Opinion
B229740
10-31-2011
In re M.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.W. et al., Objectors and Appellants.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant, LW. Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant, T.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK83231)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Terry Truong, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant, LW.
Kimberly A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant, T.M.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objectors and Appellants M.W. et al.
Office of the County Counsel, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, while objector and appellant L.W. (mother) was inside the house attending to her infant son, her 20-month old daughter drowned in the family swimming pool. The juvenile court entered a jurisdiction order over mother's eight other children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and, in the subsequent disposition order, removed five of the younger children from mother's custody. Mother and her children appeal from the jurisdiction and disposition orders on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support those orders. Alleged father T.M. separately appeals from the disposition order arguing that it does not reflect the juvenile court's finding that he is not an alleged father of any of mother's children.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
We hold that there was substantial evidence to support both the jurisdiction and disposition orders as they relate to mother and the children. We further hold that because the juvenile court did not make the nonpaternity finding asserted by T.M., T.M. is not entitled to the relief he seeks. We therefore affirm the jurisdiction and disposition orders in their entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the core issues on appeal are whether there was sufficient evidence that mother's neglect caused M.W.'s drowning and that the neglect created a current risk of injury to the children, we limit the factual statement to the facts relevant to those issues.
At the time of the drowning incident, mother had nine children: Monique, B.S., K.W., Courtney, Brittany, R.W., Janice, M.W—the drowning victim—and Michael. The children ranged in age from 16-years to seven-months old. Mother and the children lived with mother's great grandfather, Samuel.
On July 14, 2010, a children's social worker (CSW) for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received an "immediate referral" alleging that 20-month hold M.W. was the victim of neglect by mother and that the other children were at risk of neglect. The CSW went to the City of Pomona Police Department and was briefed by Sergeant Baker who informed the CSW that the police dispatcher received a telephone call on the evening of July 14, 2010, reporting that a child had fallen into the family swimming pool and was not breathing. Sergeant Baker and other officers responded to the home two minutes later and paramedics arrived five minutes after the officers. Attempts to resuscitate the child, M.W., were unsuccessful, and she was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced dead.
Sergeant Baker reported to the CSW that three of the family's older children were swimming in the family's pool and M.W. was standing on the pool deck near the shallow end. Mother was watching the children, but left to attend to her youngest child who was crying in one of the bedrooms. According to Sergeant Baker, mother explained that one of the children told her that M.W. had fallen into the pool and was not breathing. Mother ran out to the pool, brought M.W. inside the home, and called 911.
Three City of Pomona police officers, Officer Pinkosky, Detective Bebon, and Detective Lange, interviewed mother on the evening of the incident. According to Officer Pinkosky's report, when officers arrived on the scene, M.W. was lying face down in the dining room with mother kneeling next to her. Eight other minors lived at the residence, but the oldest sibling was at a friend's house when the incident occurred. Officer Pinkosky, one of the first officers to respond to the scene, told mother to roll M.W. on her back. M.W. was not breathing, had no pulse, and had a "white liquid bubbly substance coming from her mouth." Officer Pinkosky and another officer began CPR, but initially they were unable to open M.W.'s airway. Officer Pinkosky cleared the airway and initiated CPR. Paramedics then arrived and continued the efforts to revive M.W.
Detectives Bebon and Lange reported the following information obtained during their follow-up interviews with mother. Mother informed the detectives that she had nine children and provided the children's names and ages. According to mother, at around 4:00 p.m. on the day of the incident, she laid Janice, M.W., and Michael down for a nap. At 6:00 p.m., Courtney, B.S., and Brittany decided to go swimming. As the three girls were playing in the pool, mother observed M.W. walking toward the pool. Because mother knew M.W. was afraid of the pool, she did not believe M.W. would go into the pool. But mother then saw M.W. sit down next to the pool stairs and splash her feet in the pool. Mother was sitting in the living room using the computer, which faced away from the pool area. When mother heard Michael wake up crying, she told K.W., who was not swimming, to "look out," which in mother's view meant to look towards the pool for M.W. Mother then went to her room to change Michael's diaper. Mother estimated that she had been in her room attending to Michael for five to 10 minutes when K.W. told her M.W. had fallen into the pool and was not breathing. Mother went to the pool area and saw M.W. lying on her back just inside the pool gate. Mother observed what looked like "chlorine granules" on M.W.'s hand and a "white foamy froth" around her mouth.
Mother picked M.W. up and took her to the kitchen sink where she used her finger and water to wipe off the white foam. While she was doing that, she called 911 and reported that her one-year old daughter had eaten part of a chlorine tablet. The 911 operator advised mother to lay M.W. on her back and perform CPR. Mother had taken some CPR courses several years earlier, so she attempted to perform CPR on M.W. M.W. was not breathing and mother could smell the odor of chlorine on her. Mother laid M.W. on her stomach and the police and paramedics arrived.
Upon further questioning by the detectives, mother explained that she could see the pool from where she was seated at the computer because one of the blankets used as a drape was pulled aside so she could see outside into the backyard and pool area. According to Detective Lange, however, based on where mother was seated, she could not see the deep end of the pool and could only have done so by walking up to the glass door and looking south or by walking into the backyard.
Mother also stated, contrary to her initial description of the incident, that M.W. never entered the pool; instead she stood on the side throwing rings to her sister Brittany. When Detective Bebon asked mother whether she specifically instructed the older girls swimming in the pool to watch M.W. while she was wandering around the pool, mother replied in the negative. Mother told the detectives she did not think about who was watching the children in the pool and that, in retrospect, she should have told one of the older girls to watch M.W. Detective Lange noted that B.S., Courtney, and Brittany were swimming in the deep end of the pool without any adult supervision. He decided to make a request that the district attorney's office consider filing charges against mother for violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a).
Penal Code section 273 a, subdivision (a) provides: "Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four, or six years."
Detective Bebon interviewed mother's great grandfather, Samuel, at the family's residence. Samuel owned the residence and lived there with mother and her nine children. At the time of the incident, he was in the kitchen cutting lemons to make lemonade for the children. Samuel's hearing seemed impaired, but his vision was good. Samuel had no idea where the children were at the time of the incident because he was not watching them. He knew the older girls were swimming and, at some point, one of them came into the house to alert mother. He did not hear what was said and indicated that the incident "just happened so fast."
Detective Bebon also interviewed B.S., Courtney, and Brittany. According to B.S., the oldest of the three girls, on the day of the incident she went swimming with Brittany and Courtney. They were in the deep end of the pool playing a game in which they would dive to the bottom of the pool to retrieve colored plastic rings. B.S. saw M.W. come out of the house once, but thought she had gone back inside the house. B.S. continued playing in the pool and was not watching M.W. A short time later, B.S. saw clothes floating in the shallow end of the pool, so she "swam down" to the clothes and realized it was M.W. M.W. was in the water, face up, in the shallow end near the stairs. M.W. was not moving and had "white stuff on her nose." B.S. took M.W. out of the pool and placed her on the concrete outside the pool fence by the sliding door. B.S. then called mother who came outside. Mother asked what happened, and B.S. said she found M.W. in the pool and had taken her out. B.S. pointed to the "white stuff on M.W.'s nose, and mother said it was chlorine. Mother took M.W. into the house. Mother removed M.W.'s clothes and called 911. Police and fire department personnel arrived, and M.W. was taken away in an ambulance. B.S. informed Detective Bebon that she sometimes watched her younger brother and sisters with her great grandfather or older sister Monique.
Courtney told the detective that on the day of the incident, she was swimming with B.S. and Brittany. They were in the deep end of the pool playing games. She heard B.S. yell, but did not know why. She saw M.W. in the pool in the shallow end floating face up. B.S. took M.W. out of the pool and mother came out of the house. Mother took M.W. into the house.
Brittany told the detective that on the day of the incident, she was swimming with B.S. and Courtney. They were playing in the deep end, finding rings. B.S. saw M.W. in the shallow end and removed her from the pool. B.S. pushed M.W.'s stomach to determine if M.W. was breathing. As Brittany was standing with M.W. next to B.S., mother came out of the house and told them to call an ambulance. M.W. had "white stuff coming out of her nose.
On July 19, 2010, DCFS filed a petition under section 300 alleging mother had failed to provide adequate supervision for her children, including M.W., while the children were at the family's swimming pool, resulting in M.W. drowning under the care and supervision of mother. DCFS also alleged that mother's negligence created a risk of harm to mother's other children. The juvenile court found at the July 19, 2010, detention hearing that DCFS had established a prima facie case for detaining the minors and showing that they were persons described by section 300. Nevertheless, the juvenile court released the children to mother. On July 22, 2010, however, DCFS filed an ex parte application for an order removing custody of the children from mother. At the hearing on that application, the juvenile court found that continued placement of the children in mother's home was contrary to the children's welfare and entered an order removing the children from mother.
Prior to the jurisdiction hearing, a CSW conducted further interviews with the children and obtained the following additional information. When asked who usually watched the children when they swam, the oldest child, Monique, stated that her "mom usually [sat] in the living room and open[ed] the curtains so she [could] watch [the children]." B.S. was asked the same question, and she stated that "[n]o one was watching [the children;] . . . [her] mom was in the house while [they] were swimming . . . [but her] mom would come out to check on [them]." K.W. informed the CSW that her "mom usually watche[d the children while they swam]." Courtney advised that her "mom was in the house [while the children were swimming on the day of the incident] . . . [but] nobody watche[d them while they swam]." Brittany similarly explained that her "mom stayed in the house while [they] were swimming. [The children would] swim by [themselves]. No one watche[d them]."
At the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court admitted the detention report, two last minute information reports, and the jurisdiction/disposition report. After hearing argument, the juvenile court dismissed the allegations against mother in paragraph a-1 of the section 300 petition, but sustained the allegations in paragraphs b-1, f-1 and
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found, inter alia, that a substantial danger existed to the physical health of K.W., Brittany, R.W., Janice, and Michael and that there were no reasonable means to protect those children without removal from mother's custody. Monique, B.S., and Courtney were placed in mother's custody. The other five children, however, were removed from mother's custody. The juvenile court ordered unmonitored visitation for mother with K.W. and Brittany, but ordered monitored visits with R.W., Janice, and Michael. Mother and the eight children filed notices of appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders. Alleged father T.M. also filed an appeal asserting that he is not the father of any of mother's children and that the minutes should be corrected to reflect his status.
DISCUSSION
A Substantial Evidence in Support of Jurisdictional Findings
Mother and the children contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true findings on paragraphs b-1, f-1, and j-1 of the petition. According to mother and the children, because M.W.'s drowning was an unavoidable accident and a one-time occurrence, there was insufficient evidence to show that mother caused M.W.'s death or that the children would be currently at risk in mother's care.
The jurisdictional allegations in paragraphs b-1, f-1, and j-1 are identically worded as follows: "On 07/14/2010, the children Monique [W., B.S., K.W., Courtney, Brittany, R.W., Janice, and Michael's mother, L.W.] established a detrimental and endangering home environment for the children and the children's now deceased one-year old sibling, M.W. . . . , in that the mother failed to provide appropriate parental supervision for the children and the children's sibling while the children and the children's sibling were at the family's swimming pool resulting in the sibling drowning while in the care and supervision of the mother. Such a detrimental and endangering home environment established for the children by the mother and the mother's failure to provide appropriate parental supervision of the children and the children's deceased sibling endangers the children's physical and emotional health, safety and well-being, creates a detrimental home environment and places the children at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, danger and death." Thus, although the section 300 petition alleges as to mother three separate statutory bases for jurisdiction over her children, each of those jurisdictional bases arises from the same set of operative facts.
It is well established that if a section 300 petition alleges multiple grounds for jurisdiction, an appellate court will uphold a finding of jurisdiction if any one of those allegations is supported by substantial evidence. "When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence. (Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 ; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876 .)" (In re Alexis (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Thus, if the allegations in paragraph b-1—neglect of a child causing injury and the risk of future injury—are supported by substantial evidence, we do not need to reach mother's or the children's contentions as to paragraphs f-1 and
Mother and the children contend that we should decide whether paragraph f-1 was supported by substantial evidence, even if we determine that paragraph b-1 was sufficiently supported. They claim that mother will be prejudiced if the allegations in paragraph f-1, which were not supported by the evidence, are not dismissed. We disagree. As noted, paragraphs b-1, f-1, and j-1 are identically worded. Because we conclude below that the allegations in paragraph b-1 were supported by substantial evidence, the findings on that paragraph will be a matter of record regardless of whether paragraph f-1 is dismissed. Moreover, as to paragraph f-1, the juvenile court made it clear that it was not finding mother criminally liable but rather was finding her negligent under the civil standard, a finding of negligence that is identical to the finding in b-1. As a result, there is no potential that the findings on paragraph f-1 will affect mother's rights in future proceedings because those findings are identical to the findings on b-1. Thus, mother will not be prejudiced if we do not reach her contentions on paragraph f-1.
"Section 300, subdivision (b) allows a dependency where '[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.' The Agency 'has the burden of showing specifically how [the child has] been or will be harmed.' (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 .) This must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) On appeal, the jurisdictional findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (Id. at p. 1319.) We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order. (Cf. In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547 .) '[T]he question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.' (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 , italics omitted.) '[P]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions' if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue. (Ibid.)" (In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461-462.)
"'"When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence, that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citation.] In making this determination, all conflicts [in the evidence and in reasonable inferences from the evidence] are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. [Citation.]"' [Citation.] While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences that are the result of speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding. [Citation.]" (In re Precious D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1258-1259.)
Here, there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings under paragraph b-1 that mother's lack of proper supervision caused M.W.'s death and that mother's neglect in that regard created a current risk of injury to the other children. The evidence showed that mother, who was inside the house using the computer while the three older girls swam in the deep end of the pool, allowed 20-month old M.W. to not only walk near the pool unattended and unsupervised by an adult, but that she also allowed that toddler to sit on the edge of the pool and splash her feet in the water without supervision. Then, knowing M.W.'s whereabouts and precarious situation, mother ignored the obvious risk to M.W. and went to change Michael's diaper. By her own admission, mother was in a bedroom where she could not observe M.W. or the pool for between five and 10 minutes. Moreover, although mother claimed she told K.W., who was inside the house, to "look out," she conceded that she did not "think about who was watching M.W." and did not specifically instruct any of the three older girls in the pool, including 12-year old B.S., to supervise M.W. during mother's absence. That evidence supported a reasonable inference that mother was negligent—i.e., she failed to exercise reasonable care in the face of a known and substantial risk—and that her negligence was a substantial factor in M.W.'s drowning—i.e., but for mother's neglect of her duty of care toward her children, M.W. would not have drowned.
The evidence also supported a reasonable inference that mother's failure to recognize and appreciate the danger to children posed by the pool created a risk of injury to her children. The facts concerning M.W.'s drowning describe a situation in which mother was well aware of M.W.'s proximity to the pool and that the toddler was actually playing in the pool at its edge. Notwithstanding that knowledge, mother left M.W. unsupervised in that dangerous circumstance for as long as 10 minutes. Thus, this is not a case in which a toddler who is not otherwise at risk of injury escapes a mother's attention for a minute or two, and falls into a swimming pool. This is a case where mother knew precisely where M.W. was—in a dangerous situation—but nevertheless ignored the child and the imminent risk for a substantial period of time. Those facts suggest that mother forgot about her 20-month old daughter M.W. due to the competing demands on her time created by the needs of M.W.'s younger sibling. In addition, on the day of the incident, mother allowed the three older girls to swim in the deep end of the pool unsupervised while she used a computer inside the house at a location where she could not see the deep end; and both Courtney and Brittany told a CSW that no one watched the children while they swam in the pool, a fact that supports an inference that mother's negligent conduct and inability to appreciate the risks associated with the pool were not isolated to a single incident, but rather were part of a continuing course of negligent conduct. It was therefore reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude the mother's children were currently at risk of suffering similar harm under her care. In view of our conclusion, we do not need to reach the contention as to the precise meaning and application of section 300, subdivision (f) [basis of jurisdiction includes, "the child's parent or guardian caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect"].
B. Substantial Evidence in Support of Removal and Visitation Orders
Mother and the children also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the disposition order removing five of the children from mother's custody. According to mother and the children, because mother had received services and counseling since the incident and had learned from her one, isolated mistake, there would be no substantial risk to the children if they were returned to her care. In addition, the children contend that the order requiring monitored visitation by mother with the three youngest children was an abuse of discretion.
"After the juvenile court finds a child to be within its jurisdiction, the court must conduct a dispositional hearing. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court [(1993)] 5 Cal.4th [242,] 248.) At the dispositional hearing, the court must decide where the child will live while under the court's supervision. (In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 .) [¶] A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent. (In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52, 60 .) 'The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.' (In re Diamond H. [(2000)] 82 Cal.App.4th [1127,] 1136.) The court may consider a parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances. (In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900 .) [¶] Before the court issues a removal order, it must find the child's welfare requires removal because of a substantial danger, or risk of danger, to the child's physical health if he or she is returned home, and there are no reasonable alternatives to protect the child. (In re Kristin H. [(1996)] 46 Cal.App.4th [1635,] 1654; § 361, subd. (c)(1).) There must be clear and convincing evidence that removal is the only way to protect the child. (See, e.g., Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 248.) [¶] Whether the conditions in the home present a risk of harm to the child is a factual issue. Again, we apply the substantial evidence test. (In re Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1654.)" (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169-170.)
As discussed above, the evidence established that mother ignored a known and substantial risk to one of her youngest children and left that toddler unsupervised in that situation for as long as 10 minutes. Moreover, on the day of the incident mother allowed the three older girls to swim in the deep end of the pool unsupervised while she used the computer at a location from which she could not see the deep end; and both Courtney and Brittany informed a CSW that nobody watched the children while they swam. That evidence suggested that mother did not fully appreciate the risks to her children, and in particular to her younger children, posed by the family's pool. Moreover, it also suggested that if mother had difficulty recognizing and preventing such an obvious and substantial risk of harm, she may also fail to appreciate other similar risks. Indeed, there is some evidence, including mother's own observations, that M.W. may also have been poisoned by ingesting a chlorine tablet. While that aspect of the incident was not confirmed by medical evidence and did not form the basis of the jurisdictional findings, it bolsters a reasonable inference that the younger children were at risk of harm in mother's care and custody. Such past negligent conduct raises an inference that the negligence will continue. Therefore, the removal order was supported by substantial evidence and the order requiring monitored visits was not an abuse of discretion.
C. T.M.'s Appeal
Alleged father T.M. contends that during the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found that he was not an alleged father, but that the minute order for that hearing does not reflect that finding. According to father, because the minute order omitted the nonpaternity finding, it is also inaccurate in several other respects.
T.M.'s argument is based upon the following exchange between his counsel and the juvenile court: "[Father's Counsel]: Your Honor, since my client has now been struck from the petition, or dismissed, he has—I spoke with him this morning. He is asking—since he is neither alleged, biological, or presumed, he wants nothing else to do with this court. This court, I believe, has no jurisdiction over him at this time. He does not have a child within the court's jurisdictional authority, and I'm asking to be relieved.
The Court: He was found to be an alleged father previously. That's all he's going to remain at this point. [¶] [Father's Counsel]: Well, at this point, since there's no reunification and he's not seeking any custodial interest in this child—he's not even asking for notice; he wants nothing—he would like the court to strike him in the entirety. The Court: All right. Thank you."
The record does not demonstrate that the juvenile court agreed with T.M.'s counsel's arguments or made an order finding that T.M. was not an alleged father. To the contrary, the record reflects that T.M. had previously been found to be an alleged father and the juvenile court confirmed that he was going to remain an alleged father. And the juvenile court was correct in this regard because T.M. was required to comply with the requirements of section 316.2 before he could obtain a determination of nonpaternity.
"'"In dependency proceedings, 'fathers' are divided into four categories—natural [or biological], presumed, alleged, and de facto." [Citation.] A biological father is one whose paternity is established, but who does not qualify as a presumed father.' (In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 .) 'A man who may be the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established, or, in the alternative, has not achieved presumed father status, is an "alleged" father.' (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 862 P.2d 751] (Zacharia D.); see In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715 (Joseph G.) ['alleged biological father' is 'a man who may be the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established'].) [¶] . . . [¶] 'Due process for an alleged father requires only that he be given notice and an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status, in accordance with procedures set out in section 316.2. [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Under section 316.2, subdivision (b), if after the juvenile court inquiry one or more men are identified as alleged fathers, each alleged father is to be provided notice of the dependency proceedings and that the proceedings could result in the termination of parental rights and adoption of the child. The notice is to include the JV-505 form, which gives the alleged father the opportunity to decline to participate in the proceedings, ask the court for blood or DNA testing to determine if he is the biological father of the child, request that the court enter a judgment of parentage, or ask the court to find him the presumed father of the child. (§ 316.2, subd. (b);[In re] Kobe A. [(2007)] 146 Cal.App.4th [1113,] 1120.)" (In re J. H. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 635, 644-645, italics added.)
Because T.M. did not file a JV-505 form as required under section 316.2, subdivision (b), the juvenile court could not and did not make a paternity decision at the disposition hearing. Because T.M.'s appeal is predicated on the flawed assertion that the juvenile court made such a nonpaternity finding, his appeal lacks merit.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MOSK, J. We concur:
TURNER, P. J.
KRIEGLER, J.