Opinion
Case No. 00 C 7148.
October 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause coming on to be heard on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or for Remand, the Court having reviewed and studied the briefs, the relevant authorities and the record, and being duly advised in the premises, orders as follows:
BACKGROUND FACTS
The background facts are not in dispute. See Plaintiff's amended memorandum, p. 2; Defendant's memorandum, pp. 1-3.
ISSUE
The parties disagreement here, essentially, centers on whether the Plaintiff is entitled to retirement insurance benefits ("RIB") during the period 1976 to November 15, 1994, for any part (or all) of that period that such retirement benefits are greater than the widower's insurance benefits ("WIB") the Plaintiff actually received during the 1976 to 1994 period.
ANALYSIS
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied the Plaintiff's claim as to retirement insurance benefits for the period 1976 to 1994. The ALJ's dispositive and sole finding in denying the subject claim was that:
"The claimant filed an application for widow's insurance benefits in October, 1976 and limited the scope of the application to that class of benefits only." (R. 13)
See also Agency Reconsideration Determination (R. 31)
However, nowhere in his opinion (R. 12, 13) does the ALJ state any record factual basis for his inherently factual finding from the "entire record" that Plaintiff in her 1976 WIB application "limited the scope of the application" to WIB "benefits only." (R. 13)
Similarly, no record factual basis is recited by the Appeals Council for its conclusion that there was an increased likelihood that Plaintiff's application and related documents "included [her] statement that [she] did not wish to file for old-age insurance benefits." (R.3).
In fact, Plaintiff's 1976 RIB/WIB application was not presented in the record before the ALJ as proof that she unequivocally waived any claim to RIB benefits. Nor was a copy of the 1977 WIB award letter submitted before the ALJ, as proof that Defendant specifically warned Plaintiff that to receive RIB a new application would be required.
In its brief, the Defendant possibly, if not presumably, referring to the 1976 application and later award letter, makes the general statement that the original documentation was no longer available for inclusion in the record (Defendant's memorandum, p. 5).
Moreover, Plaintiff points out, and Defendant does not contest, that since the mid-1960's, "All applications for retirement and widow's benefits" have contained a statement that the applicant was applying for "all insurance benefits payable under Title II of the Social Security Act." (Plaintiff's amended memorandum, p. 5).
In these circumstances, the cause must be remanded for, at a minimum, a recitation and greater elaboration by the ALJ as to the record factual basis for his dispositive factual finding that the claimant in her 1976 application "limited the scope of the application" to WIB "benefits only." (See generally, Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
Upon remand, each party should also be given the opportunity to present further evidence on the subject issue. If the 1976 application and/or 1977 award letter are available, those documents should be presented in evidence.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment and for Remand are granted insofar as a remand is requested. The case is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Plaintiff's conclusory request for reassignment to a different Administrative Law Judge, respectfully, is denied.