Opinion
14819
February 7, 1939.
Before THURMOND, J., Laurens, June, 1938. Affirmed.
Action by the Lower Main Street Bank against Mrs. Annie R. Parker, Mrs. Lila May M. Richey, and others to foreclose a mortgage. Judgment for plaintiff, and first-named defendant appeals.
The decree of Judge Thurmond in the Court below follows:
This is an action by The Lower Main Street Bank to foreclose the mortgage securing the payment of a note, both given by the late W.R. Richey, Sr., to The Life Insurance Company of Virginia, dated May 4, 1926, said mortgage being recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County, S.C. on May 6, 1926, in book 59 of Mortgages, page 293, tract one as described in the mortgage, having been heretofore released from the lien thereof by The Life Insurance Company of Virginia. The said W.R. Richey, Sr., the mortgagor, subsequently died intestate, all of his heirs having been made parties defendant and duly served with process. Mrs. Lila May M. Richey was made a party defendant as an indorser of the note given by Grover C. Richey to The Lower Main Street Bank, the mortgage being foreclosed and the note secured thereby having been deposited with The Lower Main Street Bank, as collateral security for the payment of the note of Grover C. Richey to said bank. The defendants other than Mrs. Lila May M. Richey and the heirs-at-law of the mortgagor are made parties by reason of some subordinate interest that they may claim. I find that all the defendants have been duly served with process and are properly before the Court. The summons, complaint, notice for the appointment of a Receiver and notice of lis pendens were duly filed in the office of the Clerk of Court for Laurens County, South Carolina, on or about October 5, 1936. The defendant, Mrs. Lila May M. Richey, filed answer, admitting her liability as indorser on the note of Grover C. Richey to the plaintiff, The Lower Main Street Bank. W.R. Richey, Jr., filed answer for the defendants, W.R. Richey, Jr., J.J. Adams, Sr. and Elizabeth R. Tyler, alleging, on information and belief, that the allegations contained in the complaint are true and admit same. Mrs. Annie R. Parker in her answer, alleges that the note and mortgage in question given by her father, W.R. Richey, Sr., to The Life Insurance Company of Virginia, were assigned, transferred and delivered to her and that she was the owner thereof. She admits signing and indorsing her name on the back of the note and mortgage and delivering them to Grover C. Richey, her brother, on or about April 18, 1932, admitting in Paragraph four (4) that the indorsement was in blank, but alleging that delivery was "with the distinct understanding that he was to furnish her and her father Fifty ($50.00) Dollars a month each," and he was to hold said mortgage papers "for any and all amounts to be advanced in accordance with said agreement"; that thereafter, her brother, Grover C. Richey, refused to abide by said agreement and that the transfer of the said note and mortgage was void for failure of consideration. She further denied that she gave permission to her brother to transfer the note and mortgage to The Lower Main Street Bank. She further denies that the plaintiff bank has any lien on the note and mortgage and joins in the prayer of the foreclosure complaint herein. The other heirs-at-law and defendants are in default, as appears from the affidavit of default of plaintiff's counsel.
The bank contends that the defendant, Grover C. Richey, borrowed on April 26, 1932, $2,500.00 from said bank and deposited with it as collateral security for the said note the mortgage and note of W.R. Richey, Sr., to The Life Insurance Company of Virginia, the said note and mortgage having been indorsed in blank by Mrs. A.R. Parker and transferred to Grover C. Richey; that said note of Grover C. Richey was renewed on the 24th day of November, 1935, and that said note and mortgage constitutes collateral security for the payment of the note of Grover C. Richey to said bank.
There is no controversy as to the amount due on the note and mortgage sought to be foreclosed, a written stipulation having been introduced in evidence, signed by the mortgagor, stating that there was due on said note and mortgage the principal sum of Sixty-eight Hundred ($6,800.00) Dollars, with interest thereon from May 4, 1931. Under the testimony, I further find that there is due on the note given by Grover C. Richey to The Lower Main Street Bank the principal sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars with interest thereon from February 4, 1936, at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, payable annually, the total amount due on said note as of February 24, 1938, being the sum of Three Thousand, One Hundred Ten and Fifty hundredths ($3,110.50) Dollars, in accordance with the following statement:
Principal at .............................. $ 2,500.00 Interest on $2,500.00 from Feb. 24, 1936 (7%) .................................... 350.00 Interest on $175.00 from February 24, 1937, to February 24, 1938 (6%) ............... 10.50 ___________ $ 2,860.50 Attorney's fees ........................... 250.00 ___________ Total, as of Feb. 24, 1938 ................ $ 3,110.50 I find that the sum of Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) Dollars is a reasonable sum to be allowed plaintiff's counsel for services rendered and to be rendered herein.The sole question arising under the defense alleged by Mrs. Annie R. Parker. The cause by consent of counsel was referred to W.T. Bolt, Esquire, of Laurens, 00 S.C. to take the testimony and report the same. What does the evidence disclose? The president of the bank advised Grover C. Richey that he would not take an assignment of the note and mortgage as collateral security until he had had the title examined. Thereupon, R.E. Babb, Esq., of Laurens, S.C. examined the title for The Lower Main Street Bank and advised the bank that the title was satisfactory and that the mortgage constituted the first lien. Mr. Babb's testimony substantiated the writing of this letter. I have ruled, however, that the letter offered in evidence, beginning "At the request of Mrs. Annie R. Parker" is inadmissible against Mrs. Parker and could be used only for purpose of refreshing the witness' memory. The evidence further discloses that Mr. Babb procured from W.R. Richey, Sr., owner of the property under mortgage, a statement that there were no offsets to the mortgage and note, this statement in writing also showing the amount due thereon, this statement being introduced in evidence. This evidence is relevant on the issue of good faith on the part of the bank.
The evidence further shows considerable correspondence between The Lower Main Street Bank and Mrs. Annie R. Parker, the correspondence being voluminous. Something like a year before the mortgage was sought to be foreclosed, Mrs. Parker wrote two or three letters to the bank, stating in effect that "you will get your money," and that the value of the property was sufficient to protect the bank.
In these letters she did not raise the slightest question concerning offset which she later claimed. In these letters she thanked the bank for the consideration shown her and her father. Mrs. Parker admitted indorsing the note and mortgage and delivering them to her brother; that she did so after conference with her father, an experienced attorney of the Laurens bar; that she and her father needed money and "decided to take a chance"; that she was not quite clear to what she expected her brother to do with the note and mortgage. She said:
"My name is on it, but I know it is my signature. I transferred it."
Question: "How did you expect Mr. Grover Richey to raise this $50.00 a month when you did not intend him to borrow the money on the mortgage?" Answer by Mrs. Parker: "I do not know. All that I had was his word. I accepted his word."
Question: "You did not expect him to use the mortgage for borrowing money?" Answer: "I do not know."
Question: "So when you delivered the note and mortgage to your brother, Mr. Grover Richey, you trusted him, of course, in the transaction?" Answer: "I did absolutely."
Answer: "Why did I wait? Because he failed to pay what he said he would and we thought it best to secure the mortgage before he went through with it."
Question: "Before he went through with it?" Answer: "Borrowed on it, I suppose."
It is important to note that above Mrs. Parker's signature was a typewritten form of assignment in blank, the name of the assignee not being filled out.
What are the legal principles applicable?
I. Since the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act there is no question, however, as to a holder who takes by way of security for a pre-existing indebtedness being a holder for value. 3 R.C.L., 1061.
Furthermore, Section 6776, South Carolina Code 1932 (Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law), provides: "An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such, whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time." See Farr-Barnes Lumber Company v. Town of St. George, 128 S.C. 67, 122 S.E., 24.
II. Section 6781, South Carolina Code 1932 (Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law), provides: "An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order it is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
III. Section 6765, 1932 South Carolina Code, provides: "Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks thereon."
IV. A mortgage securing a negotiable note is itself negotiable and the law applicable to negotiable notes is applicable to mortgages securing such notes. Talbert v. Talbert, 97 S.C. 136, 81 S.E., 644. Furthermore, Section 6798, 1932 South Carolina Code, provides: "An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively endorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise."
Section 387, South Carolina Code, 1932, Volume 1, provides: "An action upon a bond, or other contract in writing, secured by a mortgage of real property" (this of course includes a note) is not barred until twenty years from the date of maturity.
Section 6758, 1932 Code of South Carolina, provides: "When an instrument is issued, accepted, or endorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or endorsing it, payable on demand."
Under this section, it is apparent that the cases dealing with an offset set up by the maker of a note as distinguished from a defense alleged by an indorser are to be carefully distinguished. When Mrs. Parker indorsed the note and mortgage and delivered them to Grover C. Richey, under this section, she reissued the instruments. They were then negotiated by delivery and as to Mrs. Parker, the indorser, the paper was not overdue. Crawford's Annotated Negotiable Instruments Law, page 28, states: "It is commonly said that the indorsement of a bill or note which is overdue is equivalent to drafting a new instrument payable `at sight.'" Citing numerous authorities.
The identical question arose in the late case of Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Suger Company, 74 Utah, 24, 276 P., 659, 665, 68 A.L.R., 969, decided in 1929. In that case a negotiable promissory note was made by Hooper Sugar Company. One Wright, the owner of the note, after its maturity, so far as the maker was concerned, indorsed the note and delivered it to the National City Bank. The decision shows that the Negotiable Instruments Act had been adopted in Utah. The Judge cites the exact provisions of Section 6758, South Carolina Code, 1932, as being the law in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court said:
"The note sued upon is complete and regular on its face. No claim is made that it is not. Did the plaintiff become the holder of the note before it was overdue and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such were the fact? No claim is made that the note sued upon was ever dishonored. It is earnestly argued by Wright that the note was overdue at the time it was received by plaintiff as well as at the time it was transmitted to the National City Bank. It will be observed that the note is dated September 5, 1919, and was made payable six months after date. It is obvious that when the note was transmitted to the National City Bank on September 2, 1920, it was overdue as to the maker, Hooper Sugar Company. Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 4036, in support of its contention that the note was not overdue when received by plaintiff as to Wright. It is there provided: `An instrument is payable on demand: 1. Where it is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight on presentation: or 2. in which no time for payment is expressed. Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand.'
"This language is so plain that when applied to the facts in the instant case it is open to but one construction. When Wright indorsed the note and delivered it to the National City Bank after its maturity date, such note as to Wright became a demand note."
The case involved here, therefore, is to be distinguished from those cases under the common law involving the application of the rule that a chose in action could not be assigned. We are not dealing here with a mere chose in action but a negotiable instrument, both as to the note and the mortgage.
V. Under these authorities I hold that the plaintiff, The Lower Main Street Bank, is the holder in due course for value of the note and mortgage sought to be foreclosed in this action, and that the contention of the defendant, Mrs. Parker, cannot be sustained.
VI. There is another principle that might be applicable in this matter. Judge Hydrick, in Middleton v. Cockfield, 113 S.C. 282, 102 S.E., 328, 329, speaking for the Court, said: "The principle relied upon by appellants that one who buys a non-negotiable security takes it subject to all equities existing between the original parties is sound, but inapplicable where such original parties have, by their conduct, acts, or omissions, estopped themselves from asserting the existence of such equities. There is no conflict between the two rules."
In Davis v. Bland, 138 S.C. 354, 136 S.E., 300, 304, our Supreme Court said: "If one of two (innocent) parties must suffer, it must be he who placed it within the power of the malefactor to perpetrate the wrong."
The Bland case is a case where the mortgage secured the payment not of a negotiable instrument, but of a bond. In the said case the mortgagor had executed a bond and mortgage. When the mortgagor was ready to pay the debt Bland had indorsed his name in blank on the back of the bond and mortgage and sent them to O'Bryan for collection. O'Bryan wrote in an assignment to himself. Our Supreme Court held that Bland should lose in that he had put it in the power of the wrongdoer to commit the wrong. The Court also had recourse to that doctrine that the principal must be bound by the act of his agent, acting within the scope of his apparent authority. Judge Cothran said: "O'Bryan's act was, if not within the actual scope of his authority, clearly within the apparent scope, and for his fraud, he who put it in his power to commit it must be the responsible party."
In the instant case it would be difficult for me to find that Grover C. Richey had violated any contract, because under the form of the indorsement and transfer of the papers in question and under the testimony of Mrs. Parker, the only reasonable interpretation that I can put upon the facts is that Mrs. Parker expected her brother to use the note and mortgage as collateral security for raising money.
Likewise, in Hahn v. Smith, 157 S.C. 157, 154 S.E., 112, where the mortgage secured the payment of a negotiable note two legal principles were recognized by our Supreme Court: First, the principle that where one of two parties must bear a loss the loss should fall on the party who negligently supplied the opportunity for the fraud. The second was that the principal is responsible for the fraud of his agent committed within the apparent scope of his agency.
Mrs. Parker's statements in writing to the bank before the foreclosure of the mortgage hereinabove set forth might be construed as constituting some evidence with reference to estoppel, but I do not concur with plaintiff's counsel that the principle of estoppel should apply here on account of Mrs. Parker having written those letters, as in order to successfully claim equitable estoppel, the person claiming it must have been misled into such action that he will suffer injury if the estoppel is not declared. There is no evidence in this case that plaintiff bank was induced to alter its position in such a way that it was injured by any act or representation of Mrs. Parker's by her writing the said letters, and consequently no ground on which the plea of estoppel could be predicated. Ott v. Ott, 182 S.C. 135, 188 S.E., 789. The statements in those letters are in accord with the reasonable interpretation of her acts and her own testimony with reference to the indorsement of the note and mortgage and placing them in the possession of her brother.
There is not the slightest evidence that the bank had any notice of such collateral agreement.
XII. What does the indorser of a negotiable instrument warrant? Section 6816 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 1932 Code, seems to be conclusive against the right of an indorser to set up any collateral agreement. One of the settled rules of law in South Carolina is that a seller impliedly makes certain warranties. Long prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act our Supreme Court applied the rule of warranty even as to the assignment of choses in action. Confining our attention to the cases concerning the defenses set up by the assignor and not by the maker, we find our Supreme Court saying, in Thompson v. Hudgens, 161 S.C. 450, 159 S.E., 807, 808: "Assignor of note and mortgage warrants their validity and impliedly asserts that they are true and vital papers, and that mortgage is lien on property."
In Hall v. Latimer Son, 1908, 81 S.C. 90, 61 S.E., 1057, 1059, one, who assigned a chose in action without recourse, was sued by the assignee, because the chose in action which was assigned was not valid. The Court said that since the assignor put "without recourse" after his name, it did not warrant the payment of the debt, of course, but the assignment does make him responsible as to its genuineness (the genuineness of the instrument), irrespective of his knowledge thereof. We quote from the language of the Court in that case: "The first eight exceptions will be considered together. The circuit judge held, in effect, that when one assigns a chose in action, even if he uses the words `without recourse' to the assignor, while such assignment must be taken by the assignee with the recognition that the assignors are not responsible to make up the value of the thing assigned, but yet they are responsible for the bona fides of the transaction. In other words that the assignors are responsible for the genuineness of the chose assigned. Now the judge in his charge held that while an assignor assigned the chose without recourse, yet they were responsible to the assignee for the bona fides of the transaction; that the assignment must be made bona fide, not in fraud; that the defendants must assign a genuine paper, and not a fictitious paper. Now care must be taken to remember distinctly that the defendants, having hedged about their assignment with the words `without recourse,' are protected against any claim by the plaintiff to respond in value for the thing assigned; that the liability of the defendants arises purely from having assigned something which never in fact existed, as a fact, but was a paper which was not genuine. That is not a new question to this court, but has been considered in the case of Strange v. Ellison, 2 Bailey, 385. The court in that case held: `Every one who vends an article impliedly undertakes that it is what its appearance indicates, and that it is not disguised so as to make it what it is not. The principle applies to all sorts of commodities, in whatever form they may exist. Promissory notes are a common article of traffic, and their value is measured by the responsibility of the drawer and the indorser. The usual manner of indorsing is by superscription of the indorser's name, which constitutes the liability. Finding a name so indorsed, one would necessarily conclude that it was placed there for that purpose; and it would as necessarily be looked to as a part of the security of the debt.' * * * We might also refer to 13 Enc., 1240, where it stated as follows: `It is a general rule that one making a sale or transfer of a chose in action warrants its genuineness, and this is so whether he warrants it in terms, or is silent, at the time when the sale or transfer is made.' 4 A. E. Law, 476; Meyer v. Richards, 163 U.S. 385, 16 S.Ct., 1148, 41 L.Ed., 199. In Watson v. Chesire, 18 Iowa, 202, 87 Am. Dec., 382, it is held: `That a party who transfers a paper without recourse is held still to guarantee the validity of the paper.' These exceptions are overruled."
From the testimony I find that the amount due on the note and mortgage of W.R. Richey, Sr., to The Life Insurance Company of Virginia (which note and mortgage are now held by plaintiff bank, as collateral security for the payment of the note of Grover C. Richey to said bank) is the principal sum of Sixty-eight Hundred ($6,800.00) Dollars, with interest from May 4, 1931, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, in accordance with the following statement: Total amount due as of May 4, 1938, $9,656.00.
Full argument was had before me at the spring term of Court in Laurens, S.C. by counsel for plaintiff and defendants. The case was marked heard.
Now, on motion of plaintiff's counsel, it is adjudged, ordered, and decreed:
1. That there is now due on the note of Grover C. Richey to The Lower Main Street Bank the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred Ten and Fifty-hundredths ($3,110.50) Dollars, with interest thereon from February 24, 1938, and that plaintiff have judgment for said sum against the defendants, Grover C. Richey and Mrs. Lila May M. Richey, with leave forthwith to enter same; that there is now due on the note and mortgage of W.R. Richey, Sr., to The Life Insurance Company of Virginia, as set forth in the complaint, the sum of Nine Thousand, Six Hundred Fifty-six ($9,656.00) Dollars, with interest thereon from May 4, 1938, and that said note and mortgage are held by The Lower Main Street Bank, as collateral security for the payment of the aforementioned debt of the defendants, Grover C. Richey and Mrs. May M. Richey, to said bank.
2. That the defendants do on or before the first day of September, 1938, pay to the plaintiff, The Lower Main Street Bank, or its attorney, the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred Ten and Fifty-hundredths ($3,110.50) Dollars, with interest thereon from February 24, 1938, together with the costs and disbursements of the plaintiff, and its attorney to be taxed by the Clerk.
3. That on default of payment at or before the time herein indicated, as aforesaid, the mortgaged premises described in the complaint, and hereinafter set forth, be sold by the Clerk of Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County, S.C., at public auction, before the Court House, in Laurens, in the county of Laurens, on the first Monday of October, 1938, or on some subsequent and convenient salesday thereafter, on the following terms, that is to say: To the highest bidder for cash. No bid shall be accepted by the Clerk of Court until a cash deposit of three per cent. of the amount of the bid has been made at the conclusion of the bidding. Said sum shall be forfeited and applied to costs and plaintiff's judgment, if a compliance with sale is not had. The said provisions for cash deposit shall apply to any resale of the property; and if compliance is not had the Clerk of Court may, at the written request of the plaintiff, resell at the risk of the former purchaser. Purchaser shall pay for revenue stamps and recording of papers.
4. That the said Clerk of Court by advertisement, according to law, give notice of the time and place of such sale, and the terms thereof; that he, the said Clerk of Court, do execute to the purchaser, or purchasers, a deed of the premises sold; and that the plaintiff or any other party to this action, may become a purchaser at such sale, and that if, upon such sale being made, the purchaser, or purchasers, should fail to comply with the terms thereof, the said Clerk of Court may advertise the said premises for sale on the next, or some subsequent salesday, at the risk of the former purchaser, and so from time to time thereafter until a compliance shall be secured.
5. That after deducting the amount of his fees and expenses in such sale, and any liens upon the premises so sold at the time of such sale for taxes and assessments, he do apply the proceeds of sale, as follows:
First: to the payment of the costs and disbursements of the plaintiff, The Lower Main Street Bank, and its attorney in this action, to be taxed by the Clerk, including all costs of Clerk and sheriff, including the payment to W.T. Bolt, Esquire, Special Referee, the sum of Thirty-five ($35.00) Dollars.
Next, and secondly: to the payment of the plaintiff or its attorney, of the said amount of Three Thousand, One Hundred Ten and Fifty-hundredths ($3,110.50) Dollars with interest from the 24th day of February, 1938, due to the plaintiff, as aforesaid.
That if there be any surplus remaining after the payments of said amounts, interest, costs, disbursements and taxes, that the said Clerk of Court do report such surplus and hold the same subject to the further order of this Court.
I find from the testimony herein that the defendant, Mrs. Annie R. Parker, is the owner and holder of a junior note and mortgage given by W.R. Richey, Sr., to Mrs. Annie R. Parker, dated November 27, 1926, recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Laurens County, S.C., in Mortgage Book 77, page 108, on November 30, 1926, which mortgage I find to be junior in lien to the mortgage held by the plaintiff.
6. And it is further adjudged, ordered and decreed, that upon the making of the sale of said mortgaged premises, as hereby ordered, and the execution and delivery to the purchaser of a deed of the premises the said purchaser, or purchasers, be let into possession of the premises on production of the deed.
7. And it is further adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the defendants herein, Mrs. Annie R. Parker, and all other defendants herein and all persons whomsoever claiming under him, or them, be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest, and equity of redemption in the said mortgaged premises so sold, or any part thereof.
8. The following is a description of the premises herein ordered to be sold:
All that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land, lying, being and situate within the corporate limits of the City of Laurens (County of Laurens, South Carolina), containing one and six-tenths (1.6) acres, more or less, and bounded on the north by lands of White Bailey, on the east by lands of the estate of D.A. Davis, deceased; on the south by West Main Street, and on the west by lands of Mrs. Sallie Burton, Albert Dial and others, and having thereon located the residence of the said W.R. Richey, Sr. And of which I am the sole owner in fee simple and upon which there is no existing encumbrance or lien whatsoever save the lien of this mortgage. The lot last above described is more fully described as follows: Commencing at a stake 3XN on West Main Street, on line of lot of Mrs. Sallie D. Burton and thence north 18 1/2 degrees west 10.07 chains to stake 3XN on line of lot originally of Mrs. P.D. Pitts, and thence north 71 1/2 degrees east to a stake X3N, thence south 18 1/2 degrees E 9.80 chains with lot formerly belonging to Dr. T.E. Todd now or Mrs. D.A. Davis, to stake X3O on Main Street and thence 1.64 chains along West Main Street to the beginning corner. All of which will more fully appear by reference to plat of survey thereof made by C.L. Fike, surveyor, on March 29, 1893, attached to the deed of Mrs. Sallie D. Burton to W.R. Richey dated April 1, 1893, and recorded in Book 6, page 457, in the office of the Clerk of Court for said county and State.
Mr. O.L. Long, for appellant, Mrs. Annie R. Parker, cites: Negotiable instruments: Sec 398, Code 1932; 167 S.E., 27; 133 S.E., 539; 170 S.E., 439; 100 S.C. 28; 84 S.E., 299; 127 S.E., 441; 35 S.E., 764; 38 S.E., 462; 45 S.C. 83; 22 S.E., 747. Equitable estoppel: 138 S.C. 154; 113 S.C. 282; 157 S.C. 137; 188 S.E., 789.
Messrs. Charles B. Elliott, for respondent, Lower Main Street Bank, and Tobias Turner, for respondent, Mrs. Lila May M. Richey, cite: Negotiable instruments: Sec. 6798, Code 1932; 97 S.C. 136; 81 S.E., 644; 276 P., 659. Rights of purchaser of assignment in blank: 67 S.C. 377; 45 S.E., 927. Equitable estoppel: 113 S.C. 282; 102 S.E., 328; 138 S.C. 354; 136 S.E., 300.
February 7, 1939. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The history of the distressing events out of which this litigation arose is clearly set forth in the decree of Judge Thurmond, from which this appeal comes to us. We have given full and careful consideration to the issues involved and are satisfied that the Circuit decree states sound conclusions. Let it be reported.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STABLER and MESSRS. JUSTICES BAKER and FISHBURNE concur.
MR. JUSTICE CARTER did not participate on account of illness.