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), transfer denied, which we find distinguishable. In that case, the children were removed due to squalid conditions and drug paraphernalia in the home, and the father later admitted that the children were CHINS. The father was subsequently incarcerated for drug-related offenses. Id. at 618. In the meantime, the Office of Family and Children ("OFC") petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights to the children and, because the father was incarcerated, did not provide services geared towards reunification. Id.
[¶30] At the termination of parental rights hearings, OFC presented evidence regarding the conditions in the home as well as the father's lack of parenting skills, history of unemployment, history of transience, and history of substance abuse. Id. at 621. The father, however, presented evidence that, while incarcerated, he was placed in a "Therapeutic Community" and participated in numerous services, including those to address parenting skills and substance abuse. Id. at 622. The father testified that he had secured employment for after his release, had not used drugs while incarcerated, and did not plan to use drugs in the future. Id. Although the trial court ordered the father's parental rights terminated, on appeal, a panel of this Court reversed that ruling on the grounds that the father made "positive strides . . . toward turning his life around" and "the OFC did not present clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied." Id.
[¶31] Mother argues that, as in Rowlett, Mother made positive strides toward reunification by engaging in drug treatment "successfully throughout her termination proceedings." Appellant's Br. p. 21. This is not entirely true, as Mother admitted that she relapsed in March 2023, which was approximately two months after DCS filed the petition for termination of Mother's parental rights.
[¶32] Moreover, the father's situation in Rowlett was far different than Mother's here. Whereas the father in Rowlett was incarcerated and had no access to reunification services, Mother had access to these services. Mother also repeatedly missed visits with the Children, showed a lack of engagement, and used illegal drugs during a supervised visit. Even between hearings in the termination of parental rights proceedings, Mother missed a majority of the visits. The trial court's finding of no reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will be remedied is not clearly erroneous.
Mother also argues that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Consequently, DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children.
B. Best interests of the Children
[¶33] Lastly, Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a "central consideration" in determining the best interests of a child. Id.
[¶34] Here, DCS argued that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests because Mother was no closer to reunification than she was at the beginning of the case; Mother failed to address her substance abuse despite treatment; and adoption by the foster family, with whom the Children have lived since birth, would give the Children the "permanency and stability that they need." Tr. Vol. II p. 184. The GAL agreed that termination was in the Children's best interests, relying on Mother's lack of adequate housing and Mother's substance abuse.
[¶35] The trial court determined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests because termination "will allow the children to be adopted into the only home they have known for their nearly five years of life," and "[a]doption will allow the children to find permanency in a safe, stable home free from the use of illicit substances." Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 3940. The trial court also noted that "[i]t is not in the best interests of the children to further delay their permanency by offering [Mother] more of the same services with which she has historically been unsuccessful." Id. at 39.
[¶36] Mother argues that the fact that a better home for the Children exists cannot support the termination of Mother's parental rights. Appellant's Br. p.10; see, e.g., In re R.A., 19 N.E.3d 313, 321 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (citing In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (noting that the mere fact that there may be a "better home available" for a child cannot form the basis for terminating parental rights), trans. denied. This, however, was not the basis for the trial court's best interests determination. On the contrary, the trial court relied on the fact that, over the life of the case, Mother was unable to address her substance abuse. Cf. In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 439-40 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (affirming termination of parental rights order based, in part, on mother's continued illegal drug use and CASA's recommendation that termination was in the child's best interests), trans. denied
[¶37] Additionally, Mother demonstrated a pattern of missing visits, terminating visits early, and showing little engagement with the Children. Although Mother claims that many of her missed visits were due to Mother's cancer diagnosis and treatment, Mother demonstrated this pattern throughout the entirety of the case. The trial court's best interests determination was not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights.
Conclusion
[¶38] The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶39] Affirmed.
May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.