To be sure, "the Legislature has a wide latitude to create statutory classifications, but they must be reasonable." Ponca Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Wilkinson , 2010 OK 75, ¶ 6, 242 P.3d 534, 536 ; see also Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness , 1977 OK 70, ¶ 16, 563 P.2d 143, 147 (statutory classifications must "above all be reasonable"). "The Legislature runs afoul of the prohibition on enacting special laws set forth in Oklahoma Const. Art. 5 § 46 when it adopts a classification that is arbitrary and capricious and bears no reasonable relationship to the object of the Legislation."

Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Conventions, 742 P.2d 1087, 1096 (1987); Peters v. Golden Oil Co., 600 P.2d 330, 331 (1979). Section 109 was enacted in 1978 after we overturned a portion of a similar statutory scheme in Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977). The section now provides as follows:

B. After holding that the statute of repose, § 109, applied to this case, the district court also upheld the constitutionality of that statute, relying primarily on Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977). Of course, the question concerning the application and interpretation of § 109, now governed by Smith, must be decided before reaching the constitutional question raised in this case. The constitutionality of § 109 should not be decided if the case can be resolved on narrower grounds.

rp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131, aff'd on rehearing, 325 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1982); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assocs., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating Plumbing Co., 81 Wn.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).See, e.g., Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Overland Const. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Haw. 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., Nev., 660 P.2d 995 (1983); Henderson Clay Prods. Inc. v. Edgar Wood Assocs., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). In Illinois the original statute was found unconstitutional in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); after the statute was amended, an intermediate appellate court upheld it as constitutional under the facts of the case, Matayka v. Melia, 119 Ill.App.3d 221, 74 Ill.Dec. 851, 456 N.E.2d 353 (1983).

The statute of repose was initially enacted by the Oklahoma Legislature in 1967. Thereafter, in Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between the class of engineers/architects (who were protected by the statute) and the class of owners/tenants (who were not protected). The Loyal Order decision also seemingly construed the 1967 version of the statute to be broad enough to protect manufacturers of products used in the construction of improvements to real property. The decision reads, in pertinent part: The 1967 version of Section 109 did not include owners and tenants within the class of persons protected by the statute of repose.

A number of state courts have held that similar statutes violate their state constitutions on the grounds that such classifications are irrational and violative of equal protection.See n. 29 supra (citing cases) and Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977). Two other state courts have held similar statutes violative of other provisions of state constitutions.

“This Court has unequivocally stated that ‘it is within the power of the Legislature to modify or abolish an old right under common law as long as no vested right is disturbed.’ ” Getty Oil Co., 1989 OK 139, ¶ 14, 782 P.2d 915 (quoting Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 1977 OK 70, ¶ 8, 563 P.2d 143). Appellee's Supplement to Record on Accelerated Appeal, filed September 20, 2011, page 2.

¶ 20 Public protection falls within the Legislature's authority, as does the authority to define what constitutes an actionable wrong unless constitutionally forbidden, i.e., the Legislature cannot completely cut off an existing or vested right. The plaintiffs have no constitutionally secured right under Article II, section 6 for the court to provide a remedy, where, as here, the Legislature has explicitly refused to recognize a private cause of action, leaving the plaintiffs with no wrong recognized by law.Jaworsky v. Frolich, 1992 OK 157, ¶¶ 14-15, 850 P,2d 1052, 1056; Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 1977 OK 70, ¶ 10, 563 P.2d 143, 146. The plaintiffs' claims are based on a violation of the Act, and they do not raise any common-law causes of action.

Cases this court cited generally for precedential support include some of the more influential statute of repose decisions, including Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); and Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). Compare Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla.

In the following cases, statutes were held unconstitutional: Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) (open courts); Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988) (equal protection); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (open courts); Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Haw. 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982) (equal protection); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (equal protection); Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985) (special legislation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822, 107 S.Ct. 89, 93 L.Ed.2d 41 (1986); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977) (equal protection); State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983) (equal protection); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood Assocs., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982) (equal protection); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977) (equal protection); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978) (equal protection); Daugard v. Baltic Coop. Build. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984) (open courts); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (equal protection); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) ("open courts," special laws). Because the issue before this Court involves only the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, the decisions of other states based on other grounds, such as equal protection and due process, provide no support for Buehner Concrete's argument that the architects and builders statute of repose is constitutional under Article I, section 11.