The Wells court concluded that after summary judgment is final, the only permissible amendments are those that conform the pleadings to the proofs. In the case of Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, this court recently questioned the analysis of the Wells court. As we noted in Loyola, the Code of Civil Procedure is to be liberally construed "to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties."

Defendant responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff had prior opportunities to amend the complaint and she has not justified why she could not have alleged these facts prior to the summary judgment hearing. Defendant relies on Hill v. Jones (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 854, and Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799. Hill and Loyola Academy were decided within one week of each other by the same panel of the Appellate Court, First District.

In two recent cases, which were both decided after the trial court's ruling in this case, the First District Appellate Court addressed the propriety of amending a complaint after the entry of summary judgment. In Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 556 N.E.2d 586, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendants, seeking to recover damages incurred to its roof. The initial complaint alleged negligence in the installation of plaintiff's roofing system, breach of implied warranty of merchantability and breach of express warranty.

In two recent cases, which were both decided after the trial court's ruling on plaintiff's motion to amend, the First District Appellate Court addressed the propriety of amending a complaint after the entry of summary judgment. In Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 556 N.E.2d 586, the court held that a trial court has the power to allow a plaintiff to amend a complaint pursuant to section 2-1005(g), and a plaintiff is not limited in its ability to do so by conforming the pleadings to the proofs. ( 198 Ill. App.3d at 802.)

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Loyola Academy, appeals from a modified opinion on a denial of a rehearing from the appellate court affirming, with one justice dissenting, the order of the circuit court. ( 198 Ill. App.3d 799.) The circuit court had denied plaintiff leave to amend its complaint after it granted the separate motions of the defendants, S S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (S S), and Kelly Energy Systems, Inc. (Kelly), for summary judgment on two of the three counts of plaintiff's complaint.

Delgatto v. Brandon Associates, Ltd., 131 Ill. 2d 183, 195, 545 N.E.2d 689, 695 (1989). This is consistent with the position taken by Professor Michael (see 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 38.7, at 238-39 (1989)), and a similarly more restrictive approach has been articulated in the appellate court decision in Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc., 198 Ill. App. 3d 799, 802, 556 N.E.2d 586, 588 (1990), rev'd, 146 Ill. 2d 263 (1992). However, upon review, the supreme court applied the more liberal standards applicable generally to amendments brought under section 2-616(a) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-616 (a) (West 1992)).

In Loyola, the supreme court allowed an appeal from the denial of the plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint following the entry of summary judgment for the defendants. In reversing the appellate court ( Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 804, 556 N.E.2d 586 (McMorrow, P.J., dissenting)), which upheld the order denying the plaintiff's motion to amend, the supreme court reaffirmed the precedent established by Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 373, 437 N.E.2d 774, and decisions following Kupianen (see e.g., Siebert v. Continental Oil Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App.3d 891, 515 N.E.2d 728; Evans v. United Bank (1992), 226 Ill. App.3d 526, 598 N.E.2d 933). • 1 The court observed that section 2-1005(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(g)) (the Code) provides that the trial court shall permit pleadings to be amended upon just and reasonable terms before or after the entry of summary judgment.

Aside from the factual distinction between Calabrese and the present case, this court has stated before that at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the parties move beyond an examination of the sufficiency of the pleadings. ( Loyola Academy v. S S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 556 N.E.2d 586, appeal allowed (1990), 133 Ill.2d 559, 561 N.E.2d 693.) That which may be sufficient to plead a cause of action does not necessarily survive a summary judgment motion.

Entering this stage, the trial judge has a right and a need to know what the parties know." ( Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 803, 556 N.E.2d 586.) "[T]he parties [at the summary judgment stage] have a responsibility before the hearing to make known to the trial judge the significant matters of which they are aware."

) Upon reaching the summary judgment stage of these proceedings, we have moved beyond an examination of the sufficiency of the pleadings to a determination of whether there are any material issues of fact to advance to a full trial. ( Loyola Academy v. SS Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 799, 556 N.E.2d 586, leave to appeal granted (1990), 133 Ill.2d 559, 561 N.E.2d 693, citing Janes v. First Federal Savings Loan Association, 57 Ill.2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605.) For the reasons outlined below, we believe that there are not. The plaintiff has failed to sufficiently contradict the factual basis for the defendant's motion for summary judgment. We must conclude that the plaintiff lacks the evidence to support the element of damages, an element essential to his case.