Opinion
3:20-cv-00710
09-25-2023
MACK MANDRELL LOYDE, Plaintiff, v. TEHUM CARE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a CORIZON HEALTH, INC., et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Elliot Garrett and Brooke Edwards (Doc. No. 81, “Motion”). Defendants filed a memorandum in support of the Motion (Doc. No. 82). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 90), and Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 94).
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Mack Mandrell Loyde, is an inmate with Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”). During the relevant timeframe, Plaintiff was receiving psychiatric health services provided to him by Defendant Tehum Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Corizon Health, Inc. (hereinafter “Corizon”) through a contract with TDOC. One of Corizon's employees, Defendant Carolynn Kolesnikoff, provided care and treatment to TDOC inmates, including Plaintiff, housed in Unit 7A at the Lois DeBerry facility. Kolesnikoff began a sexual relationship with Plaintiff in August 2019.
Plaintiff testified that he repeatedly told staff members that he wanted to make a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint against a staff member but was ignored. (Doc. No. 89-2 at 7). He testified that he filed numerous grievances about this issue but never received any response. Plaintiff further testified that Defendant Elliot Garrett, the behavioral administrator employed by Corizon at the relevant time, dismissed Plaintiff's complaint by commenting that Plaintiff was “reliving his past.” Defendant Brooke Edwards was the grievance chairperson at Corizon during the relevant timeframe.
B. Procedural Posture
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Corizon, Kolesnikoff, Garrett, and Edwards, as well as Defendants Keisha Bean, Molly O'Toole, and Christopher Smith. The claims against Bean, Corizon, and O'Toole have since been stayed. (Doc. No. 108), and Smith has since been dismissed. (Doc. No. 102).
Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I, Plaintiff claims that Kolesnikoff violated his Eighth Amendment rights by engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with him. (Doc. No. 1 at 8). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Corizon, O'Toole, Bean, Garrett, and Edwards (and the now-dismissed Smith) violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from Kolesnikoff's alleged sexual abuse. (Doc. No. 1 at 9). In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Corizon negligently hired and supervised Kolesnikoff. (Doc. No. 1 at 9-10). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and costs of litigation. (Doc. No. 1 at 10-11). Via the Motion, Garrett and Edwards (hereafter, collectively, “Defendants”) seek summary judgment regarding the sole claim against them, namely the Count II failure-to-protect claim. (Doc. No. 81 at 1).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248. On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine[.]'” Id.
A fact is “material” within the meaning of Rule 56(c) “if its proof or disproof might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248), abrogated on other grounds by Young v. Utd. Parcel Serv., 575 U.S. 206 (2015). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Alternatively, the moving party may meet its initial burden by otherwise “show[ing]”-even without citing materials of record-that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to support a material fact (for example, the existence of an element of a nonmovant plaintiff's claim).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the summary judgment movant meets its initial burden, then in response the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Pittman, 901 F.3d at 628. Importantly, “[s]ummary judgment for a defendant [that has met its initial burden as the movant] is appropriate when the plaintiff ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” Clevelandv. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).