Opinion
No. 03-CV-3538.
September 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Presently pending is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment — reinstated by letter request — and Plaintiff's Response thereto. On April 18, 2004 the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to attempt to appoint a volunteer attorney from the Prisoner Civil Rights Attorney Panel on Plaintiff's behalf. Based on the allegations as stated in Plaintiff's Complaint, the attorneys contacted declined representation. Upon notification that the Clerk of Court was unable to locate counsel willing to represent Plaintiff, the Court permitted Defendants to reinstate their motion for summary judgment. By letter of August 25, 2004, Defendants notified the Court that they wished to reinstate their motion for summary judgment. On September 2, 2004 Plaintiff filed a second response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment shall be granted ". . . if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(s) The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-movant has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his claim for which he has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317, 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Defendants move for summary judgment and argue that it is warranted because they had a legitimate penalogical interest in denying Plaintiff's request to purchase the religious medal. They also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's First Amendment claims.
Defendants are prison officials at the State Correctional Institution — Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. Defendant was previously incarcerated at that facility and is presently serving his sentence at the State Correctional Institution — Graterford. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's violated his First Amendment rights to order and wear a relgious medal of the Odin faith. By way of relief, Plaintiff sought the use of the prison chapel for study group, the right to observe his religious calendar, a budget to purchase religious books and tapes, and damages in excess of $10,000.00. Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's claims because they had a legitimate penalogical interest in denying Plaintiff's request because Defendants assert that the medal is related to white supremacy groups. Defendants support their motion for summary judgment with Plaintiff's deposition testimony wherein Plaintiff stated that: he never followed the proper prison procedures to establish his religion; the medal was not required for him to exercise this religion; and, there were other manners in which he could practice his religion. (See, Lovas N.T. of 1/29/04 at 14-16, 22-24).
The court must first consider whether Defendants are entitled to a grant of qualified immunity. I conclude that with respect to Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed against Defendants' because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. The United States Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102, S.Ct 2727, held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." In order for the governing law to be sufficiently well established for immunity to be denied, it is not necessary that there have been a previous precedent directly on point; the ultimate issue is whether reasonable officials in the Defendants' position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful. See, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987); Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989). Defendants assert that they had a legitimate penalogical interest in denying Plaintiff's request because the religious medal was known to have been associated with white supremacy. I conclude that based on the assertions that the medal was affiliated with white supremacist groups or beliefs, and due to the resulting legitimate security concerns, Defendants could have believed — in light of decided case law — that their conduct was lawful. Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages must be dismissed.
Summary judgment will also be entered in Defendants' favor on Plaintiff's claim for equitable relief because he is no longer incarcerated at the institution where the alleged constitutional violation occurred. Relief cannot be granted in his favor as to the new institution of his incarceration because he has not alleged any constitutional violations against the new facility.
An appropriate order follows.