' " Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). "This additional requirement, that the parties be the same in both actions, is known as the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.
Res judicata requires: (1) a prior judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a prior judgment rendered on the merits; (3) substantially the same parties in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action in both suits. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1985). "Where these elements are present, the former suit bars any later suit on the same cause of action, including issues that were or could have been litigated in the prior case."
"Where these elements are present, the former suit bars any later suit on the same cause of action, including issues that were or could have been litigated in the prior case." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). By way of showing the slight contrast, we note that our cases applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, have required the following elements: (1) that an issue in a prior action was identical to the issue litigated in the present action; (2) that the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) that resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) that the same parties are involved in the two actions. Dairyland Ins. Co., 566 So.2d at 726; see also Constantine v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 545 So.2d 750 (Ala. 1989).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to promote the efficient allocation of our limited judicial resources, by preventing the unnecessary and pointless relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. Blanton's argument that Jones's claim should be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not without merit, but it must fail for two reasons: First, the argument is contrary to present Alabama law. See, e.g., Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190, 1199 (Ala. 1978); Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1985); and Pierce v. Rummell, 535 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1988). Because we are upholding the summary judgment in favor of Blanton on other grounds, we need not consider whether we should overrule those precedents.
Where these elements are present, the former suit bars any later suit on the same cause of action, including issues that were or could have been litigated in the prior case."Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis added). The first three elements are unquestionably present here.
When these elements are present, "the former suit bars any later suit on the same cause of action, including issues that were or could have been litigated in the prior case." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). The first three elements are not in dispute in this case.
"Substantially identical" parties under Alabama law exist where the parties to both proceedings are "either the same, or in privity of estate, blood, or law with the original parties." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). Claim preclusion thus may be applied in Alabama to bar litigants who were not actual parties to the prior judgment only where the non-party had either: (1) a mutual or successive relationship to the same property rights as a party to the prior proceeding; or (2) substantially identical interests in the litigation and an actual opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding.
This contention overlooks that Travelers did not consent to this judgment, and a consent decree is binding only on the parties to it. See Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). As the Supreme Court aptly put it, “parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party . . . without that party's agreement.
"Where these elements are present, the parties are barred from relitigating issues actually litigated in a prior suit." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985). Wall has not demonstrated that the circuit court's determination that Moultrie never contributed capital has been actually litigated or necessarily decided, especially in light of the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion in Moultrie v. Wall, 172 So.3d 828 (2015).
" Such identity of parties may exist where predecessors to a title in land were parties, seeWilliams v. Moore, 36 So.3d 533, 539-40 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), or where there the parties are "in privity of estate, blood, or law with the original parties." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Clark v. Whitfield, 213 Ala. 441, 105 So. 200, 203 (1925) ).Sellers argues that he was a party to the state-court action and that Miles is in privity with the City and McKinney because she was an employee of the City and because her interests were "closely aligned" with McKinney's. (Doc. 43, p. 20).