Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 16-0411
06-08-2017
DWAYNE L., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.L., Appellees.
COUNSEL David W. Bell, Mesa Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By JoAnn Falgout Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS18337
The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL David W. Bell, Mesa
Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By JoAnn Falgout
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Acting Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. BROWN, Chief Judge:
The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
¶1 Dwayne L. ("Father") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his child, A.L. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Father is the biological father of A.L., born in July 2013. In June 2015, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") took A.L. into care in response to allegations that the child's mother had neglected her by leaving her alone "with the dog to watch after her." Father's whereabouts were not known to DCS at the time of removal and A.L. was placed with her maternal grandparents.
¶3 In February 2016, A.L.'s guardian ad litem filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, alleging Father had abandoned the child. The guardian ad litem later filed an amended petition adding the grounds of abuse to child, and six and nine months' time-in-care. At the severance hearing in September 2016, Father testified his most recent contact with A.L. was around April or May 2015, and he had not given her financial support since June 2015. He also acknowledged he never contacted DCS despite being told by the maternal grandmother that he would need to do so to be able to visit A.L. Father further admitted to using methamphetamine in 2015, being placed on probation as a result of a drug paraphernalia charge, and using methamphetamine again in 2016, within six months preceding the severance hearing. The DCS caseworker also testified, stating that Father had failed to take a urinalysis test DCS required.
¶4 The juvenile court issued a ruling terminating Father's parental rights to the child on the grounds of six and nine months' time-in-care, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 8-533(B)(8)(a) and (b), and on the ground of abandonment, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Father's only argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because DCS failed to make diligent efforts to provide him with appropriate and timely reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). Father does not challenge the court's finding that Father abandoned A.L., nor does he contest the court's best interests finding.
¶6 On this record, Father's argument fails because the diligent efforts requirement applies only to the six and nine months' time-in-care grounds, not the abandonment ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). The juvenile court is not statutorily required to find DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services when granting severance based on abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1); see e.g., Toni W. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 61, 64, ¶ 9 (App. 1999) (recognizing the legislature amended § 8-533(B) to remove the requirement that services be provided before termination on the ground of abandonment); Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510, ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (recognizing that "neither § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided reunification services before the court may terminate the parent's rights on the ground of abandonment").
We need not address whether a constitutional basis exists for inferring a diligent efforts requirement here because Father has not made that argument. See Toni W., 196 Ariz. at 65-66, ¶¶ 13-15. --------
¶7 Because Father has not challenged the court's findings as to the abandonment ground, he has waived any argument that the court erred in terminating his parental rights on that basis. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011) (recognizing that the failure to develop an argument on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver of the issue); s ee also Crystal E. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, ___, ¶¶ 5-6 (stating it is "generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant"). Therefore, because only one statutory ground for severance is required, we affirm the juvenile court's ruling terminating Father's parental rights. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (requiring "[e]vidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship" of "any one of the" statutory grounds enumerated); see also Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) ("If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.").
CONCLUSION
¶8 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Father's rights to A.L. based on abandonment.