Opinion
CIV-24-696-JD
08-01-2024
CHRIS ELROY LOVELESS, Plaintiff, v. GINA LOWE et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHON T. ERWIN JUDGE
Plaintiff Chris Elroy Loveless, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various violations. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Jodi W. Dishman has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). A review of the Complaint has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Based on that review, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS the Complaint.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court must review each complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity, officer, or employee and each case in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must accept Mr. Loveless' allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Since Mr. Loveless is proceeding pro se, his complaint must be construed liberally. See id. at 1218. The Court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal).
III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS/NAMED DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff brings the instant lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his capacity as a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 1:2-3). As Defendants, Mr. Loveless names: (1) Jeff Sifers; (2) Gina Lowe; and (3) Jason Hicks. (ECF No. 1:1, 4, 6, 7). In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two claims. In Claim One, Mr. Loveless states: “U.S. Const. Amd. VIII deprived freedom U.S. Const. Amd. XIV sec 1 state deprived liberty.” (ECF No. 1:6). Plaintiff names all three Defendants to this claim and as supporting facts, Plaintiff states: “There is no fact to a Felony or Public Offensce [sic] of O.S. 21 Section 455, Not possible to commit ” felony Getting an Application.” (ECF No. 1:6, 7).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff states: “U.S. Constitution XIV sec 1-State deprived liberty.” (ECF No. 1:7). Again, Mr. Loveless names all three Defendants, and as supporting facts, he states: “arrested and charged for a Felony for applying for an Application for A Marriage License. Maliciously Arrested & imprisoned is not a violation of O.S. Section 455.” (ECF No. 1:7. 8). For both claims, Mr. Loveless seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 1:7, 8).
IV. DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT
Although Plaintiff names three Defendants, he has failed to allege that any particular Defendant was responsible for any particular wrongdoing against him. See supra; see ECF No. 1. In a case such as this one where Mr. Loveless has brought claims against more than one defendant, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Loveless has failed in this regard and the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff's failure in this regard renders the Complaint legally deficient. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the ” plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”).
Mr. Loveless appears to be challenging an arrest related to an application for a marriage license. See supra. But beyond that, the undersigned is unclear regarding the actual constitutional violations allegedly committed by each individual Defendant. As a result, the Court should dismiss the Complaint without prejudice because it does not “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom,” and, as such, does not provide any of the Defendants with “fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him[.]" Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1250; see also Brooks v. Colo. Dept of Corr., 762 Fed.Appx. 551, 557-58 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the standard set forth in Robbins, is "the standard by which [courts] review complaints asserting § 1983 claims against multiple defendants"); see also Mayfield v. Presbyterian Hosp. Admin., 772 Fed.Appx. 680, 686 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal when complaint contained "undifferentiated allegations" that did not "provide fair notice" to defendants because plaintiff had not "attributed specific acts to them").
Furthermore, Plaintiff is cautioned to not rely on "labels and conclusions," such as citing constitutional amendments without explanation as to how those amendments were allegedly violated. Such assertions are insufficient and subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nature of the claims set forth in Mr. Loveless' Complaint are simply unclear. "Mindful that pro se actions are held to a less stringent standard of review and that sua sponte dismissals are generally disfavored by the courts, we nonetheless allow a complaint to be dismissed [as frivolous] if the plaintiff cannot make a rational argument on the law and facts in support of her claim.” Triplett v. Triplett, 166 Fed.Appx. 338, 340, 2006 WL 182060, at *2 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
V. FILING FEE.
Plaintiff has neither paid the filing fee nor requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff did provide a handwritten note on page one of the Complaint alongside the title that reads-“have sent in forma pauperis.” However, the Court did not receive in forma pauperis paperwork with the initiating documents. Further, the undersigned recognizes the special rules applying to prisoners who move to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). In this case, the undersigned also recognizes the futility of requiring Plaintiff make application to proceed in forma pauperis. Moreover, the claims in the Complaint are all subject to dismissal, without prejudice. Therefore, the undersigned has concluded that an attempt to force strict compliance with the aforementioned requirement would be a waste of judicial resources.
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is hereby advised of his right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by August 19, 2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
VII. STATUS OF THE REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral to the undersigned magistrate judge in the captioned matter.