' " Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "This additional requirement, that the parties be the same in both actions, is known as the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to promote the efficient allocation of our limited judicial resources, by preventing the unnecessary and pointless relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. Blanton's argument that Jones's claim should be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not without merit, but it must fail for two reasons: First, the argument is contrary to present Alabama law. See, e.g., Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1985); and Pierce v. Rummell, 535 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1988). Because we are upholding the summary judgment in favor of Blanton on other grounds, we need not consider whether we should overrule those precedents.
It is noted, however, that the Trust Company cites Alabama law on res judicata in its supplemental brief. (Lead Case Doc. # 87, at 8 (citing Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985)).) A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be forever barred from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the legal elements or the evidence upon which any claims in the prior proceeding depended, or the particular remedies sought.
For example, it stated the same critical language (i.e., that preclusion extends to any "issue which was or could have been litigated in the prior action" Wheeler, 364 So.2d at 1199) in several cases involving court-approved settlements. See e.g. Educators' Investment Corporation of Alabama, Inc. v. Autrey, 383 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 1980) (class action settlement); Parmater v. Amcord, Inc., 699 So.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Ala. 1997) (settlement); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (consent decree). In particular, in Autrey, 383 So.2d 536, a corporation brought suit in Alabama state court seeking payment from a shareholder on a promissory note.
See, Pierce v. Rummell 535 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Ala. 1988). Accord, Jones v. Blanton, 644 So.2d 882, 885-86 (Ala. 1994); Watkins v. U.S., 789 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (M.D.Ala. 1992); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So.2d 723, 726 (Ala. 1990); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978). A party to the second suit will not be estopped from relitigating an issue unless all of the requisite elements exist.
While it may be true that as a matter of federal collateral estoppel, the requirement that the parties be identical is on the wane, Alabama has not followed that trend. See Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). B. Landowner Liability
Under Alabama law, a prior judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect if: (1) the issue involved in the prior proceeding was identical to the issue involved in the present proceeding; (2) the issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding; (3) the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as those involved in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala.1985). A judgment by consent satisfies the "actually litigated" requirement and is, with respect to issues actually decided by that judgment, as conclusive between the parties as a judgment entered after the conclusion of a trial.
Under Alabama law, a prior judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect if: (1) the issue involved in the prior proceeding was identical to the issue involved in the present proceeding; (2) the issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding; (3) the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as those involved in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). C. Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Under Alabama law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue where 1) the issue is identical to an issue litigated in a prior proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and 4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as the parties in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "If the prior judgment was rendered by a state court, then the collateral estoppel law of that state must be applied to determine the judgment's preclusive effect."
In Alabama, a prior judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect if: (1) the issue involved in the prior proceeding was identical to the issue involved in the present proceeding; (2) the issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding; (3) the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as those involved in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). Factor number 2 is, of course, the issue before this Court.