But, at least 15 state courts have interpreted their own versions of the uniform drug possession statute to require proof of knowledge or intent. See Walker v. State , 356 So. 2d 672, 674 (Ala. 1977) ; Bell v. State , 519 P.2d 804, 809 n.17 (Alaska 1974) ; Loy v. State , 88 Ark. App. 91, 101, 195 S.W. 3d 370 (2004) ; People v. Rubacalba , 6 Cal. 4th 62, 67, 859 P.2d 708, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (1993) ; State v. Carbone , 116 Conn. App. 801, 816, 977 A.2d 694 (2009) ; Ayers v. State , 97 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Del. 2014) ; Duvall v. State , 289 Ga. 540, 542, 712 S.E.2d 850 (2011) ; State v. Armstrong , 142 Idaho 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321 (2005) ; State v. Faulkner , 220 Kan. 153, 156, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976) ; Neal v. State , 191 Md. App. 297, 316, 991 A.2d 159 (2010) ; State v. Ali , 775 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) ; State v. Anderson , 159 Mont. 344, 351, 498 P.2d 295 (1972) ; State v. Sinclair , 191 N.C. App. 485, 492, 663 S.E.2d 866 (2008) ; Commonwealth v. Fortune , 456 Pa. 365, 368-69, 318 A.2d 327 (1974) ; Kabat v. State , 76 Wis. 2d 224, 227, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977). Some state courts have gone so far as to interpret the possession of a controlled substance to require knowledge of both the presence of the substance and the general character of the substance.

Resolution of conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility are for the finder of fact. Loy v.State, 88 Ark.App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). The court found the Laynes' testimony regarding the loans persuasive.

Resolution of conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact. Loy v. State, 88 Ark.App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). The circuit judge determined that there were not two equally reasonable conclusions, specifically finding appellant's testimony " somewhat unbelievable."

Resolution of conflicts in testimony and assessment of witness credibility is for the finder of fact. Loy v. State, 88 Ark.App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). In this case, the trial court, as the finder of fact, found the testimony of the State's witnesses to be more credible than the testimony of Watkins and her husband and resolved any conflicts in the testimony in the State's favor; this court is bound by these determinations.

Appellant first argues that the State failed to prove that his failure to pay was in fact willful, citing Jordan v. State, 327 Ark. 117, 939 S.W.2d 255 (1997), where the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be punished by imprisonment solely because of failure to pay restitution absent a determination that the failure to pay was willful. Next, appellant contends that the results of the search on August 26, 2008, that resulted in the possession charges, should be suppressed. He contends that the officer was not given permission to search, and the officer had no probable cause to make contact with them. He argued that the story given to the officer would not have given rise to probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. Appellant claims that his being in the car with the girl was joint occupancy, and that joint occupancy alone is insufficient to establish possession or joint possession. See Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). Finally, appellant argues that circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to show that a preponderance has been met. Lamb v. State, 74 Ark. App. 245, 45 S.W.3d 869 (2001).

Id.Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 101, 195 S.W.3d 370, 374-75 (2004). Here, appellant admits that she knew that the manufacture of methamphetamine was being carried out at the residence.

The second search, in my view, cannot be justified on these grounds because the Drug Task Force Officers were, on arrival, informed by Mr. Wyles that the matter was actually an eviction based on faulty process. They could not, at this point, reasonably rely on Mr. Wyles's consent. Nor, in the absence of a more imminent danger, could they conduct a search solely on the basis of exigent circumstances pursuant to our holding in Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004). The y should have secured a warrant.

However, by concurring in this case, I am not retreating from my previous statements of strong disfavor for the "good faith" exception to the general rule that searches made pursuant to invalid search warrants are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 90 Ark. App. 174, 204 S.W.3d 572 (2005) (Neal, J., dissenting); Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004) (Neal, J., dissenting); Grain v. State, 78 Ark. App. 153, 79 S.W.3d 406 (2002) (Griffen, J., dissenting); Hoay v. State, 75 Ark. App. 103, 55 S.W.3d 782 (2001) (Griffen, J., concurring). Now, more than ever before, I am convinced that the good-faith exception operates to judicially sanction police conduct that violates the fundamental rights protected by the Fourth Amendment and serves to eviscerate the rules regarding search and seizure.

The test for determining whether the "good-faith" exception applies is whether it "was objectively reasonable for a `well-trained police officer' to conclude that [the search] was supported by probable cause." Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 195 S.W.3d 370 (2004); Crain v. State, 78 Ark. App. 153, 79 S.W.3d 406 (2002). This court has recently stated that the objective standard under Leon requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of our rules.