3. Love v. National Bank, 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965), where Code Sec. 55-154 was held constitutional is not controlling here because that case involved property east of the Blue Ridge and application of the statute west of the Blue Ridge was not considered there. 4.
Va Code, § 55-154 to § 55-155. Held constitutional in Love v Lynchburg National Bank Trust Co, 205 Va. 860; 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965). "While the rule appears to be sound enough from the mineral owner's point of view, it can cause economic inconvenience to the public.
This Act is also based upon the same rule. Cf. Love v. Lynchburg National Bank and Trust Co., (1965) 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650. We do not disregard the distinctions between the two types of statutes.
" Appellees refer to a Virginia case, Love v. Lynchburg National Bank Trust Co., 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965), as supporting their position. It is true, in that case a statute extinguishing mineral interests was held to be constitutional. That case, however, is distinguishable. There, the statute merely created a presumption there were no minerals in the land if the claim was not exercised for 35 years.
We note that similar statutes in other states have been found to be constitutional under both federal and state constitutions. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (“[T]his Court has recognized that States have the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to revert to another after the passage of time”); Short v. Texaco, Inc., 273 Ind. 518, 406 N.E.2d 625 (1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (upheld under state constitution and federal constitution); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980) (same); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn.1979) (same); Love v. Lynchburg Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965) (upheld under state constitution). Moreover, the states that have found dormant mineral interests acts to be unconstitutional were considering statutory language that differed from the language of the Maryland act.