Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2017-000753 Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-145
04-17-2019
Donnie Lowe, Employee, Claimant, Appellant, v. BMW Manufacturing Corporation, Employer, and Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, c/o Sedgewick Claims Management Services, Inc., Carrier, Respondents.
Mitchell King Byrd, Jr., of The Carolina Law Group, of Greer, for Appellant. Bradford B. Easterling, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
AFFIRMED
Mitchell King Byrd, Jr., of The Carolina Law Group, of Greer, for Appellant. Bradford B. Easterling, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents. PER CURIAM : Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Transp. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 389 S.C. 422, 429, 699 S.E.2d 687, 690 (2010) ("If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, then the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and a court has no right to impose another meaning." (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 375 S.C. 76, 88, 650 S.E.2d 465, 472 (2007))); Carter v. Verizon Wireless, 407 S.C. 641, 648, 757 S.E.2d 528, 531 (Ct. App. 2014) ("Section 42-17-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015) permits the review of a previous workers' compensation award 'on proof by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a change of condition caused by the original injury, after the last payment of compensation.'"); § 42-17-90(A) ("[T]he review must not be made after twelve months from the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to an award provided by this title."); Roper Hosp. v. Clemons, 326 S.C. 534, 538, 484 S.E.2d 598, 600 (Ct. App. 1997) ("While we are mindful that th[is] court should give the [South Carolina Workers' Compensation] Act a liberal construction, we are not justified in construing it so as to do violence to a specific requirement of the Act."); Wallace v. Campbell Limestone Co., 198 S.C. 196, 201, 17 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1941) (stating "the conclusiveness of [section 42-17-90(A)] is inescapable"); Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 415 (2002) (recognizing appellate courts generally defer to an administrative agency's construction of an applicable statute but will reject the agency's interpretation when the plain language of the statute is contrary to that interpretation). AFFIRMED. HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. --------