In order to establish timely notice of their claims under §§ 8-103 and 8-104, plaintiffs only need show "substantial compliance" with those statutory requirements. See Lampton v. LaHood, 94 Md. App. 461, 469, 617 A.2d 1142 (1993); Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md. App. 189, 197, 533 A.2d 922 (1987). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Lowery specifically referred to the "forms of presentment" of a claim delineated in § 8-104(b) as "permissive and not mandatory in nature" and reiterated that, even if a claimant fails to comply with the section, such failure "` may be a basis for disallowance of a claim in the discretion of the court.'"
Id. The lawyers also cite Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md. App. 189, 533 A.2d 922 (1987). In Lowery, the claimants were attempting to exercise an option granted by the deceased, but their letters to the estate went unanswered.
The actions at issue in Lampton and Lowery all occurred after LaHood and Hairston had been formally appointed personal representatives of the estates at issue. The sole authority cited by Lampton in support of her argument is Lowery v. Hairston, supra [ 73 Md. App. 189, 533 A.2d 922 (1987)]. There, plaintiff filed an action against the personal representative of an estate seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase option.
§ 8-104(a) of the Estates Trusts Article. Within the appropriate statutory time period, a creditor must: (1) deliver a verified, written statement of the claim to the personal representative pursuant to § 8-104(b); (2) file the claim with the register in the correct county, pursuant to § 8-104(c); or (3) if a cause of action survives death, commence an action on any person to whom property has been distributed, pursuant to § 8-104(d). See Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md. App. 189, 197, 533 A.2d 922 (1987). Here it is conceded that the appropriate statutory period is "within nine months of the date of death;" the date of death was May 31, 1989, so creditor's claims had to be filed by February 28, 1990.
Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 8-103(a)(1) provides that claims against a decedent's estate must be presented within six months after the decedent's death.See also Lowery v. Hairston, 533 A.2d 922, 927 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)("Regardless of which of the three methods [under § 8-104(b), (c), or (d)] is employed to present a claim against an estate, the time limitations of § 8-103 apply."). Under § 8-104(e)(1), when decedents are covered by a liability insurance policy, "then, notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, an action against the estate may be instituted after the expiration of the time designated in this section, but within the period of limitations generally applicable to such actions.
Appellee also emphasizes that the policy of § 8–103 is to expedite the administration of estates, a policy that is satisfied by requiring one whose claim rests on adverse possession to come forward within six months, or be barred. The bill to quiet title, the estate asserts, is subject to the nonclaim statute because this Court held the statute to apply to an action in equity, i.e., specific performance, in Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md.App. 189, 533 A.2d 922 (1987). Thus, appellant's position is that adverse possession and prescription created Nimro's interests in the disputed property by operation of law when the twenty years had run.
There must still be compliance with the statute, indeed there must be "substantial compliance" with it. Lampton does not cite any case, from any jurisdiction, in which a court has held that in the absence of some writing — whether it be a formal claim, or a letter, or a memorandum, or a lawsuit — a claimant has been held to have substantially complied with a claims notice statute like § 8-104. In [ Lowery v.] Hairston, 73 Md. App. 189, 533 A.2d 922 (1987)] and all of the out-of-state cases cited above, the claimant timely notified the personal representative of the claim by a writing of some kind. Rejecting the notion that "actual knowledge" of a claim should be sufficient, the Maryland court also stated: