' " Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "This additional requirement, that the parties be the same in both actions, is known as the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to promote the efficient allocation of our limited judicial resources, by preventing the unnecessary and pointless relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. Blanton's argument that Jones's claim should be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not without merit, but it must fail for two reasons: First, the argument is contrary to present Alabama law. See, e.g., Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1985); and Pierce v. Rummell, 535 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1988). Because we are upholding the summary judgment in favor of Blanton on other grounds, we need not consider whether we should overrule those precedents.
This contention overlooks that Travelers did not consent to this judgment, and a consent decree is binding only on the parties to it. See Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). As the Supreme Court aptly put it, “parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party . . . without that party's agreement.
" Such identity of parties may exist where predecessors to a title in land were parties, seeWilliams v. Moore, 36 So.3d 533, 539-40 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), or where there the parties are "in privity of estate, blood, or law with the original parties." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Clark v. Whitfield, 213 Ala. 441, 105 So. 200, 203 (1925) ).Sellers argues that he was a party to the state-court action and that Miles is in privity with the City and McKinney because she was an employee of the City and because her interests were "closely aligned" with McKinney's. (Doc. 43, p. 20).
While it may be true that as a matter of federal collateral estoppel, the requirement that the parties be identical is on the wane, Alabama has not followed that trend. See Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). B. Landowner Liability
Under Alabama law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue where 1) the issue is identical to an issue litigated in a prior proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and 4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as the parties in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "If the prior judgment was rendered by a state court, then the collateral estoppel law of that state must be applied to determine the judgment's preclusive effect."
Under Alabama law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue where 1) the issue is identical to an issue litigated in a prior proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and 4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as the parties in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "If the prior judgment was rendered by a state court, then the collateral estoppel law of that state must be applied to determine the judgment's preclusive effect."
Under Alabama law, a prior judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect if: (1) the issue involved in the prior proceeding was identical to the issue involved in the present proceeding; (2) the issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding; (3) the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as those involved in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). C. Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Under Alabama law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue where 1) the issue is identical to an issue litigated in a prior proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and 4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as the parties in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "If the prior judgment was rendered by a state court, then the collateral estoppel law of that state must be applied to determine the judgment's preclusive effect."
In Alabama, a prior judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect if: (1) the issue involved in the prior proceeding was identical to the issue involved in the present proceeding; (2) the issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding; (3) the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) the parties in the present proceeding are the same as those involved in the prior proceeding. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). Factor number 2 is, of course, the issue before this Court.