Opinion
B233633
01-24-2012
In re CAMERON S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SUZANNE S., Defendant and Appellant.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK60070)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Donna Levin, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Suzanne S. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. She contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child exception to termination. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree and affirm.
All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One-month-old Cameron S. was detained in June 2009 when the police executed a search warrant at the house where Mother lived and found drugs, drug paraphernalia and weapons. Mother had a history of drug abuse, and her parental rights to her three older children had been terminated due to her drug abuse.
Although Mother initially made progress with her reunification program, she ultimately relapsed and tested positive for drugs. At the conclusion of the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
On March 4, 2011, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) reported that Cameron had been placed with a prospective adoptive family in September 2010. The family had an approved home study and wanted to adopt Cameron. The children's social worker (CSW) had "observed Cameron relate to the caregivers as his parents."
DCFS further reported that as of March 2010, Mother was visiting Cameron several times a week. The "visits were of high quality," and Mother "was appropriate and appeared to be caring and interacting well with Cameron." Mother was arrested in July 2010 and remained incarcerated until September 2010. Thereafter, she resumed visiting with Cameron on a weekly basis.
On May 6, 2011, DCFS reported that in November 2010, the court had ordered visitation to occur a minimum of once per month. Since that time, Mother had visited Cameron once a month. The CSW noted that during these visits, "Cameron responds to [Mother] as he would to any other casual person in his life. While the visits go well and Cameron appears to enjoy the visits, his relationship to [Mother] is not that of a child to a parent. Cameron is a sociable child who likes to play and have fun. [The CSW] when he visits with the child, often plays games with Cameron and the minor appears to have a fun time. This is very much the same as when [M]other visits."
Mother testified that when she visited with Cameron, they ate lunch or a snack together. She brought toys, and they would play together. Cameron "loves bubbles so we play with a lot of bubbles." When she previously visited with him several times a week, they went to the park. She pushed him on the swings or she played patty-cake with him to help him with his motor skills. Cameron called her "Mommy."
Mother testified that she was devastated when she learned that DCFS was recommending termination of her parental rights "[b]ecause I love my son more than anything. And I feel that for a year and a half, I did everything and complied with everything that was asked of me. And maybe I made a few mistake[s] along the way, but I am only human, but that doesn't mean that I don't deserve to have my child."
The juvenile court found no exception to termination of parental rights existed. It observed that Mother never received liberalized visitation because she did not complete her case plan or follow the court's orders. The court acknowledged that Mother "did visit [Cameron]. However, visiting the child and playing with the child one time per month, certainly is not acting in a parental role, and throughout the history of this case, the mother has never acted in the parental role. She's never had custody of the child and she has never had more than monitored visits." The court therefore terminated Mother's parental rights.
DISCUSSION
On appeal from an order pursuant to section 366.26 terminating parental rights, the question is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527; see In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Here, Mother claims the order is not supported by substantial evidence, because the evidence showed Cameron loved her and would suffer detriment if their relationship were severed. We disagree.
Once the proceedings reach a selection and implementation hearing, the legislative preference for adoption over legal guardianship or long-term foster care must be heeded unless, under one of the enumerated statutory exceptions, termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(A).) The first exception arises when the parent has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
At this point in the proceedings, "'. . . the goal of the proceedings changes from reunifying the family to locating a permanent home for the child apart from the parent.' [Citation.] The permanency planning hearing aims 'to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker.' [Citation.] The abiding principle at the permanency planning hearing is the welfare and best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (In re Jason E. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548.) As a consequence, regular visitation alone does not meet the requirements of the parental relationship exception to the preference for adoption. What is necessary is a strong and substantial relationship.
The parent seeking to avoid adoption bears the burden of demonstrating "that there exists 'a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.'" (In re Jason E., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1548.) "[T]he parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child . . . ." (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527; accord, Jason E., supra, at pp. 1548-1549.)
In other words, the parent must show that "severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed . . . . [¶] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult's attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.]" (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) Among the factors the court examines in determining whether the exception applies are "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs . . . ." (Autumn H., supra, at pp. 575-576.)
Here, Cameron was taken from Mother's custody when he was only one month old. After that, Mother never played a parental role in his life. She visited with him regularly, played with him, and ate with him. The interaction between Mother and Cameron was positive, and he enjoyed the visits, but that is not enough to support a finding that he would suffer detriment if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527; In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
Mother testified about how much she loved Cameron and deserved to have him in her custody, but her testimony did not establish that he would suffer if he could not maintain his relationship with her. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that Mother did not meet her burden of demonstrating "that there exists 'a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent'" (In re Jason E., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1548) such that he would be greatly harmed if her parental rights were terminated (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575).
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
JACKSON, J. We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
ZELON, J.