In a Memorandum Opinion, the Circuit Court opined that petitioner had no right to the requested relief. Instead of entering a declaratory judgment to that effect, however, the court merely granted the motions for summary judgment filed by SHA and the county. Overlooking the absence of a declaratory judgment but in the belief that the Circuit Court correctly granted the motions for summary judgment, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment. Lovell Land v. State Highway, 180 Md.App. 725, 952 A.2d 414 (2008). We agree that petitioner has no right to the relief it requested, but we shall direct that the case be remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of a proper declaratory judgment in conformance with this Opinion.
Under Maryland law, "a third party beneficiary contract arises when two parties enter into an agreement with the intent to confer a direct benefit on a third party, allowing that third party to sue on the contract despite his or her lack of privity." Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 952 A.2d 414, 429 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008), rev'd, 969 A.2d 284 (Md. 2009) (reversing the lower court's decision but not its statement of the law). "An incidental beneficiary . . . has no rights against the promisee or promisor," and a third-party beneficiary "must show that the parties to the contract clearly intended that the third party benefit from it."
Moreover, although generally an individual cannot enforce a contract in which he or she is not a party, Maryland courts recognize an exception for a third party beneficiary. See Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 952 A.2d 414, 429-30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008), rev'd, 969 A.2d 284 (Md. 2009) (reversing the lower court's resolution of the case but not its statement of the law). "Ordinarily, a third party beneficiary contract arises when two parties enter into an agreement with the intent to confer a direct benefit on a third party, allowing that third party to sue on the contract despite his or her lack of privity." Id.
Granted October 7, 2008. Reported below: 180 Md.App. 725, 952 A.2d 414. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari.
Ragin v. Porter Hayden Co., 133 Md.App. 116, 134, 754 A.2d 503 (2000). See Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 180 Md.App. 725, 746, 952 A.2d 414 (2008) (citing Vogel v. Touhey, 151 Md.App. 682, 706, 828 A.2d 268 (2003)) ("Ordinarily, appellate courts review the grant of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but if the alternative ground is one upon which the circuit court would have no discretion to deny, summary judgment may be granted for a reason not relied upon by the trial court."). It is only when "a motion for summary judgment is based upon a pure issue of law that could not be properly submitted to a trier of fact, that we will affirm on an alternative ground."