Opinion
3:98 CV 61 (JGM).
February 17, 2000.
John R. Williams, Williams Pattis, New Haven, Ct., for Gregory G. Loucony.
Ann E. Lynch, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, Ct,. for Robert J. Kupec, Karl Friedmann, Elaine Leroy, Joanne Nitsch, RN, Patricia Staszko-Kovic, Paul Filippini, and Kathleen Weiner.
Peregrine Alban Zinn-Rowthorn, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, Ct., for Robert Swaynee, Patricia Staszko-Kovic, Paul Filippini, and Kathleen Weiner.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NAME AND ADDRESS OF VICTIM
Although familiarity of the facts and the procedural history of this case is presumed, a brief summary of facts relevant to this motion follows. On January 13, 1998, plaintiff Gregory G. Loucony commenced this lawsuit against defendant Robert J. Kupec and seven medical personnel or administrators employed by the Connecticut Department of Correction ["DOC"]. (Dkt. #1). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his civil rights because they exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was incarcerated from November 30, 1993 until April 27, 1995. (Id. at ¶¶ 16 8). Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages.
On November 3, 1998, the parties consented to trial before this Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. #22). On February 11, 2000, the Court granted defendants Friedman, LeRoy, Nitsch, and Kupec's Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #53). Pending before the Court is defendants' Motion for Name and Address of Victim and Guardian of Plaintiff's Crime to Be Filed with Defense Counsel, filed on January 26, 2000. (Dkt. #41). On February 7, 2000, plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (Dkt. #52).
I. DISCUSSION
In their motion, defendants argue that pursuant to Pub.L. 104-134, Title I, § 101[(a)][Title VIII, § 808], Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321-76, renumbered Title I Pub.L. 104-140, § 1(a), May 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1327 ["Notice to Crime Victims of Pending Damage Award"], the Court should order plaintiff to provide defense counsel with the name and address of the victim of his crime and his guardians. (Dkt. #41 at 1). Defense counsel wishes to "take reasonable efforts to notify the victim of the crime that this lawsuit is pending and compensatory damages may be awarded to plaintiff." (Id. at 2).
In opposition, plaintiff sets forth four arguments: that the statute does not authorize the relief requested, that Congress cannot dictate discovery procedures, that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ["PLRA"] applies only to actions brought by persons who are prisoners at the time of the litigation, and that the deadline for discovery in this action has expired. (Dkt. #52 at 1-2).
In order to determine what interests are protected by that statute, the Court must examine the statute's text, regulations and legislative history. See Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 292-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981). The relevant provision states that:
Prior to payment of any compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner in connection with a civil action brought against any Federal, State, or local jail, prison, or correctional facility or against any official or agent of such jail, prison, or correctional facility, reasonable efforts shall be made to notify the victims of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and incarcerated concerning the pending amount of any such compensatory damages.
Pub.L. 104-134, Title I, § 101[(a)][Title VIII, § 808], Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321-76, renumbered Title I Pub.L. 104-140, § 1(a), May 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1327.
Here, the plain language of the statute refers to a litigant as a "prisoner." In the present case, plaintiff was discharged from custody on April 27, 1995, almost three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. (Dkt. #45, Exh. D Dkt. #1 at 1). The Court was unable to find any case law construing this language, nor did defendants cite any supporting case law in their motion.
Courts have consistently held that the term "prisoner," as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) of the PLRA, does not apply to individuals who were formerly incarcerated. See Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "litigants . . . who file prison condition actions after release from confinement are no longer 'prisoners' for purposes of § 1997e(a)"); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding same and that courts "should implement the language actually enacted . . . [unless] internally inconsistent or otherwise absurd"); Doe By and Through Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The PLRA unambiguously applies to only those suits filed by prisoners").
Relying on the reasoning in the cases cited above, the PLRA does not apply to the present case because plaintiff was not a prisoner when he filed this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' motion.
II. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendants' Motion for Name and Address of Victim and Guardian of Plaintiff's Crime to be Filed with Defense Counsel (Dkt. #41).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (written objections to ruling must be filed within ten days after service of same); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(e) 72; Rule 2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small v. Secretary, H HS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge's recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit).
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 17th day of February, 2000.
Joan Glazer Margolis United States Magistrate Judge