Opinion
B233954
12-21-2011
In re G. P., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. Y. P., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Eva E. Chick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Y. P. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brian V. Andrew Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK54943)
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Marilyn Kading Martinez, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Eva E. Chick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Y. P.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brian V.
Andrew Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Y. P. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughters G. P. (born April 2003), Ruby V. (born December 2006), and Jane V. (born April 2008.) Mother also challenges the juvenile courts order terminating visits with G. and Ruby and the denial of her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking to reinstate visitation and family reunification. Appellant Brian V. (father), the father of Ruby and Jane, appeals the order terminating his parental rights to those children.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Gigi's father, Jesus A., is not a party to this appeal.
We affirm the juvenile court's orders.
BACKGROUND
1. Detention and section 300 petition
Mother and father were arrested on June 18, 2009, after police officers searched their home and recovered cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and two digital scales. Both parents had previous narcotics-related arrests, as well as a history with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department).
A petition had been sustained against mother in 2004 for physical abuse and neglect of G., resulting in G.'s removal from her custody for approximately two years. G. was eventually returned to mother's care and jurisdiction terminated.
Father had an unsubstantiated allegation against him of sexually abusing G. in 2005. In addition, father had a petition sustained against him in 1998 for endangering another son, Bryan because father had been selling drugs out of the home in which the child resided. Father failed to reunify with Bryan.
At the time of mother's and father's June 2009 arrest, six-year-old G. told a Department social worker that mother smoked "funny cigarettes" that "smell[ed] bad." Four days later, G. told the social worker that mother and father fought and hit each other; that both parents hit the children, and that father "hits us really hard."
The Department removed the children from the home and filed a section 300 petition alleging that both parents placed the children at risk by selling drugs from the home and keeping large quantities of drugs within access of the children. The petition further alleged that mother and father engaged in domestic violence, that father physically abused the children by striking them with a belt and with his hands, that G. was a victim of prior abuse by mother's former boyfriend, and that mother abused marijuana and failed to protect her children from abuse. At the detention hearing held on June 23, 2009, the juvenile court ordered the children detained and accorded the parents monitored visits.
In July 2009, the Department reported that the parents were participating in one-hour monitored visits with the children two times a week.
In October 2009, G. told the social worker that she had seen father sell "white stuff" in plastic bags to his friends. She also said that father touched her in a sexual manner while bathing her and that she often overhead mother and father having sexual relations. A subsequent examination of G. found no evidence of sexual abuse; however, G. was acting out sexually at school and with her siblings. In response to G.'s disclosures, the Department filed an amended petition adding allegations of sexual abuse, exposing the children to sexual conduct, and drug trafficking.
2. Jurisdiction and disposition
In January 2010, the Department reported that mother had tested positive for marijuana four times and failed to appear for testing once. Father had tested positive for marijuana five times and failed to test twice. Both parents had completed a parenting class and were regularly attending weekly monitored visits with the children.
On February 8, 2010, mother and father pleaded no contest to an amended petition that alleged domestic violence, excessive physical discipline of the children, and exposing the children to drug use and drug sales transactions. The juvenile court sustained the amended petition and accorded mother reunification services, including random drug testing and a drug program if mother missed a test or tested positive, domestic violence counseling, parenting education, and individual counseling. No reunification services were granted to father.
3. Review proceedings
In August 2010, the Department reported that mother was attending weekly monitored visits with the children. During the visits, mother appeared to favor Ruby and Jane, and had little interaction with G. This caused G. to feel sad and to express anger toward her siblings.
Mother had attended six sessions of a domestic violence program and had recently enrolled in individual counseling. She had four positive drug tests and four missed tests.
At an August 9, 2010 hearing, the juvenile court found that mother was in minimal compliance with her case plan and that there was no evidence that she was making progress. The court noted that mother was testing positive for drugs and missing drug tests but had failed to enroll in a treatment program, and that her visits with the children were lacking in quality. The court then terminated mother's reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
4. Section 366.26 proceedings
In November 2010, the Department reported that the children had had no contact with father because he was incarcerated. Mother had visited consistently with the children but continued to favor Ruby and Jane and had little interaction with G. G. appeared sad when mother favored the younger children.
All three children had become emotionally stable, pleasant, and active children in the home of their caregivers, who were willing to become legal guardians for the children but who did not wish to adopt them. The Department asked the juvenile court for a continuance so that an adoptive placement could be located, and the court continued the matter to February 2011.
In February 2011, the Department reported that despite its efforts to find an adoptive placement, none had yet been found. The Department also advised the juvenile court that the children's therapists had expressed concerns about visits with mother, who continued to favor Ruby and Jane over G. Mother also purportedly made false promises to the children, telling them they were going to live with their grandmother. The visits with mother left the children upset and confused, and the Department recommended terminating mother's visits. The children had had no contact with father, who was still incarcerated.
At a February 24, 2011 hearing, mother's attorney advised the juvenile court that mother disagreed with the Department's description of her visits with the children. The children's attorney requested that the court confirm the therapists' concerns before terminating mother's visits. The juvenile court ordered that the existing visitation schedule remain in effect and continued the matter to June.
On March 8, 2011, mother filed a request that the court order more regular visitation with the children, as mother's last visit had occurred on January 27, 2011. In response, the Department submitted letters from G.'s and Ruby's therapists stating that continued visits with mother would be detrimental to the girls' progress in treatment.
The letter from G.'s therapist stated that she had been working with G. in individual and group therapy during the past year. During the course of treatment, G. had expressed distress about her visits with mother, stating that mother's behavior during the visits caused her to feel sad and angry. In addition, mother's attempts to continue G.'s contact with father through letters caused G. anxiety that father might attempt to contact her. G.'s therapist opined that continued visits with mother would be detrimental to G.'s progress in treatment.
Ruby's therapist stated in her letter that Ruby had been in treatment with her since April 2010. Although the child had been making consistent progress, she had regressed during the past four months, exhibiting aggressive behavior toward her peers and having frequent tantrums at school and at home. Ruby's therapist concluded that visits with mother were detrimental to the child's progress in therapy.
At a March 11, 2011 hearing on mother's request, mother told the juvenile court that she had visited with the children only two times in December 2010 and twice in January 2011. The court ordered the Department to ensure that mother received two visits per month and to file a report addressing the Department's efforts to facilitate mother's visits.
On April 5, 2011, mother filed a second request for more regular visitation, stating that she had still received no visits with the children. The juvenile court set mother's request for a hearing to be held on April 21, 2011.
On the day of the hearing, the Department filed a report documenting its efforts to facilitate mother's visits. The report stated that the Department had contacted the children on February 2, March 15, March 28, and April 4, 2011, in an effort to arrange visits, but G. and Ruby had consistently refused to visit with mother. G. had said that she never wanted to see mother again because mother hurt her and made her feel bad. On March 28, 2011, the Department's social worker arranged to speak separately with each of the three children. The social worker asked each child whether she wanted to visit with mother. G. and Ruby both refused. Jane would not respond. On April 12, 2011, the social worker arrived at the caregiver's home to transport the children to a scheduled visit with mother, but the children refused to go. The Department's report also informed the court that the children had been placed with prospective adoptive parents on March 23,
2011.
Mother was present with counsel at the April 21, 2011 hearing on her visitation request. The juvenile court stated at the outset of the hearing that the matter was on calendar for receipt of the Department's progress report and whether to discontinue mother's visits. After hearing argument from the parties, the juvenile court found that in light of G.'s and Ruby's repeated, consistent, and sincere statements that they did not want to see mother, further visits would be detrimental to them. The court then ordered that G. and Ruby have no further contact with mother. The court ordered continued visitation between mother and Jane.
5. Section 388 petition and section 366.26 hearing
On June 2, 2011, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting visitation with G. and Ruby, additional reunification services, and continuation of the section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, mother alleged she had significantly complied with her court ordered case plan by meaningfully participating in individual counseling since January 2010, attending a substance abuse program since March 2011, and attending 14 parenting classes and 21 anger management classes. Mother further alleged that she and Jane shared a significant bond, that G. and Ruby had lived with her for a significant part of their lives, and that it was in the children's best interest to reunify with her.
In support of her petition, mother submitted letters from her therapist, from the facilitator of her parent education and anger management programs, and from her substance abuse program. The letter from mother's therapist stated that mother had participated in six sessions of couples therapy and was continuing to participate in individual therapy. The letter further stated that mother now lived with her own mother and stepfather, who provided her with stability and daily support. Mother's therapist stated that mother realized the poor choices she had made and that she was now focused on regaining family reunification and visitation with the children. The letter from mother's program facilitator stated that mother was progressing acceptably in her programs but that she needed to work on more consistent attendance, as she had missed 10 parent education classes and 7 anger management sessions. The letter from mother's substance abuse program, dated May 31, 2011, stated that mother had been attending individual and group sessions since March 8, 2011.
The Department's June 2011, section 366.26 report informed the juvenile court that an adoptive home study had been approved for Mr. and Mrs. H., with whom the children had been placed for the past two months. Mr. and Mrs. H. had adopted special-needs children in the past, had experience and training in dealing with children who had suffered from abuse, and were committed to adopting G., Ruby, and Jane. The children were doing well in the H.s' home and had expressed their desire to remain there. G. had formed a bond with the H.'s daughter, who was close to her in age.
At the June 2, 2011 hearing, the juvenile court denied mother's request for a hearing on her section 388 petition. The court noted that mother's petition showed she had only recently enrolled in programs that she had been ordered to complete two years ago and that her participation in those programs was inconsistent at best. The juvenile court found that mother was only beginning to address the issues that had brought her children under the court's jurisdiction and that her requests were not in the children's best interest.
The court then turned to the section 366.26 issues and found that neither parent was entitled to a contested hearing. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were likely to be adopted and no evidence that it would be detrimental to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court then terminated the parental rights of both mother and father. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Visitation Orders
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her visitation with G. and Ruby during the period after her reunification services were terminated and before the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. Mother claims the denial of visitation was a violation of her due process rights and precluded her from establishing the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B).
We deny the Department's motion to dismiss mother's appeal of the juvenile court's order terminating her visits with G. and Ruby.
Mother relies on section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A) and case law applying that statute to support her position. That statute addresses visitation as an element of reunification services and is inapplicable here because mother's reunification services had already been terminated when the juvenile court ordered no further visits between mother and the two older children.
Section 362.1 provides in part: "(a) In order to maintain ties between the parent or guardian and any siblings and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent or guardian, . . . any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall provide as follows: [¶] (1)(A) Subject to paragraph (B), for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. [¶] (B) No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. . . ."
The applicable statute, section 366.21, subdivision (h), requires the court to permit ongoing visitation between a parent and child during the period between termination of family reunification services and the section 366.26 hearing unless the court finds such visits would be detrimental to the child. Section 366.21, subdivision (h) provides in pertinent part: "In any case in which the court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held, it shall also order the termination of reunification services to the parent or legal guardian. The court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child."
Ensuring that ongoing visitation occurs pending the section 366.26 hearing serves two purposes. First, ongoing visitation protects the parent's substantive due process rights by affording them a mechanism to avoid termination of parental rights. A parent who can show that circumstances have changed since services were terminated and that it would be in the child's best interest to reinstate reunification services can file a section 388 petition seeking relief before the section 366.26 hearing takes place. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).) When ruling on a section 388 petition, one of the factors the court considers is the strength of the parent-child bond. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447.) If visitation is denied after reunification services have been terminated, any parent-child bond is likely to weaken and a parent would have greater difficulty demonstrating that the reunification order should be changed.
Second, as mother notes, ongoing visitation is essential to establishing the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) If visitation is denied, it is a foregone conclusion that the parent will be unable to establish the exception. (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504-1505.)
In the instant case, the juvenile court terminated mother's visits with G. and Ruby only after the court made the requisite finding that continuing the visits would be detrimental to the children. Substantial evidence supports that finding. There was evidence that mother behaved inappropriately during her visits with the children, crying, making false promises that the children were going to live with their grandmother, and favoring the younger children over G. Mother's behavior caused the children to be angry, anxious, and confused. As a result, G. and Ruby repeatedly refused to attend visits with mother and told the Department's social worker that they did not want to see mother because she lied to them and made them feel bad. G.'s and Ruby's therapists submitted letters stating that mother's visits were detrimental to the girls' progress in treatment. The juvenile court's order terminating mother's visits was not an abuse of discretion.
II. Section 388 Petition
Section 388 provides in relevant part: "Any parent . . . [of] a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . ." To obtain the requested modification, the parent must demonstrate both a change of circumstance or new evidence, and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e), (f); In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47 (Casey D.).) The parent bears the burden of proving the requested modification should be granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h); In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).)
To obtain an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, the petitioner must plead facts sufficient for a prima facie showing that (1) the circumstances have changed since the prior juvenile court order, and (2) the proposed modification will be in the best interests of the child. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310; In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.) In determining whether the petition has made a prima facie showing that modification of the prior order is in the child's best interests, it is important to consider the stage of the dependency proceedings. "After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) "[S]uch presumption obviously applies with even greater strength when the permanent plan is adoption rather than foster care." (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) We cannot reverse a summary denial of an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition unless the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, i.e., it was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 805; see Stephanie M., at p. 316.)
In summarily denying mother's section 388 petition the juvenile court found that mother had only begun to address the issues that had brought her children under the court's jurisdiction. Mother had only recently enrolled in programs she had been ordered to complete nearly two years ago, and her participation in those programs was inconsistent, at best. Mother's petition showed, at most, that her circumstances were changing rather than changed. A petition that alleges "merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if [the] parent . . . might be able to reunify" with the child at some future point does not promote stability or the child and the child's best interests. (Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) The record discloses no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court.
III. Termination of Parental Rights
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides for the termination of parental rights if family reunification services have been terminated and the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted. Once reunification services have been terminated, '"[f]amily preservation ceases to be of overriding concern . . . the focus shifts from the parent's interest in reunification to the child's interest in permanency and stability. [Citations.]'" (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. [Citations.]" (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).)
A. Adoptability
As a prerequisite to terminating parental rights under section 366.26, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the children are likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) "In determining adoptability, the focus is on whether a child's age, physical condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing to adopt. [Citations.] To be considered adoptable, a minor need not be in a prospective adoptive home and there need not be a prospective adoptive parent '"waiting in the wings."' [Citation.] Nevertheless, 'the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor's age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.' [Citation.]" (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 491.)
There are two alternative methods of demonstrating adoptability. "General adoptability" is demonstrated when an agency proves that a child's personal characteristics are sufficiently appealing that it is likely an adoptive family will be located for the child in a reasonable time, regardless of whether a prospective adoptive family has yet been found. "Specific adoptability" refers to an agency's demonstration that it has located a committed adoptive family for a child whose adoptability is otherwise in question, most often because the child is part of a sibling group, has a physical or mental disability requiring a high level of care, or is relatively old. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(3).) When a prospective adoptive family has been found for such a child, the child is found likely to be adopted, not in the abstract, but because that specific adoptive family has committed to adoption. (See, e.g., In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060-1061 (Carl R.); In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650 (Sarah M.).)
Because specific adoptability depends upon a successful adoption by the designated prospective adoptive family, the judicial inquiry must, to a limited degree, include that family. "When a child is deemed adoptable only because a particular caretaker is willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any legal impediment[] to the prospective adoptive parent's adoption and whether he or she is able to meet the needs of the child. [Citation.]" (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80.) This limited inquiry into the characteristics of the prospective adoptive family is necessary because a demonstration that the family is legally prevented from adopting or is incapable of caring for a child with special needs would preclude a finding of adoptability. (See, e.g., Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1061-1062; Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.) Even in these situations, however, the inquiry must be balanced against the concern that "[i]f an inquiry into the suitability of prospective adoptive parents were permitted at the section 366.26 hearing, many hearings would degenerate into subjective attacks on those prospective adoptive parents--a result not envisioned by the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Those types of inquiries might also discourage people from seeking to adopt, a result that would contravene the strong public policy favoring adoption." (Carl R., at pp. 1061-1062.)
The legal impediments to adoption are those set forth in Family Code sections 8601, 8602, and 8603. (In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552.) Mother did not argue in the proceedings below nor does she contend in this appeal that there are any legal impediments to adoption.
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It is important to note that the law does not require a juvenile court to find a dependent child "generally adoptable" or "specifically adoptable" before terminating parental rights. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) All that is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406.)
We review the juvenile court's finding of adoptability for substantial evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the juvenile court's order. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.)
The record shows that the children were placed in the home of prospective adoptive parents who were committed to adopting all three of them. The prospective adoptive parents had experience and training in caring for children who were victims of abuse. There was no evidence of any legal impediment to the adoption. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the children were adoptable.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
Although the statutory preference is in favor of adoption, section 366.26 lists certain exceptions that may preclude termination of parental rights, if the juvenile court finds "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The exception relevant to the instant case provides as follows: "The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The parent bears the burden of proving that this exception applies. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952-954.) "[T]he exception does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.)
For the exception to apply, the parent must have maintained regular visitation with the child, and the juvenile court must determine that the parent/child relationship "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) A parent must establish more than merely some benefit to the child by continuing the parent/child relationship. That relationship must be "a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed" if the relationship were severed. (Ibid.) To overcome the benefits associated with a stable, adoptive family, the parent seeking to continue a relationship with the child must prove that severing the relationship will cause not merely some harm, but great harm to the child. (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.)
Factors that the juvenile court should consider when determining the applicability of the exception include "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs . . . ." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
We review the juvenile court's ruling on whether an exception applies to terminating parental rights pursuant to section 366.26 for substantial evidence. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.) Under this standard, an appellate court must affirm the juvenile court's order if there is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the order (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080), and the evidence must be considered "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. [Citations.]" (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Mother failed to meet her burden of establishing that the beneficial parent/child relationship exception to terminating parental rights applied in this case. There was no evidence of a substantial, positive emotional attachment between mother and the children. To the contrary, there was evidence that G. and Ruby clearly and consistently expressed their preference to avoid all contact with mother. The interaction between mother and her two older children had a patently negative effect on the children.
Mother contends she maintained regular visits with Jane, that she shared a beneficial bond with her youngest child, and that there was no evidence that her relationship with any of the children, particularly with Jane, was merely that of a "friendly visitor," "playmate," or "family friend." Mother bore the burden of establishing that she and the children shared a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the children would be "greatly harmed" if that relationship were severed. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 575; In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 952-954.) There was no evidence that such an attachment existed between mother and any of the children. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that the exception to terminating parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders denying mother's section 388 petition and terminating mother's and father's parental rights are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
___________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
We concur:
___________________________, P. J.
BOREN
___________________________, J.
DOI TODD