See OCGA § 17-3-1 (c). See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2); Lowman v. State, 204 Ga. App. 655-656 ( 420 SE2d 94) (1992) (knowledge relevant to statute of limitation exception is that of the state).Lowman, supra.

This enumeration is without merit. Lowman v. State, 204 Ga. App. 655, 655-656 ( 420 SE2d 94) (1992). In fact, in a case involving the meaning of "knowledge" (rather than the meaning of "prosecutor") pursuant to OCGA § 17-3-2 (2), this Court stated that the knowledge test applies only to knowledge of the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceeding.

The same reasoning applies in this appeal. Lowman v. State, 204 Ga. App. 655-656 ( 420 SE2d 94) (1992). As set out in Division 1, supra, and argued by McMillan, Jackson, the principal of Helmac, became aware that McMillan was practicing dentistry on Nichols without a license in 1998.

That “actual knowledge” standard was not shown to have been met before February 2010. Compare Lowman v. State, 204 Ga.App. 655, 656, 420 S.E.2d 94 (1992) (knowledge of probate judge, as a person with an interest in the offense (perjury), was imputed to the state for purposes of OCGA § 17–3–2(2)); Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793–794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) ( “The knowledge placed at issue by OCGA § 17–3–2(2) is the knowledge of the State, which knowledge includes that imputed to the State through the knowledge not only of the prosecution, but also includes the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or injured by the offense. Thus, the knowledge of a victim of a crime or of a law enforcement officer, is imputed to the State.”) (citations omitted); Holloman v. State, 133 Ga.App. 275, 278(4), 211 S.E.2d 312 (1974) (knowledge imputed to the state when “offense was known to one whose special duty it was to report it”; the sheriff is the county's chief law enforcement officer and his knowledge is imputable to the state).

That "actual knowledge" standard was not shown to have been met before February 2010. Compare Lowman v. State, 204 Ga.App. 655, 656, 420 S.E.2d 94 (1992) (knowledge of probate judge, as a person with an interest in the offense (perjury), was imputed to the state for purposes of OCGA § 17–3–2(2) ); Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793–794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) ( "The knowledge placed at issue by OCGA § 17–3–2(2) is the knowledge of the State, which knowledge includes that imputed to the State through the knowledge not only of the prosecution, but also includes the knowledge of someone interested in the prosecution, or injured by the offense. Thus, the knowledge of a victim of a crime or of a law enforcement officer, is imputed to the State.") (citations omitted); Holloman v. State, 133 Ga.App. 275, 278(4), 211 S.E.2d 312 (1974) (knowledge imputed to the state when "offense was known to one whose special duty it was to report it"; the sheriff is the county's chief law enforcement officer and his knowledge is imputable to the state).