Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Clark v. Heard

    538 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Tex. 1982)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that, under Texas law, the protection ordinarily allowed an officer who proceeds under a facially valid warrant does not apply to the arrest and detention of the wrong person and that such an arrest, even under a duly issued warrant, amounts to false imprisonment

    Under Texas common law, the essential element of false imprisonment are: 1) wilful detention of the person, 2) detention without authority of law, and 3) a detention against the consent of the party detained. Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980). Where an arrest by a law enforcement officer is concerned, the general rule is that "[i]t is a complete defense to an action for false imprisonment that the arrest or detention was by virtue of process, legally sufficient in form, and duly issued by a court or official having jurisdiction to issue it."

  2. Ali v. Merchant (In re Ali)

    CASE NO. 13-50724-CAG (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jul. 23, 2015)   Cited 3 times
    Analyzing the clarity, completeness, and quality of witness responses in order to make credibility determinations

    iii. Merchant's service of a writ of garnishment on Plaintiffs' vendors and social organization representatives 563. "Texas has generally recognized a cause of action for abuse of process in situations where the original process, such as a writ of garnishment or writ of sequestration, has been abused to accomplish an end other than that which the writ was designed to accomplish." Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1980, no writ) (citing Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Teas, 138 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1940) affirm'd 158 S.W.2d 758 (1942); Rogers v. O'Barr & Dinwiddie, 76 S.W. 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no writ)). 564. Under Texas law, a garnishment is "a statutory proceeding brought by a judgment creditor (the garnishor) whereby the property, money, or credits of the judgment debtor (the debtor) in the possession of another (the garnishee) may be applied to payment of the final judgment against the debtor."

  3. Wayne County Bank v. Hodges

    175 W. Va. 723 (W. Va. 1985)   Cited 24 times
    In Hodges, a car dealer had borrowed money from the bank and signed a promissory note, with his parents as co-signers of the note.

    the plaintiff's action against the defendants for abuse of process was properly dismissed. See also Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980); McClellan Agency, Inc. v. Cunningham, Nielsen Molloy, Inc., 22 Misc.2d 372, 198 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1960). Cf., Delisi v. Garnett, 257 Md. 4, 261 A.2d 784 (1970); Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423, 187 N.E.2d 859 (1963).

  4. Futerfas v. Park Towers

    707 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App. 1986)   Cited 32 times
    In Futerfas, the court held that summary judgment had been properly granted against a plaintiff who had never been arrested or tried in connection with the criminal complaints, explaining that "[i]f [the plaintiff] has not been arrested, then there has been no 'use' of any process (presumably a warrant for his arrest) issued as the result of the filing of the criminal complaints against him."

    3. that damage resulted to the plaintiff as a result of such irregular act.Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex.Civ.App. __; Tyler 1980, no writ). We discern from the residents' briefs that they claim summary judgment was proper because they proved no genuine issue of material fact existed on the following essential grounds of recovery: (1) that a valid and regular process duly and properly issued; (2) that there was an illegal, improper or perverted use of process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process; and (3) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of process.

  5. Matador Pipelines Inc. v. Thomas

    650 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    In a venue hearing, once a plea of privilege has been controverted, the plaintiff has the same burden of proving a cause of action (i.e., that venue is proper in the county where suit was filed) as in a trial on the merits. Lozano v. Tex-Paint, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1980, no writ); Mustang Tractor Equipment Co. v. Flowers, 596 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1980, no writ). We agree with Appellant's assessment of Hamill v. Bahr, 271 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1954, no writ), as an isolated and spurious decision.