Opinion
Case No. 20030008-CA.
Filed June 4, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Leon A. Dever.
Thomas J. Lowery, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se.
David B. Thomas, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Appellant Thomas J. Lowery appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Brigham Young University (BYU) and the denial of his motion to amend his complaint. We affirm.
Lowery's complaint was founded upon a single event that occurred in April 1995, when he was a BYU instructor. At that time, BYU released a reference letter, written by Lowery, to the student who was the subject of the letter. As a result of BYU's act, Lowery alleged that he was harmed. Consequently, in March 2002, Lowery filed a complaint arguing that BYU was responsible for damages associated with the release of the letter. Pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (2002), BYU moved to dismiss Lowery's complaint. To forestall BYU's motion, Lowery sought to amend his complaint to include facts that suggested he did not discover the connection between BYU's act and his damages until November 1998.
A party may request that a judge grant leave to amend pleadings [under] rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." In Utah, rule 15 is interpreted liberally to allow parties the opportunity to fully adjudicate their claims on the merits. However, the dimensions of liberality are generally defined by the trial judge, who is best positioned to evaluate the motion to amend in the context of the scope and duration of the lawsuit.
Smith v. Grand Canyons Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ¶ 32, 84 P.3d 1154 (citation omitted). If the party's amendment attempts to add a claim that is legally futile, a trial court acts well within its discretion in denying the motion to amend. See id. at ¶ 33.
Here, Lowery sought to amend his complaint to avoid the running of the applicable statute of limitations. "It is generally accepted that a statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of the last event required to form the elements of the cause of action." Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). "`[M]ere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.'" Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, there are certain rare situations where the discovery rule will toll the running of the statute of limitations. See Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284. However, "`the discovery rule does not apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute of limitations expires.'" Id. at 1286 (citation omitted).
By its own terms, Lowery's proposed amended complaint had no effect on the running of the statute of limitations. The last event required to form the elements of his causes of action occurred in April 1995. Thus, Lowery had four years from that time to file his lawsuit. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (setting forth the types of claims subject to a four-year statute of limitations). Accepting Lowery's assertion that he discovered the connection between BYU's act and his damages in 1998 as true, the discovery of the claimed injury occurred prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the discovery rule has no application to the status of his cause of action. See Williams, 970 P.2d at 1286. Accordingly, because Lowery's proposed amendment had no effect upon the outcome of the pending motion to dismiss, the trial court properly denied his motion to amend the complaint.
Lowery further argues that the running of the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his debilitating mental illness. "In reviewing the trial court's ruling on [a] motion to dismiss, we accord the trial court's conclusions of law `no particular deference, but review them for correctness.'" O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). However, "we accept as true the allegations made in the complaint." Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Utah 1993). "Tolling statutes based on mental incompetency are enacted to relieve from the strict time restrictions people `who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society.'" O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1142 (citation omitted). "[C]ourts generally hold that a person is incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling a statute of limitations `when the disability is of such a nature to show him unable to manage his business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his legal rights or liabilities.'" Id. (citation and alterations omitted). However, a person able to participate in "more or less normal activities" will most likely be deemed competent. Id.
Lowery's complaint does not support a conclusion that he was incompetent at any time during the relevant period. Instead, his complaint alleges that he was, and is, mentally ill and that BYU's act aggravated the symptoms of his mental illness. However, the existence of a mental illness is insufficient, in and of itself, to support the conclusion that Lowery was unable to protect his legal rights, manage his business affairs, manage his estate, or comprehend his legal rights. See id. After reviewing Lowery's complaint, we conclude that he failed to plead any facts that would, on their face or through reasonable inference, support a conclusion that his mental illness deteriorated into legal incompetence following BYU's act. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations had run and dismissed Lowery's complaint.
We also conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider documents that Lowery submitted in support of his position, including findings of fact issued in Lowery's 2002 divorce. See Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977) (stating "if a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider matters outside the pleadings initially lies in the discretion of the trial court"). Moreover, nothing in the additional material would support a conclusion that Lowery was incompetent during the relevant period. Rather, the divorce findings clearly state that although Lowery suffers from a "serious and persistent mental illness," they also make clear that he is capable of generating some income. Consequently, it would be impossible to conclude, based on the findings, that Lowery was unable to manage his business affairs or estate, or that he was not able to comprehend his legal rights. See O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1991). A plain reading of the divorce findings supports BYU's position, while at the same time undermining Lowery's. Therefore, even if the trial court erred in refusing to consider the materials, any error was harmless to Lowery.See Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553 (stating "an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our confidence in the verdict" (quotations and citation omitted)), cert. denied, 2004 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah April 1, 2004).
We have examined Lowery's other appellate arguments and find them to be without merit. Consequently, we do not further address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that an appellate court may, after fully considering the substance of a particular claim, dismiss the claim without written analysis).
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.