Courts have held that similar prior-knowledge exclusions are unambiguous, and neither party in this case asserts that an ambiguity exists. See Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 524 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (observing that a similar exclusion was unambiguous); Westport Ins. Corp. v. Lilley, 292 F. Supp. 2d 165, 171 (D. Me. 2003) (surveying cases from multiple jurisdictions finding the exclusion to be unambiguous). Accordingly, the exclusion will be applied based on its plain meaning.
rn Univ., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 18-CIV-61842, 2019 WL 7820594, *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2019) (insured must have known "of any act, error, omission, or event that could reasonably be expected to give rise to that claim") (emphasis added); Houston Specialty Ins. Co. v. Titleworks of S.W. Fla., Inc., 2:15-cv-219, 2018 WL 11354007, *3 (M.D. Fla. March 16, 2018) (insured must have "had no knowledge of the actual or alleged Wrongful Act"); David R. Farbstein, P.A. v. Wesport Ins. Corp., No. 16-cv-62361, 2017 WL 3425327, *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2017) (definition of "wrongful act" of which insured could not have prior knowledge included "circumstance" and "personal injury"); Axis Ins. Co. v. Farah& Farah, P.A., 3:10-cv-393, 2011 WL 5510063, *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2011) (policy was conditioned on statement that "no fact, circumstance or situation indicating the probability of a claim or action . . . is now known"); Lawyers Professional Liability Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 524 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (policy did not apply to a claim "arising out of any acts or omissions" the insured could have reasonably foreseen "might be expected to be the basis of a claim") (emphasis added).
Courts routinely affirm the denial of coverage where an insurance policy contains an unambiguous "prior knowledge" provision and where an insured has knowledge, prior to the effective date of the policy, of acts or omissions that might reasonably provide the basis for a claim. See, e.g., Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 524 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988) (holding prior knowledge provision clearly and unambiguously barred coverage for claim of which insureds were aware before policy's effective date); Coregis Ins. Co. v. McCollum, 961 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (same); see also Cuthill & Eddy, LLC v. Continental Cas. Co., 784 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2011). However, if the asserted policy language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the policy is considered ambiguous and strictly construed against the policy's drafter.
See Feldman v. Imperium Ins. Co., No. 8:14–cv–1637–T–30EAJ, 2015 WL 5854153, at *6 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 5, 2015) (“Courts have held that similar prior-knowledge exclusions are unambiguous....”); Cuthill & Eddy, LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 784 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1337 (M.D.Fla.2011) (“Courts routinely affirm the denial of coverage where an insurance policy contains an unambiguous ‘prior knowledge’ provision and where an insured has knowledge, prior to the effective date of the policy, of acts or omissions that might reasonably provide the basis for a claim.”); Coregis Ins. Co. v. McCollum, 961 F.Supp. 1572, 1579 (M.D.Fla.1997) ; Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig, & Curtis, 524 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1988). In its Motion, Diamond State maintains that the analysis utilized in those cases is applicable here, see Motion at 13-14, and Boys' Home, as an alternative to its ambiguity argument, relies on the same interpretation applied in those cases, see Boys' Home Response at 14-16.
Courts routinely affirm the denial of coverage where an insurance policy contains an unambiguous prior knowledge provision and where an insured has knowledge, prior to the effective date of the policy, of acts or omissions that might reasonably provide the basis for a claim. See, e.g., Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig Curtis, 524 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding prior knowledge provision clearly and unambiguously barred coverage for claim of which insureds were aware before policy's effective date); McCollum, 961 F. Supp. at 1579 (same). In this case, "the prior knowledge provision essentially makes fortuity a condition of coverage.
Courts routinely affirm the denial of coverage where an insurance policy contains an unambiguous "prior knowledge" provision and where an insured has knowledge, prior to the effective date of the policy, of acts or omissions that might reasonably provide the basis for a claim. See, e.g., Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig Curtis, 524 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding prior knowledge provision clearly and unambiguously barred coverage for claim of which insureds were aware before policy's effective date); McCollum, 961 F. Supp. at 1579 (same). However, if the asserted policy language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the policy is considered ambiguous and strictly construed against the policy's drafter.
Courts routinely affirm the denial of coverage where an insurance policy contains an unambiguous “prior knowledge” provision and where an insured has knowledge, prior to the effective date of the policy, of acts or omissions that might reasonably provide the basis for a claim. See, e.g., Lawyers Prof'l Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 524 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding prior knowledge provision clearly and unambiguously barred coverage for claim of which insureds were aware before policy's effective date); Coregis Ins. Co. v. McCollum, 961 F.Supp. 1572, 1579 (M.D.Fla.1997) (same). However, if the asserted policy language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the policy is considered ambiguous and strictly construed against the policy's drafter.
As we are unable to conceive of a reasonable construction of the language that would afford coverage for the defendants here, we reject their ambiguity argument. We note that several other jurisdictions have found similar exclusions unambiguous, Professional Mgrs. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 224 (5th Cir. 1986); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Const. Co., Inc., 186 Cal.Rptr. 513, 514-15 (Ct.App. 1982); LPLIC v. Dolan, Fertig Curtis, 524 So.2d 677, 678 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 536 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1988); Stiefel v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 73, 75-76 (Ill.App.Ct. 1983); Tewell, Thorpe v. Continental Cas., 825 P.2d 724, 726-28 (Wash.Ct.App. 1992), and we know of no court that has held otherwise. [5] The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they could have foreseen, prior to May 3, 1989, that the shareholders might file affirmative claims against them based on the stock redemption.