Lott v. Toomey

4 Citing cases

  1. Ex Parte Flexible Products Co.

    915 So. 2d 34 (Ala. 2005)   Cited 61 times
    In Ex parte Flexible Products Co., 915 So. 2d 34 (Ala. 2005), this Court noted the well established principle that "'[c]ollateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is available as a defense to relitigation of an issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties which is not on the same cause of action.'"

    ' " Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "This additional requirement, that the parties be the same in both actions, is known as the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.

  2. Jones v. Blanton

    644 So. 2d 882 (Ala. 1994)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that an attorney of record in a prior action was not a party to that action for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata

    The doctrine of collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to promote the efficient allocation of our limited judicial resources, by preventing the unnecessary and pointless relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. Blanton's argument that Jones's claim should be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not without merit, but it must fail for two reasons: First, the argument is contrary to present Alabama law. See, e.g., Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1985); and Pierce v. Rummell, 535 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1988). Because we are upholding the summary judgment in favor of Blanton on other grounds, we need not consider whether we should overrule those precedents.

  3. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation

    16 F. Supp. 2d 744 (S.D. Tex. 1998)   Cited 8 times

    For example, it stated the same critical language (i.e., that preclusion extends to any "issue which was or could have been litigated in the prior action" Wheeler, 364 So.2d at 1199) in several cases involving court-approved settlements. See e.g. Educators' Investment Corporation of Alabama, Inc. v. Autrey, 383 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 1980) (class action settlement); Parmater v. Amcord, Inc., 699 So.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Ala. 1997) (settlement); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (consent decree). In particular, in Autrey, 383 So.2d 536, a corporation brought suit in Alabama state court seeking payment from a shareholder on a promissory note.

  4. Phx. E. Ass'n, Inc. v. Perdido Dunes Tower, LLC

    295 So. 3d 1016 (Ala. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    Austin v. Alabama Check Cashers Ass'n, 936 So. 2d 1014, 1039 (Ala. 2005). "[A] consent decree is binding only on the parties to it." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (citing Cowley, 193 Ala. at 384, 69 So. at 115 )." ‘[P]arties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without the party's agreement.