Bressman v. Farrier, 825 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Iowa 1993). See also Lovell v. Superintendent North Central Correctional Institution, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 37 (1988). Unless there is substantial evidence in the record to indicate that prison officials have "exaggerated their response," deference should be given to the expert judgment of correctional officers relating to matters of prison administration.

However, the record before this court does not demonstrate that the ban on educational materials is reasonably related to legitimate penalogical interests as a matter of law. See Affidavit of E. Eugene Miller, and Lovell v. Superintendent North Central Correctional Institution, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 36-38 (1988). Consequently, summary judgment for the defendants on these counts is not appropriate.

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 82, 97-99, 107 S.Ct. 2254. See also Gaskins, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 562-564, 194 N.E.3d 1238 (affirming invalidation of regulation based on Turner factors as illuminated by summary judgment record); Abdul-Alazim v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 456-458, 778 N.E.2d 946 (2002) (vacating summary judgment for prison officials and ordering summary judgment invalidating policy, where record evidence did not show policy furthered claimed penological interest, or any adverse impact from accommodating asserted right); Lovell v. Superintendent, N. Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 40, 523 N.E.2d 268 (1988) (reversing summary judgment upholding prison directive and remanding for further proceedings where first and fourth Turner factors could not be evaluated solely as matter of law).

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 82, 97-99. See also Gaskins, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 562-564 (affirming invalidation of regulation based on Turner factors as illuminated by summary judgment record); Abdul-Alazim v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 456-458 (2002) (vacating summary judgment for prison officials and ordering summary judgment invalidating policy, where record evidence did not show policy furthered claimed penological interest, or any adverse impact from accommodating asserted right); Lovell v. Superintendent, N. Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 40 (1988) (reversing summary judgment upholding prison directive and remanding for further proceedings where first and fourth Turner factors could not be evaluated solely as matter of law).

"[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Lovell v. Superintendent, N. Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 35, 37 (1988),

Massachusetts Prisoners Assn. Political Action Comm. v. Acting Governor, 435 Mass. 811, 819–820 (2002). Insofar as the plaintiff relies on Lovell v. Superintendent, North Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 35, 40 (1988), where we determined that the justification for an internal rule at one correctional facility that banned nude photos in housing units and common areas was lacking, we agree with the defendants that Lovell was decided twelve years before the DOC conducted its 2000 review of the effect of sexually explicit material on inmates and staff which led it to conclude that such material impairs the security of the prison. Moses, 523 F.Supp.2d at 62.

It is well to remember that "a good democratic government must be protected from within, as well as watched from without." Lovell v. Superintendent, N. Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 41 (1988) (Brown, J., concurring). So ordered.

Government lawyers must step up and consider the ethical, as well as the practical, consequences of their respective agencies' actions. See Lovell v. Superintendent, North Central Correctional Inst., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 41 (1988) (Brown, J., concurring). They owe their client, the public, and the profession nothing less than that.

Behind prison walls the right to petition is limited because "a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Lovell v. Superintendent, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 37 (1988), quoting from Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Even a limited right to petition for redress of grievances is elusive, however, if the petitioner must undergo, as a consequence of such an exercise, compulsory psychological examinations, solitary confinement, threatened procedures under G.L.c. 123, or the potential loss of parole.

I hasten to add that the office of the Attorney General has had its knuckles rapped before. See Lovell v. Superintendent, N. Cent. Correctional Inst., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 41 (1988) (Brown, J., concurring). I reiterate here that, of all members of the bar, it is imperative that attorneys for the Commonwealth not only take care to behave themselves but that they set the standard by their exemplary conduct. Cf. Commonwealth v. Tirrell, 382 Mass. 502, 513 (1981) (Kaplan, J. dissenting); Commonwealth v. Felton, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 66 (1983).